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Mr Michael Organ,
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Dear Sir,
Upon re-reading a section of my doctoral thesis "McTaggart's
Theory Of The Determining Correspondence Of Substance And The Unity
Of The Universe" [Department of Philosophy, 1994] I noticed an error
which was originally undetected by myself, and remained undetected by
my supervisor and the examiners of the thesis. The error occurs on
page 214, lines 20-21, Section 28.
If, as a matter of fact, our knowledge of some entity is
inferred from our knowledge of some other entity, then we may
say that our knowledge of the former is epistemic&lly prior to
our knowledge of the latter.
In this sentence, the order of the words "former" and "latter" is
incorrect. The sentence should read:
If, as a matter of fact, our knowledge of some entity is
inferred from our knowledge of some other entity, then we may
say that our knowledge of the latter is epistemically prior to
our knowledge of the former.
Although the error is ostensibly minor, it significantly affects
the soundness of the argument in subsequent sections. I would
appreciate it, therefore, if you could either correct the original
version, or else append this letter and/or the attached note to the
thesis.
Yours sincerely,

ERRATA

P.214, line 20: For "former" read "latter”.
P.214, line 21: For "latter" read "former".
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ABSTRACT
This work

is a study

in Metaphysics, based

upon a critical

examination of the central themes in Volume 1 of McTaggart's The
Nature Of Existence. Metaphysics, in general, I have defined as being
the study of the most general characteristics of all existents, and
of existence or the Universe as a whole. Within the general subject
of Metaphysics there are two principal divisions, Ontology and
Cosmology. Ontology is the study of the most general characteristics
of all existents, and Cosmology is the study of the way in which, if
at all, these existents are comprised by a genuine whole or unity. In
the Introduction I argue that Metaphysics is essentially an a priori
study; and, that attempts to found it upon a broadly empirical or
inductive method are unacceptable.
The most general principles of classification within Ontology I
have called the categories of existence. Upon the assumption that
something exists we are, I maintain, entitled to conclude that there
are four basic categories of existence. The categories are Substance,
Quality, Relation, and Unity. The validity of these categories is
defended in Chapters 1 and 2.
In Chapter 3 I defend the view that substance is infinitely
divisible; hence that there is a plurality of substances, each, in
turn, comprising an infinite number of parts. I also defend the view,
which is sometimes known as the principle of the Dissimilarity of the
Diverse, that substance is differentiated by its nature.

In Chapter 4 I discuss McTaggart's distinction between Intrinsic
and Extrinsic Determination, and argue that Intrinsic Determination
is best conceived as a relation of existent implication. The nature
of the laws of existence, and the principle of Universal Determinism,
are discussed within this context.
The assumption that substance is infinitely divisible can be shown
to imply a number of contradictions. In Chapter 5 I discuss the
nature of these contradictions. McTaggart has argued that these
contradictions can only be avoided if certain conditions are met. The
theory of the Determining Correspondence of Substance claims to
satisfy these conditions. In Chapter 6 I discuss the theory, and
defend it against some criticisms.
The validity of the theory of Determining Correspondence allows us
to draw some conclusions about the kinds of unity which the Universe
displays. Specifically, I argue that we are entitled to conclude that
the Universe is a self-re fleeting unity. In the final chapter I
consider the nature of such a unity in relation to some more familiar
kinds of unity. I also consider some of the empirical conclusions
which might be drawn from the assumption that the Universe is a unity
of this kind.
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INTRODUCTION

Subject—Matter Ariel Method

1. In the preface to his book Mind and Matter, G.F. Stout
suggested that philosophy has two parts.

The first consists in an analysis of ordinary Experience in
order to find a coherent account of the principles involved in
it. The second is concerned with the ultimate nature of the
all-inclusive Universe of Being. It considers whether the
Universe, besides being all-inclusive, is properly regarded as
a self-complete unity rather than as an endless series or
aggregate. If it is a unity, the question arises as to the
nature of the unity, and this leads to the problem of the
distinction and relation of the world of becoming and finite
existence to eternal Being.1

These two parts are said to correspond roughly to Kant's Analytic
and Dialectic respectively. CD. Broad has suggested that a similar
distinction be drawn between Critical and Speculative Philosophy2;
and, under various titles, such a distinction has been more or less
explicitly acknowledged by many philosophers. The second of these
divisions I shall call Metaphysics; and in doing so I do not believe
that I am making any significant departure from what has been
traditionally understood by that term.
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This work is, in the above sense, a study in Metaphysics. It is an
attempt, based upon a critical study of J.E. McTaggart's The Nature

Of Existence, to arrive at some conclusions about the ultimate nature
of the Universe and the way in which, if at all, it can be said to be
a unity.

2. But what are we talking about when we talk about the Universe?
A universe, according to McTaggart3, is to be defined as being either
a substance which contains al 1 existent content or a substance of
which all other substances are parts. He then points out that, since
it is impossible for two or more substances to each contain all
existent content, it is impossible for there to be more than one
universe. The description, "a substance which contains all existent
content", is therefore an exclusive description - i.e. a description
which applies to one and only one entity. If there is a universe,
then there is, and can be, only one universe; and so we may
understand the description to be a description of the universe, or
the Universe.

3. Does the Universe exist? In one sense the answer to this
question seems obvious. The denial of the existence of the Universe
would, it appears, amount to an avowal of Nihilism - and the avowal
of such a doctrine, it is evident, amounts to a refutation of that
doctrine. But the Universe, thus understood, is simply a name for the
aggregate of all existents; and it is clear that if there is more
than one existent, then there must be an aggregate of existents hence the Universe exists.
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But in another sense the existence of the Universe is quite
problematic*. It is by no means uncontentious to assert that the
categories of Substance and Content, which feature in McTaggart's
definition, are applicable to the existent; and it is questionable
whether the part/whole relation is, in the manner proposed by
McTaggart, applicable to the aggregate of all existents. In order to
establish that there is a universe, in McTaggart's sense, it is
necessary to argue, firstly, that the primary or fundamental
existents are substances; and, secondly, that these existent entities
make up a particular kind of unity.
Accordingly, we may draw a distinction between the Universe
insofar as it is an aggregate of all existents, and the Universe
insofar as it is a unity of all existents. The Universe, considered
as a unity of all existents, I shall call the Cosmos, and the study
of the kind of unity which its constituents form, Cosmology1. It is
clear, however, that it is impossible to determine the kind of unity
displayed by the Universe without determining the general
characteristics of the existents which make it up. The study of the
general characteristics of the existents which make up the Universe I
shall call Ontology.
Metaphysics can thus be said to have two parts, Cosmology and
Ontology. Although distinct, they are not mutually independent fields
of study. Conclusions reached about the general characteristics of
all existents, for example, will inevitably determine the way in
which, if at all, such entities form a genuine unity or Cosmos. And
since the Universe itself is assumed to be an existent entity, any
genuine ontological knowledge may also be Cosmological knowledge.
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4. Having briefly indicated the subject-matter of our study we may
now consider the most appropriate method of obtaining knowledge of
this subject-matter.
In Chapter 3 of The Nature Of Existence McTaggart discusses the
question of the correct method of obtaining knowledge in Metaphysics.
He begins by stating the aims of such a study. They are, firstly, to
consider what can be determined about the general characteristics of
all existents; and, secondly, to consider what can be determined
about the characteristics of existence or the Universe as a whole.
The first is clearly the aim of Ontology, and the second that of
Cosmology - as I have defined these studies. McTaggart then argues
that metaphysical knowledge cannot, in the first instance, rest upon
inductive inferences. But before considering the reasons why he
believed that metaphysical knowledge cannot rest upon inductive
inferences we should, I think, briefly consider the other possible
means of obtaining such knowledge.

5. It would appear that cosmological knowledge cannot be obtained
merely by perception*. Perception ostensibly provides us with
knowledge of only a limited number of particular existents and their
characteristics. The Universe, as a whole, is not generally
considered to be a possible object of perception - except, perhaps,
to God, should He exist. But to finite minds, ostensibly limited in
their perceptual fields, such knowledge would appear to be
impossible7.
It would also appear that perception alone cannot provide us with
ontological knowledge, since the number of existents with which we
are acquainted in perception is ostensibly limited in comparison with
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the indefinite, and arguably infinite, number of existents which make
up the Universe. Perception might provide us with knowledge of some
of the characteristics of some existents; but it cannot alone, it
would seem, provide us with knowledge of the general characteristics
of all existents.

6. Perception alone, then, cannot ostensibly provide us with
either cosmological or ontological knowledge. It would appear that
such knowledge must be obtained by some other mode of cognition. Now
it is, I think, universally accepted that there are at most two
distinct general modes of cognition. The first is the intuitive or
perceptual mode, which I have mentioned above. The second is the
discursive or rational mode. The latter differs from the former in
that knowledge obtained by its use does not necessarily involve
direct acquaintance with the object of that knowledge - although it
may be based upon knowledge which is obtained by such acquaintance in
the intuitive or perceptual mode.
If cosmological and ontological knowledge is possible it must,
then, be obtained by means of discursive cognition. Now discursive
cognition may be divided into two modes - inferential and noninferential. Non-inferential discursive cognition includes beliefs or
judgements which are not based upon further beliefs or judgements.
Most true perceptual beliefs, for example, are instances of noninferential discursive cognition. The same can be said of most
beliefs involving self-evident propositions. Inferential discursive
cognition, on the other hand, includes beliefs or judgements which
are based either upon non-inferential beliefs or upon other
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inferential beliefs, and which are reached by a process of inference
or reasoning.
Inferential discursive cognition can itself be further divided
into beliefs which are reached by a process of inductive inference,
and beliefs which are reached by a process of deductive inference.

7. Of the various modes of discursive cognition which, if any,
might provide us with metaphysical knowledge?
Such knowledge can, I believe, be obtained by means of noninferential discursive cognition. Although non-inferential discursive
cognition based upon perception cannot directly provide us with
knowledge about all existents or about existence as a whole, it may
provide us with knowledge about one or more existents; and from this
knowledge we may infer certain conclusions about all existents or
about existence as a whole. McTaggart's assertion that something
exists8 is, I suggest, an example of a non-inferential belief, based
upon perception, which may indirectly provide us with genuine
metaphysical knowledge.
The other mode of non-inferential discursive cognition, involving
the awareness of self-evident propositions, can also, I believe,
provide us with genuine metaphysical knowledge. The belief that no
existent can, at the same time and in the same respect, unite
contrary characteristics, is, I suggest, an example of a noninferential discursive cognition involving a self-evident
proposition, which provides us with genuine metaphysical knowledge.
It is a belief which is not based upon any further belief; and,
although confirmed by, it is not based upon, perception. It is an
example of cosmological knowledge, since it tells us something about
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existence as a whole. And it is an example of ontological knowledge
since it tells us something about all existents.

8. It is not clear, however, that both modes of inferential
discursive cognition can provide us with metaphysical knowledge. In
Sections 41 to 44, and in Sections 244 to 271, of The Nature Of
Existence, McTaggart provides us with what are, I believe, conclusive
reasons for believing that genuine metaphysical knowledge cannot be
obtained by means of inductive reasoning.
There are according to McTaggart, two general reasons why
inductive reasoning cannot provide us with metaphysical knowledge.
The first is that the validity of inductive inferences is not selfevident. Any validity they may have is dependent upon the knowledge
that all existents, as well as existence as a whole, have certain
characteristics which guarantee the validity of inductive inferences.
And it is clear that we cannot prove that all existents, and
existence as a whole, have these characteristics by means of
inductive reasoning without involving ourselves in a vicious circle.
What these characteristics might be, and whether, assuming that the
Universe does have these characteristics, we are even then justified
in accepting inductive inferences as valid, are questions which I
will consider in Section 10.

9. The second reason which McTaggart gives for believing that
inductive reasoning cannot provide us with metaphysical knowledge is
that, even if such reasoning could be shown to be valid, it is
nonetheless incapable, by its very nature, of providing us with such
knowledge. In the first place, it is incapable of providing us with
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cosmological knowledge, since induction essentially involves the
initial observation that some members of a class of entities share a
characteristic which is other than the characteristic which
determines the fact that they are members of that particular class.
But the Universe, or existence as a whole, is not, as we have seen, a
member of a class of entities each of which is a universe or
existence as a whole. Hence the initial step in any inductive
inference cannot, in this case, be carried out. We cannot,
accordingly, obtain any cosmological knowledge by this method.
In the second place, insofar as inductive reasoning provides us
with conclusions which are probable, rather than certain, it is
incapable of providing us with ontological knowledge - since the
probability of the truth of any conclusion about the general
characteristics of all existents reached by such a method would be so
small as to render the inference invalid. Any ontological conclusions
reached by means of inductive inference will vary in their
probability of being true in accordance with the ratio between the
field of observation and the field of inference. Now the number of
observed existents is ostensibly finite. On the other hand, the
number of existents is indefinitely, and, as McTaggart subsequently
argues, infinitely, larger than the number of observed existents. The
field of observation is thus an infinitely small proportion of the
field of inference; and the probability of the truth of any inferred
conclusion about the general characteristics of all existents will
accordingly be infinitely small - so small as to render the inference
invalid.
It is true, as McTaggart acknowledges, that the probability of the
truth of inductively inferred conclusions does not vary only in
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accordance with the ratio between the field of observation and the
field of inference. But where the probability of the truth of such
inferences does increase independently of this ratio it is on the
basis of prior knowledge of some general characteristic or
characteristics of the members of the field of inference. And it is
clear, for the reason outlined in the previous paragraph, that such
prior knowledge concerning all existents cannot be obtained by
inductive reasoning alone. If ontological conclusions reached by
inductive inference are to have any significant degree of
probability, then that probability must be based upon prior
ontological knowledge obtained by some other mode of cognition. Now
there are, I have suggested, only two modes of cognition which can
provide us with such prior knowledge - non-inferential discursive
cognition involving the awareness of self-evident propositions, and
deductive inferential discursive cognition. I will now consider
whether such modes of cognition can provide us with the kind of
knowledge which will justify the use of inductive reasoning in
Metaphysics.

10. It is generally admitted that a necessary, if not a sufficient
condition for the validity of inductive reasoning is the truth of the
principle of the Uniformity of Nature'. What exactly this principle
amounts to is a matter of conjecture. It is sometimes understood to
mean that every event is caused by some other event in accordance
with a law. But it is clear that such a principle is less general
than, and depends for its validity upon, the principle that every
characteristic of every existent entity is determined, in accordance
with some law, by some other characteristic belonging to that or to
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some other entity. All instances of causality are understood to be
instances of laws, whereas it is not obviously the case that all
instances of laws are instances of causality. The principle of the
Uniformity of Nature will, then, be understood to mean that every
characteristic of every existent entity is determined, in accordance
with some law, by some other characteristic.
It is generally admitted that the principle of the Uniformity of
Nature is necessary for inductive reasoning to be valid. But it is
also generally admitted that such a principle cannot, without
circularity, be established by inductive reasoning. There are, then,
two questions we must ask ourselves: (i) Can this principle be
established by some other mode of cognition?; and (ii) Would such a
principle, even if true, provide us with a sufficient condition for
the validity of inductive reasoning in Metaphysics? I will consider
each of these questions in turn.

11. The claim that every characteristic of every existent entity
is determined, in accordance with some general law, by some other
characteristic, should, at the outset, be distinguished from the
claim that every such characteristic is determined by some other
characteristic. The distinction is important, especially in view of
McTaggart's subsequent distinction between the principles of
Intrinsic and Extrinsic determination10. The view that every
characteristic of every existent is determined, in accordance with
some general law, by some other characteristic, I shall call
Nomological Determinism. The view that every characteristic is
determined by some other characteristic of the existent - although
not in accordance with some general law - I shall call Anomalous
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Determinism. The relevance of this distinction for the present
discussion is that even if we could show that Anomalous Determinism
is true, this would not provide us with a basis for believing that
inductive reasoning is valid. Inductive reasoning essentially
involves an inference from the premiss that a number of entities have
been observed in which certain characteristics, say X and Y, have
been conjoined, to the conclusion that anything which has the
characteristic X has the characteristic Y; that is to say, to the
conclusion that a relation of intrinsic determination exists between
X and Y. The principle of the Uniformity of Nature will, then, be
understood to be equivalent to the principle of Nomological
Determinism.
Can the principle of Nomological Determinism be established by
means of either non-inferential discursive cognition or deductiveinferential cognition? I do not see that this is possible. In the
first place it cannot be accorded the status of a self-evident
principle. There is plainly no absurdity or self-contradiction
involved in the assumption that there might be some existent
qualities which are not determined by other qualities in accordance
with general laws. And the existence of characteristics which are
essentially unique or item-specific undermines any claim that the
principle might be self-evident11. On the other hand, the principle
of the Uniformity of Nature has often been understood to mean that
every event has a cause - where causation is understood to be a
species of general law. And it is sometimes maintained that such a
principle is self-evident. But the principle of Universal Causation,
thus understood, is not equivalent to the principle of Nomological
Determinism, since it is possible that every event is determined by
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some other event in accordance with some general law without it being
the case that every characteristic of those events is determined, in
accordance with some general law, by some other characteristic. The
principle of Universal Causation is, of course, consistent with the
principle of Nomological Determinism. But the two principles are not
equivalent. Nor is the latter implied by the former. And it is the
latter which is required to establish the validity of inductive
reasoning.
The fact that the principle of Nomological Determinism is not
self-evident does not, however, imply that there are no general laws
which are self-evident. When I judge, upon the awareness of
particular instances of red, yellow, and orange, that the qualitative
difference between red and yellow is greater than that between red
and orange, I implicitly assert that this relationship holds of all
instances of red, yellow, and orange. In one sense it might be argued
that such a process of inference from the observation of particular
instances to the existence of a general law is a process of inductive
inference. W.E. Johnson, from whom the example is borrowed, called
such a process Intuitive Induction11. The use of the term
"induction" to describe such a process is, however, somewhat
misleading, since it is clear that what guarantees the validity of
such inferences is the awareness of a relation of intrinsic
determination among the characteristics involved. Now the awareness
of this relation might be dependent upon the awareness of the
instances of the qualities involved in the sense that I could not
have known of the existence of such a relation had I not been aware
of the particular instances of the qualities. But this does not mean
that the validity of the general law involved is established by the
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awareness of particular instances. In other words, the validity of
the law is established independently of the way in which the law is
discovered. And unless we could know, independently of any inductive
inference, that such a law was valid, any attempt to establish its
validity by induction would prove to be circular.
Whether the awareness of the relation of intrinsic determination
among such characteristics should be called a priori or empirical is,
perhaps, a matter of convention. It is clear that such a relation is
not among the impressions derived from the senses; we do not perceive
such a relation in the sense that we perceive the particular
instances of red, yellow, and orange. And if the claim that something
is discovered empirically means that it is contingent, then such an
awareness of intrinsic determination cannot be considered to be
empirical. For these reasons I believe that it is preferable to say
that such awareness is a priori, and that the awareness of selfevident general laws is a matter of a priori insight or intuition.
Even though some qualities of the existent are known to be related
to other qualities of the existent in accordance with general laws,
this does not imply that all qualities are so related. Now it is
obvious that any attempt to establish the principle of Nomological
Determinism by induction from the premisses that some qualities of
the existent are known to be related to other qualities in accordance
with general laws will ultimately be circular; and I don't see how
this principle can be deduced from any other principle which is selfevident.

12. The fact that we are unable to demonstrate the truth of the
principle of Nomological Determinism does not, of course, imply that
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it is false. I maintain, however, that even if we assume that the
principle is true, it would not guarantee the validity of inductive
inferences.
In the first place, it is evident that the validity of an
inductive inference to the existence of a general law is dependent
upon the assumption that such a law is not known, and is not capable
of being known, a priori. I do not see any reason to doubt that this
condition might be fulfilled; and McTaggart has claimed13 that this
condition is, in fact, guaranteed by the principle of Determining
Correspondence. But even if this condition is satisfied we are still
not in a position to guarantee the validity of inductive inferences.
Let us assume that we have observed one hundred occurrences of the
characteristic X in which it is accompanied by the characteristic Y.
We wish to conclude, on the basis of this information1*, that X is
related to Y in accordance with some general law. Is such an
inference valid? Now we know - or at least we have assumed - that
every quality of the existent is related, in accordance with some
general law, with some other quality of the existent. And we do not
know a priori that X is related to Y in accordance with some general
law. Are we, then, entitled to draw the conclusion that X is related
to Y in accordance with some general law on the basis of this
information alone? Clearly, we cannot draw this conclusion. Firstly,
it is always possible that the connection between X and Y is
contingent. The principle of Nomological Determinism states that
every characteristic of the existent is related, in accordance with
some general law, with some other characteristic of the existent. It
does not state that every characteristic of the existent is related,
in accordance with some general law, with every characteristic of the
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existent. And yet, without this latter principle, it is clear that
our inference would be invalid.
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, insofar as the connection
between X and Y might be contingent, it is always possible that the
occurrence of X is always determined by some characteristic, W, and
that the occurrence of Y is always determined by some characteristic,
Z - where W and Z are both unobserved, and unrelated to each other in
accordance with some general law. Again, any inference to the
existence of a general law relating X and Y would be invalid.

13. It has been claimed that, even though inductive inferences are
not strictly valid, they are nonetheless rational, in the sense that
their validity is presupposed in the most fundamental human
activities. The claim that induction, though not strictly valid, is
rational, is, however, somewhat ambiguous, and it has been used to
support various conclusions.
It has been suggested, for example, that unless we accept some
inductive inferences as valid, we could not be sure that the sun will
rise tomorrow, or that beheading someone will cause their death. But
what such examples show is not that induction is rational, but that a
belief in the validity of induction is prudent. I should distinguish
prudence from rationality in the following way. Let us assume that,
after several years of study, we come to the conclusion that there is
no sound philosophical reason to believe that there is a supreme
deity. Let us also assume that there are very good philosophical
reasons for believing that God could not exist. But we know that a
belief in the existence of God is a prerequisite for eternal life,
should eternal life be possible and desirable. I should say, in this

16
case, that although it is not rational to believe that God exists, it
is nonetheless prudent to do so, since the consequences of failing to
believe that He exists, if He does exist, would be quite disastrous
for our future well-being. A belief in the validity of induction is,
I suggest, prudent in the same sense that a belief in the existence
of God would be prudent. But neither belief is rational because they
cannot be supported by any sound philosophical argument. In any case,
it is not generally argued that all inductive inferences are
rational, only that some are. And the fact that inferences of the
kind mentioned above are accepted as rational does not imply that
inductive inferences in Metaphysics are rational, since a belief in
the validity of such inferences is not, in general, essential to the
conduct of everyday life.
It has also been suggested that a belief in the validity of
inductive inferences is rational in the sense that the conclusions of
such arguments, though not certain, are nonetheless probable; and a
number of ingenious attempts have been made to formulate a theory of
probability which will accommodate inductive inferences. There are,
however, two obvious reasons why such theories cannot help us in
determining the probability of ontological conclusions reached by
induction. Firstly, such theories almost invariably presuppose that
the field of inference is finite, and that the field of observation
is a "fair sample" of the field of inference. But in the case of
ontology, the field of inference is indefinite, and arguably
infinite; and we can never be sure that the number of observed
existents provides us with a fair sample of that field. Secondly,
unless we have some antecedent knowledge concerning the incidence of
general laws among the characteristics of all existents it is
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impossible to assign any real probability to ontological conclusions
reached by induction. And we have seen that even the principle of
Nomological Determinism is inadequate to provide us with a prima
facie case for believing that the regular conjunction of certain
characteristics is evidence for the conclusion that such a
conjunction is an instance of a general law.

14. The claim that a belief in the validity of induction is
rational has recently been used to support a rather unusual
conclusion. In Chapter 4 of What Is A Law Of Nature?11, D.M.
Armstrong has employed a form of transcendental argument, involving
the premiss that we know that induction is rational, to prove that
there must be laws of nature; and, that these laws must be of a
particular nature. The claim to know that induction is rational is
supported in the following way.

We make inferences from the observed to the unobserved. Such
inferences are central to the conduct of life. It is notorious
among philosophers that these inferences are strictly invalid
and also that they are very difficult to formalize. Are they
nevertheless rational? In ordinary life we assume without
question that they are rational. Hume, however, denied that
they are rational. This constitutes his inductive scepticism.
Inductive scepticism is one of those sceptical theses that
question part of the bed-rock of our beliefs....It is this bedrock of beliefs which G.E. Moore defended in his vindication of
commonsense....This central core has the characteristic that we
are much more certain of their truth than any of the
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philosophical arguments used to make us feel sceptical about
them. We think, or we should think, that it is more likely that
the arguments are unsound in some way (philosophy is very
difficult) than that the beliefs are false
It is to be noted also, as Hume has so conspicuously noted,
that a philosopher's denial of one of these fundamental beliefs
always involves him in a certain amount of mauvaise foi. He may
believe the sceptical theory, or, more likely, experience an
illusion of belief, while he is in his study. But in his
ordinary thinking and reasoning he will return to the
unsceptical belief which he has officially repudiated....
Now, of all our beliefs, the belief in the rationality of
our inferences to the unobserved has claims to be our most
basic belief of all. It is therefore a most serious
philosophical objection to a philosophical theory if it has
inductive scepticism as a consequence.16

Armstrong then argues that the best explanation for a belief in
the rationality of induction is that there are laws of nature which
involve a necessary connection between universal characteristics.
There are, however, a number of serious problems with this view.
Firstly, there is an unresolved ambiguity in the statement that
induction is rational. It might be understood to mean that a belief
in the validity of induction is a rational belief; and this is, I
suggest, the most natural and the most accurate analysis of the sort
of commonsense belief to which Armstrong appeals. What is implied in
our commonsense belief is, I suggest, the claim that when we make
inductive inferences, these inferences are rational in the sense that
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they can, in principle, be supported by sound philosophical argument;
and that they do, for the most part, lead us from true premisses, by
means of a valid logical principle, to true conclusions. But as we
have already seen, a philosophical justification for believing that
such inferences are valid is just what we lack, and what seems, in
principle, impossible to obtain.
On the other hand, the statement might be understood to mean that
a failure to accept the validity of inductive inferences would have
disastrous consequences for the conduct of our normal life. In that
case, however, the claim that induction is rational amounts to little
more than the claim that it is prudent to accept the validity of such
inferences. And if we accept the distinction between prudence and
rationality which I outlined in the previous section, it follows that
the sceptic can quite consistently deny the rationality of induction,
and yet still act as if such inferences are valid. There is no bad
faith involved in denying that a belief in the validity of induction
is rational whilst insisting that such a belief is nonetheless
prudent.
Secondly, there are those of us who remain unconvinced of the
cogency of Moore's defence of commonsense principles - in which case
the sort of argument used by Armstrong to defend the rationality of
induction is of dubious merit. It is undoubtedly true that we can
isolate a central core of beliefs which we would not readily abandon
in the face of a philosophical argument which professed to show that
they are false. But the fact that we have a core of such beliefs in
common does not imply that we have a common core of such beliefs. The
nature and number of the beliefs which make up a person's central
core is surely a contingent matter. The central core of beliefs
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belonging to a New Guinea tribesman will differ from that belonging
to a nuclear physicist. And it is doubtful whether a belief in the
rationality of induction figures prominently, if at all, in either.
This is not to say that neither acts as though he believed that
inductive inferences are valid; since it is consistent, as I have
argued above, to act on the belief that induction is valid without

thereby believing that this belief has a rational, as distinct from a
merely prudential, foundation. Furthermore, it is simply not true
that those beliefs which figure most prominently in our normal
conduct are held with the greatest conviction. I would be more
inclined, for example, to reject a philosophical argument which
implied that the areas bounded by a circle and a square are
commensurate, than one which implied that there are no bodies which

exist independently of their being perceived. And yet the belief that
there are bodies which exist independently of their being perceived
figures more prominently in my normal conduct than does the belief
that the areas bounded by a circle and a square are incommensurate.

15. Thirdly, even if we accept that a belief in the validity of
induction is rational, it does not follow that the best explanation
for the rationality of this belief is that there are laws of nature
of the kind described by Armstrong.
There are two essential features of Armstrong's theory of natural
laws which are relevant to our present discussion. The first is that
all such laws assert the existence of a dyadic universal relation
which relates two universal properties. These laws can be expressed
in the form N(F,G) - where N is a relation of necessitation, and F
and G are distinct properties. The second is that the relation N,
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though a relation of necessitation, as distinct from, say, a relation
of mere constant conjunction, is not a relation of logical necessity;
so that "It is always logically possible that the antecedent of a law
of nature should be instantiated, and yet that, because of the
presence of interfering factors, the consequent universal not be
instantiated."1'. This second feature is what we might call the
Contingency Thesis.
I maintain that such a theory of natural laws does not provide us
with a rational basis for believing that inductive inferences are
valid. My reasons for saying this are as follows.
Firstly, as I have argued in Section 12, the assumption that there
are general laws does not, in itself, guarantee the validity of
inductive inferences. We must also have some antecedent knowledge of
the relative incidence of such laws before we can even begin to
determine the probability that an observed conjunction of certain
characteristics is evidence of the existence of a law. Unfortunately,
Armstrong does not explicitly address himself to the question of the
relative incidence of general laws; and we have seen that even the
principle of Nomological Determinism is not sufficient to guarantee
the validity of an inductive inference to the existence of a general
law.
Secondly, any difficulties involved in determining whether an
observed conjunction of characteristics is evidence of the existence
of a general law are compounded by Armstrong's contingency thesis.
Let us assume that we have observed ninety-nine cases in which the
characteristic F is conjoined with the characteristic G. Let us also
assume that we have observed one case in which F was not found in
conjunction with G. Do our observations confirm or refute the
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hypothesis that F and G are related in accordance with a general law?
According to the view, advocated by McTaggart, that a general law
involves a relation of intrinsic determination between two or more
characteristics1', the fact that we have observed one case in which
F occurred without G conclusively refutes the hypothesis that they
are related in accordance with a general law1'. But this is not the
case with Armstrong's theory. The fact that we have observed one or
more cases in which F has occurred without G does not, according to
Armstrong, refute the hypothesis that they are related in accordance
with a general law. Of course, the fact that we have observed ninetynine cases in which they have been conjoined might seem to make the
hypothesis that they are related in accordance with a general law
more probable than the hypothesis that their connection is merely
contingent. But this would only be true if we could be sure that our
field of observation was a fair sample of the field of inference. And
in Ontology, as I have argued above, we can never be sure that our
field of observation is a fair sample of the field of inference.
But even if we assume that the field of observation is a fair
sample, our difficulties do not cease. Let us assume that we have
observed eighty cases in which F is conjoined with G, and twenty
cases where F is found alone; and that these observations provide us
with a fair sample. Is our inductive inference to the existence of a
general law relating F and G any more rational than the conclusion
that their conjunction is merely contingent? I do not see that
Armstrong's theory can provide us with any real solution to this
dilemma.
Thirdly, by introducing an element of contingency into the
connection between F and G, Armstrong has, it seems to me, undermined
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what he considers to be one of the chief advantages of a "necessity"
view of laws as opposed to a regularity view - according to which a
general law is simply the fact that certain characteristics are
constantly conjoined. On page 50 of What Is A Law Of Nature?, he
states the following two objections to the regularity, or Humean
uniformity, view of the status of laws of nature.

(1) Law statements (in many cases) do, and regularity
statements do not, support counterfactuals.
(2) In order that a law-statement should support a
counterfactual the law statement plus the fully stated
antecedent of the counterfactual must entail the
consequent of the counterfactual. "Furthermore, the
supposition of the truth of the antecedent of the
counterf actual must not be such as to bring into doubt
whether, in this new thought-situation this law continues
to hold. It is the necessity of the law which ensures the
truth of the counterfactual."n

Now, if there is an element of contingency in the relation between
the characteristics concerned, then law-statements such as N(F,G) do
not support counterfactuals, since, from the supposition that if
something, say x, were F, we cannot legitimately infer that it would
be G. We may infer that if X were F, as well as H,J,K, etc. - where
H,J,K, etc. are the additional qualities which x would need to have
to ensure the validity of the inference - then it would be G. But in
doing so we have removed the element of contingency, and replaced our
original law-statement with another, N'(L,G) - where I is a compound
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quality comprising F,E,Ktetc. , and N' is a relation of intrinsic
determination, i.e. of logical necessity.

16. On page 53 Armstrong attempts to resolve the ambiguity in his
initial claim that induction is rational. He firstly claims that it
is rational to postulate what best explains the phenomena - in this

case the observed regular conjunction of F and G. He then argues that
induction is rational because it is a case of an inference to the
best explanation - namely, that F and G are related in accordance
with a general law.
There are, however, two problems with this argument. In the first
place, the concept of rationality remains undefined. This might be
because the concept of rationality is a primitive, hence indefinable,
notion. But then to be told that induction is rational because

inference to the best explanation is rational is hardly enlightening.
On the other hand, when we are informed, on page 59, that inference
to the best explanation is part of what we mean by rationality, then
it seems that Armstrong's argument ultimately amounts to this:

(1) Induction, insofar as it is an inference to the best
explanation, is rational.
(2) Inference to the best explanation is rational because it
is part of what we mean by rationality.
Therefore,
(3) Induction is rational because it is part of what we mean
by rationality.
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This conclusion is, of course, a familiar defence of induction.
But it is a defence which Armstrong himself, on page 53, has
condemned as "utterly unsatisfying". And it is a defence which is
open to the obvious reply that it can hardly be rational to employ a
form of reasoning which can lead from true premisses to a false
conclusion".
The second problem with Armstrong's argument is that it is open to
the charge of begging the question22. Induction might be an
inference to the best explanation. But it only provides us with the
best explanation if it also provides us with the true explanation.
Let us assume, for example, that all observed F's are G's. We then
conclude, on the basis of this information, that all F's are G's where this universal statement is understood to be equivalent to the
statement of a general law of the form N(F,G), involving a relation
of necessary connection between the characteristics F and G. Is the
conclusion that F and G are related in accordance with a general law
the best explanation for the fact that all observed F's are G's? It
might be the best explanation in the sense that it is the most
intellectually satisfying. But it is not the best explanation if the
connection between F and G is, in fact, contingent. And it is hardly
an answer to the sceptic to argue that F and G must be related in
accordance with a general law because it is more satisfying,
intellectually, to believe that their connection is necessary rather
than contingent.

17. I have argued that Metaphysics cannot be based upon principles
of reasoning which are essentially empirical or inductive. This does
not necessarily mean that such principles are of no value if, after
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reaching certain general ontological and cosmological conclusions by
other methods, we attempt, on the basis of empirical considerations,
to arrive at more specific conclusions about the nature of the
Universe. But these principles cannot be used to establish the

metaphysical conclusions upon which the relevance and validity of any
empirical considerations are ultimately based.
In the next chapter we shall begin our metaphysical inquiry with

an attempt to determine the nature of the most fundamental principles
of classification within ontology.
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In Chapter 2 I shall argue that the common objections to the
existence of such characteristics are unsound.
12. W.E. Johnson, Logic, Part I, Chapter 8.
13. McTaggart, The Nature Of Existence, §268.
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CHARTER ONE
Tti.e Categories Of Existence

1. Any metaphysical inquiry must begin with the assumption that
something exists. The proposition "something exists" is not, however,
self-evident. And it is not, as Kant has argued1, a proposition which
is analytically true. Accordingly, it might be maintained that the
conclusions of any metaphysical inquiry must be conditional - they
might be true if anything exists, but the initial assumption that
something exists cannot itself be established by a metaphysical
theory. If it is true, its truth must be established independently of
that theory1.
Although the proposition "something exists" cannot be proven to be
true by discursive cognition alone, this does not imply that it
cannot be established by some other mode of cognition. And I think we
can agree with McTaggart3 that the truth of the proposition can be
established by perception. The belief that something exists is
founded upon the fact that something is perceived as existent. That
is to say, the perception of something as existent is evidence for
the perceptual belief that something exists. Now, although this
belief is not necessarily accompanied by the certainty which
accompanies the awareness of some self-evident propositions, it is
nonetheless almost certainly true; and we can be more certain of its
truth than we can of any other perceptual belief. This is
demonstrated by the fact that, even if a particular perceptual belief
is false, it nevertheless follows that the erroneous belief exists.
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So, even if the belief that a particular entity, x, exists, is false,
the belief that something exists will still be true, since the false
belief that x exists must itself exist. Hence, although we cannot

attach a great degree of certainty to the belief that some particular
entity exists, we can attach a great degree of certainty to the
belief that something exists.

2. The proposition "something exists" is not, however, without
ambiguity. McTaggart has attempted to resolve this ambiguity by

pointing out that "something" must, in this case, be understood to be
the most abstract and indeterminate term that we can get.

...if taken literally it is not indeterminate enough, for it
would mean, in that case, some thing. And, if we say of the
existent that it is a thing, in the ordinary sense of the word,
we are saying much more of it than simply that it exists. We
must take "something" here as perfectly indefinite - the
abstract subject of predication. The German etwas is less
misleading, though even this, at any rate in Hegel's use of it,
is too definite for our present purpose.'

Although McTaggart attempts to avoid the implicit introduction of
any particular ontological category into his analysis of the
proposition "something exists", I do not think he is entirely
successful. This is evident in his subsequent deduction of the
category of Quality, and his claim that existence is a quality.
If we assume that something exists, then, according to McTaggart,
we are entitled to draw two conclusions. The first is that existence
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is true of that something. The second is that what is true of

something is a quality of that something - hence that existence is
quality of the existent. But the initial conclusion is, I suggest,

one which we are not, strictly, entitled to draw. There is at least
one other analysis of the assumption which is consistent with the

view that existence is indefinable. It may be understood to mean t

some quality exists; and the claim that some quality exists need no

be understood to mean that existence is predicated of some quality
It may be understood, rather, to mean that something can be

predicated of, i.e. is true of, existence - in which case existenc

is understood to be the ultimate substantive of which all qualitie
are directly, or indirectly, predicated, without itself being a
quality, or true of, anything.
This analysis of the proposition "something exists" will still
allow us to derive the category of Quality from our initial
assumption; since we can agree with McTaggart5 that something must
true of the existent, and that this something is not, itself,
existence. We may then agree that what is "true of" something is a
quality of that something. This analysis has the advantage of
avoiding the charge of circularity which Broad has made against

McTaggart's attempt to show that the existent must have some quali

other than existence8. It also has the advantage of not implying th

existence is a quality or predicate; thereby avoiding the well-know

and, I believe, conclusive objections raised by Kant against such a
view. There are, I think, a number of other important advantages
which will emerge in subsequent discussion.
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3. If we accept the assumption that something exists, then,

according to McTaggart, we may conclude that something must be tru
of the existent other than its existence.
Apart from the implicit assumption that existence is a quality we

can, I believe, accept this conclusion. I agree with Broad7, and wi

A.E. Taylor", that this proposition is self-evident; and I conside
McTaggart's attempts to argue for the conclusion to be both

superfluous and unsound. The first of these arguments is that, unl
the existent has some quality other than existence, it would be a
"perfect and absolute blank". And to say that only this exists, is
according to McTaggart, equivalent to saying that nothing exists9.
This argument has rightly been criticised by Broad.

This seems to me to be false or circular. If it had any
characteristic at all, it would not be a perfect and absolute
blank; and, by hypothesis, it has the characteristic of being
existent. The only ground for saying that it would be a
"perfect and absolute blank" is the assumption that the absence
of all other characteristics entails the absence of the
characteristic of being an existent and so leaves no
characteristics at all. But this is exactly what the argument
set out to prove. So the argument is circular, since it can
prove its conclusion only by assuming it as one of its
premises.10

A slightly different argument, and one which might support

McTaggart's conclusion, is, that unless existence, qua substantive,

has some determinate nature or quality, it would be indistinguisha
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from nothing. Assuming that existence is identical with Being, thi
is essentially the argument which Hegel uses11 to derive the
category of Determinate Being (Dasein), and thence Quality, from

Being (.Sein). Unlike McTaggart, however, Hegel does not assume th

Being or existence is a quality. If he had made this assumption, h

argument, like McTaggart's, would have been circular. In this respe

Hegel's argument is certainly more cogent than McTaggart's; and it
is, I think, essentially sound.
McTaggart's second argument to show that the existent must have
some quality other than existence assumes the reality of negative
qualities. I will discuss this argument in Section 6.

4. Something, then, is true of the existent other than its
existence. And what is true of something is, according to

McTaggart12, a quality of that something13. The category of Quality,

according to McTaggart1*, is indefinable. What is true of something
is a quality of that something. But this does not amount to a

definition of Quality; and any attempt to define Quality in this w
is said to involve a vicious circle.

If we try* to define "true of" and "false of", we can only say,
I think, that X is true of A when a belief which asserts that X
belongs to A is a true belief, and that X is false of A when a
belief which asserts that X belongs to A is a false belief. Now
to say that X belongs to A is equivalent to asserting that X is
a quality of A. And thus our definition of quality would
contain a vicious circle.15
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Insofar as Quality is indefinable, it is claimed that we can only

understand the meaning of that term by citing examples of qualities
McTaggart lists goodness, happiness, redness, and sweetness as
examples of qualities.

5. I believe that McTaggart is correct in claiming that the

category of Quality is indefinable. But it is sometimes claimed tha
the concept of a quality is equivalent to that of a monadic

predicate; or, alternatively, to that of a monadic universal. To th
extent that these are considered to be definitions of Quality they
are clearly unsatisfactory. In the first place, the claim that a

quality is a monadic predicate, insofar as it does not appeal to wh
is a merely syntactical distinction of doubtful ontological

significance, is ultimately circular. If we attempt to find out wha

is meant by a predicate of something, we will inevitably be told th

a predicate of something is that which is true of something; and if
we then define Quality as that which is true of something we will
involve ourselves in the vicious circle mentioned above.
The claim that a quality is a monadic universal is equally
unsatisfactory, but for different reasons. Firstly, the claim that
qualities are universals is clearly a synthetic truth, if it is a
truth at all. And it is doubtful whether it is true. The existence
what are ostensibly item-specific or non-repeatable qualities is

sufficient to cast doubt upon the claim that part of what we mean b
Quality is that all qualities are universal. Secondly, there is
nothing in the notion of universality, as such, which implies that
what is universal is true of something; and if there is, the
definition, once again, would be circular. The concept of
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universality is unquestionably rather vague; but it certainly
involves the concept of repeatability, and there is nothing in the
notion of repeatability, as such, which implies that what is
repeatable is true of something. Relations, for example, are often

considered to be universal, hence repeatable, entities; but they ar
not obviously true of their terms in the sense that qualities are.
There might still remain the suspicion that McTaggart's criterion

for what entities are qualities is unduly dependent upon what Broad

has described as a child-like trust in the guidance of the structur
of sentences in the Indo-European languages18. I think that this
suspicion is unwarranted. But to allay any such suspicion I shall

propose an alternative criterion. At the beginning of his discussio
of the relation between thought and reality in Chapter 15 of
Appearance And Reality, F.H. Bradley makes the following comments.

If we take anything considered real, no matter what it is,
we find in it two aspects. There are always two things we can
say about it; and, if we cannot say both, we have not got
reality. There is a 'what' and a 'that', an existence and a
content, and the two are inseparable. That anything should be,
and should yet be nothing in particular, or that a quality
should not qualify and give a character to anything, is
obviously impossible. If we try to get the 'that' by itself, we
do not get it, for either we have it qualified, or else we fail
utterly. If we try to get the 'what' by itself, we find at once
that it is not all. It points to something beyond, and cannot
exist by itself and as a bare adjective. Neither of these
aspects, if you isolate it, can be taken as real, or indeed in
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that case is itself any longer. They are distinguishable only
and are not divisible.17

In accordance with this distinction between the that and the what,

I should say that any determinable or determinate element of the wh
is a quality. This criterion has two important advantages over

McTaggart's. The first is that it does not involve any appeal to wh
might be construed as a merely syntactical distinction between
subject and predicate. The second is that it does not allow us to
uncritically categorise existence as a quality. Existence, being
identified with the that, cannot be an element in the what - hence
cannot be a quality. Furthermore, such a criterion is entirely
consistent with our previous interpretation of the assumption that
something exists - according to which the proposition "something
exists" is understood to mean that existence has some determinate
nature or quality.

6. Once we accept that something exists, and that the existent has
some quality other than existence, then it follows, according to
McTaggart, that there are qualities which the existent lacks.

Squareness and triangularity are incompatible, and so are red
and blue. This is sufficient to prove that whatever exists does
not possess certain qualities. If it is square, it is not
triangular; if it is triangular it is not square. If it is
neither, then there are at least two qualities which it does
not possess.1'
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I do not think that this inference is justified at this stage. We
may conclude that, if some qualities are known to be incompatible,
then these qualities cannot be true of the existent in the same

respect, or under the same conditions. But unless we assume that al
incompatibility is reducible to the sort of incompatibility which

exists between contradictory qualities, i.e. between X and not-X, w

do not, as yet, have a sound basis for concluding that there are so
qualities which the existent lacks. Now McTaggart does take the
further step of introducing what are sometimes called "negative"

qualities1'; and if we can accept the reality of negative qualities

then we may be entitled to conclude that there are some qualities -

specifically, certain negative qualities - which the existent lacks
Unfortunately, McTaggart has deduced the existence of negative
qualities from the assumption that there are qualities which are
incompatible, and not the other way round.
Broad has criticised this argument on the grounds that McTaggart

has implicitly assumed the truth of the empirical premiss that ther
are incompatible "positive" qualities20. This is essentially the

same criticism which I have made. However, Broad is prepared to gra
the truth of the premiss on the grounds that, although it is an
empirical premiss, it is obviously true - if something, x, is red,

then it is obvious, according to Broad, that it cannot also be blue
But this is not strictly correct. What is certainly true is that
something cannot be both red and blue in the same respect or under
the same conditions. It may, however, be red in one respect, i.e.,

over one part of its surface, and blue in another, i.e., over anoth
part of its surface. And we cannot, at this stage of the inquiry,
rule out the possibility that the existent does, in fact, have
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spatial dimensions. The important point is that we cannot say that
there are incompatible "positive" qualities unless we assume
something more about the existent than that it has some qualities
other than existence. And this is more than we are, at present,
entitled to assume.
It follows that McTaggart's second argument, in Section 60, to
show that the existent has some quality other than existence, is
illegitimate. The argument there is that if nothing is true of the

existent except the fact that it exists, then it will not be true o
it that it is a square. By a process of simple obversion, and by

applying the law of Excluded Middle, McTaggart reaches the conclusi
that the existent would therefore be not-square; and hence that
something, namely the negative quality not-square, will be true of

the existent other than the fact that it exists. But it is clear th

such an inference is valid only if we assume the reality of negativ
qualities21.

7. Although McTaggart's own arguments are unacceptable, we can, I

believe, still accept his conclusion that the existent lacks certai
qualities; as well as his subsequent conclusion22 that the existent
has as many qualities as there are positive qualities. Both
conclusions rest upon the assumption that there are negative

qualities - the argument for the latter consisting in an applicatio

of the law of Excluded Middle, to the effect that, for any positive

quality, F, then the existent will either have the quality For lack

the quality F, and therefore have the corresponding negative qualit
not-F.
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The reality of negative qualities has been doubted by some
philosophers23. But these doubts have not generally been supported
by cogent arguments. And in the absence of any such arguments I

consider the reality of negative qualities to be self-evident. Thos
criticisms which have been directed against McTaggart's use of

negative qualities have almost invariably been directed against his

particular analysis of such qualities, and not against their realit
as such. For example, in his review of Volume One of The Nature of
Existence, A.E. Taylor makes the following remarks.

I should have said that so far as I can see, "not-phoenix" is
not a single characteristic at all. It is true alike of the
integer 4, of the apostle on whose eve I am writing these lines
and of the argument about the action for libel in the last
paragraph that none of them is a phoenix. But I do not see that
this entitles us to conclude that there is any character of
not-being-a-phoenix which the integer, the apostle, and the
argument have in common....It is still more doubtful whether
"phoenix" can be said to be a part of the characteristic "nonphoenix". Prof. Broad's observation seems to me unanswerable.
"What kind of constituent is non?" For, of course, to say that
"phoenix" is one constituent of "non-phoenix" implies that non
is the other constituent. Of course, in a sense, you may say
that "not-phoenix" is derived from "phoenix", and so it is, but
not by composition, by the radically different and ultimately
simple process of negation.2'
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There are essentially two points here. The first concerns the

reality, the second the analysis, of negative qualities. Concerning

the reality of negative qualities the obvious response to Taylor is
to simply disagree with his intuition on this matter - for that is

all his criticism amounts to. In the first place, it seems to me to
be just as obvious that the integer, the apostle, and the argument

all do have something in common in virtue of which we can truly say

that each of them is not a phoenix; and this is the negative qualit
not-phoenix". What is more, Taylor implicitly accepts this fact
when he says that not being a phoenix is true of each of the above
entities. Now, according to McTaggart's criterion, what is true of

something is a quality of that thing. Hence, not being a phoenix is

quality of the integer, the apostle, and the argument. In formulati
his criticism Taylor has thus implicitly accepted the truth of the
theory he wishes to criticise. He might not, of course, accept

McTaggart's criterion of a quality. But that is a different matter,
and one which is not addressed in the article.
Secondly, it is doubtful whether the extent to which negative
qualities figure in our common sense and scientific views of the
world is fully appreciated by Taylor. If we are to reject negative

qualities such as not-phoenix as intrinsically impossible or absurd

then we ought to be consistent and reject all negative qualities. B
this is when difficulties arise. For one thing, it might be argued

that a consistent and ultimate epistemic distinction between positi

and negative qualities is difficult, if not impossible, to carry ou
Are we to classify as "negative" only those qualities which are

denoted by predicates which contain "non" or "not" as a prefix? But
that would surely be an example of the child-like trust in the
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guidance of English syntax of which Broad has spoken so
disparagingly. Is darkness, for example, a positive or a negative
quality - i.e. not-light? Is ugliness a positive or a negative
quality - i.e. not-beautiful? Again, is pleasure a positive or a

negative quality of certain mental states; or is it, as Schopenhaue

and Plato have claimed28, the absence of a painful quality? Clearly,
such examples can be multiplied indefinitely.
This might not constitute a decisive reply to the critic of
negative qualities. But it does highlight the fact that, since the

range of actual, as distinct from ostensible, negative qualities ma

be considerably wider than a consideration of ordinary language mig

suggest, the rejection of negative qualities might be of much great

ontological significance than the critic of negative qualities woul
have us believe it is. The ultimate price we have to pay for the
elimination of negative qualities from our ontology may, in fact,
prove that any attempt to do so is simply misguided.

8. The second objection to McTaggart's use of negative qualities
is concerned, not so much with their reality, but with the way in
which he analyses such qualities. McTaggart's analysis of negative
qualities is to be found in Section 31 of The Nature Of Existence,
the context of an argument which professes to show that al 1 real
qualities are existent.

But, if we go further, we shall find a way in which every
characteristic is either a characteristic of the existent, or
else is an element in a characteristic of the existent. For,
with any characteristic whatever, it is true of everything, and
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therefore of everything existent, that either it has that
characteristic or it does not have it. And not to have a
characteristic is equivalent to having the corresponding
negative characteristic. If a man cannot be a phoenix, then
every man will have the negative characteristic of not-phoenix.
This characteristic will be existent, and since "phoenix" is an
element of "not-phoenix", it will also be existent. For it
seems clear that the parts of what exist must themselves exist.
And thus all characteristics will exist, whether they are or
are not characteristics of existent things.27

This argument has been criticised by a number of people2'; and I
think that it is, in fact, fallacious, and based upon assumptions
which are rather implausible. There is also reason to believe that

McTaggart himself subsequently abandoned the argument, as well as t

conclusion which it professes to prove. In "An Ontological Idealism

which was the last of his papers to be published in his lifetime, h
makes the following comments concerning non-existent realities.

Existence appears to me to be another indefinable quality,
which is such that all which is existent is necessarily real,
but all which is real is not necessarily existent. It has been
said that propositions, possibilities, qualities, and relations
are real without being existent. I do not think that the
independent reality of propositions or possibilities can be
justified. But qualities and relations (which may be grouped
together under the general name of characteristics) are in
themselves real without being existent. The qualities and
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relations of existent substances, however, may be called, as
such, existent. [My emphasis]1'

In this statement, McTaggart does not commit himself to the view,

which he had taken in The Nature of Existence, that all qualities a

necessarily existent. Hence, I suggest, he does not commit himself t

the analysis of negative qualities set out there. I think that this

was a sound decision. In the first place, the argument, as stated in
Section 31 of The Nature Of Existence, is clearly fallacious. The

predicate expression "phoenix" is, as McTaggart suggests, an element

or part of the predicate-expression "not-phoenix". But this does no

imply that the quality phoenix is a part of the quality not-phoenix
any more than the fact that the predicate expression "male" is an

element or part of the predicate-expression "female" implies that t
quality male is a part or constituent of the quality female.
Furthermore, even if we eliminate this confusion between

predicate-expressions and qualities it is still rather questionable

to claim that red, for example, is part of the negative quality not

red - which is what McTaggart seems to be saying in the first of th

above passages - and both Taylor and Broad have justifiably objecte

to such a view. On the other hand, it is, perhaps, less questionable
to claim that red is an element in the analysis of the complex

negative quality not-red; and this is, perhaps, what McTaggart shou
have said in Section 31, and what he does say in Section 63, when
defining the concept of a Complex Quality.

A complex quality is one which does not consist of an
aggregate of other qualities, but which can be analyzed and
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defined by means of other characteristics, whether qualities or
relations, or both. Thus, if we defined conceit as the
possession of a higher opinion of oneself than is justified by
the facts, conceit would be a complex quality, since it is
capable of analysis, but not of analysis into an aggregate of
other qualities. Every negative quality is complex, for it can
be analyzed into two terms, of which one is negation and the
other is the corresponding positive quality, and it is not an
aggregate of those terms. Since a complex quality is not an
aggregate of the characteristics which enter into its analysis,
it is better to call them elements, and not parts, of the
complex quality.30

The distinction to which McTaggart appeals here is the distinction
between compound and complex qualities. This distinction is based

upon a more general classification of qualities as simple, compound,
or complex31. All qualities, according to Mctaggart, are either
capable of analysis, or incapable of analysis. Those which are
capable of analysis are said to be defined by a statement of that
analysis, and those which are incapable of analysis are said to be

indefinable. Those which are capable of analysis are either compound
or complex. A compound quality can be analysed into an aggregate of
other qualities. A complex quality, on the other hand, is not

analysable into an aggregate of other qualities; although it is said
to be analysable and definable by means of other characteristics
(qualities and relations). Simple qualities are neither analysable
nor definable32.
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Now there is, I suggest, some vagueness in McTaggart's definitions
here. I think we can understand pretty clearly what he means by

saying that a compound quality, such as red-and-square, is analysabl
into two qualities, red and square. But it is not at all clear what
he means by saying that a complex quality is analysable by means of

other characteristics. And it is very difficult to accept that those
characteristics, by means of which a complex quality is said to be
analysed or defined, are in any genuine sense elements of that
quality. Consider, for example, the analysis of the complex quality
not-X. On the one hand Taylor is simply wrong when he claims that,
according to McTaggart, X and not are parts of the complex quality

not-X. They are certainly not considered to be parts of that quality

in the sense that red and square are parts of red-and-square. On the

other hand, it is difficult to understand what McTaggart does mean b
saying that they are "elements", but not parts, of the quality. He

obviously wants to say that they in some sense make up the quality otherwise his claim that phoenixhood is existent as an element in
non-phoenixhood would be of doubtful value in trying to prove that

all qualities are existent. The distinction between being a part of,
and being an element in, is, however, in that case, somewhat
difficult to sustain - especially in view of McTaggart's rather
flexible use of the concept of a part.
The fact is, I think, that McTaggart has simply conflated the
notions analysable into and analysable in terms of, and concluded
that, since all complex qualities are analysable in terms of other
characteristics, they are therefore analysable into those
characteristics53. Now, even though McTaggart has not clearly stated
what the distinction between an analysis in terms of certain
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characteristics, and an analysis into certain characteristics
consists in, I think we can agree that some such distinction is

intelligible and valid. I think we can also agree that McTaggart is
quite unjustified in concluding that, since a complex quality is
analysable in terms of some other characteristics, those
characteristics are therefore elements in, or make up, in some
unequivocal sense, that complex quality. In the case of negative
qualities in particular, it seems quite certain that the

characteristics in terms of which they are analysed are not, as such
constituents of those qualities.
The fact that McTaggart's own analysis of complex qualities in

general, and negative qualities in particular, is rather questionabl
does not imply that the distinction between compound and complex

qualities is itself questionable. Quite clearly, there are qualitie

which are analysable by means of other characteristics, but which a
not analysable into other characteristics.

9. The reality of compound qualities is, perhaps, less obvious. A

compound quality is said to be a quality which is analysable into a

aggregate of other qualities. It is not necessary, however, that the
qualities which form part of the analysis of a compound quality
should be simple; and, as far as the reality of compound qualities
goes, it is prima facie possible that all qualities should be
compound or complex - i.e. that there should be no unanalysable or
simple qualities.
McTaggart provides us with some examples of what he considers to

be compound qualities. Red-and-sweet, square-and-triangular, are bot
claimed to be examples of compound qualities3*. If we allow that
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what he means by a compound quality is what others, such as
Armstrong35, have called "conjunctive qualities", then there would
seem to be very good reasons for believing that there are such
qualities. But even if we are willing to accept that the concept of
compound quality is intelligible, it is doubtful whether all of the
qualities mentioned by McTaggart can be said to be genuine compound

qualities. The claim that square-and-triangular is a real quality is
I think, unacceptable. A compound quality, to be real, must be one
quality; that is to say, it must be a unity. But we cannot simply
unite incompatible qualities; and square and triangular are

incompatible. The criterion for the reality of qualities is the same
as for any other kind of entity. No real entity can be selfcontradictory; and since a square-and-triangular quality would be
self-contradictory it cannot be real.
McTaggart attempts to demonstrate that the compound quality
square-and-triangular is existent, and therefore real, but the
argument he uses is quite spurious. He begins with the assumption
that all existent qualities are real. He then argues that, since no

existent is square-and-triangular, every existent must be not-square

and-triangular - i.e., the quality not-square-and-triangular must be
true of every existent. And, since square-and-triangular is assumed
to be an element in the existent negative quality not-square-andtriangular, the compound quality square-and-triangular must, he
concludes, exist and be real.
The argument clearly depends upon the assumption that the negative
quality not-square-and-triangular can be analysed into the compound
quality square-and-triangular, and an element of negation. But we

have seen that there is no reason to believe that this assumption is
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true. Furthermore, since the compound quality square-and-triangular
is self-contradictory, we should, in fact, conclude that the
assumption must be false. The fact that this particular argument is
spurious does not, however, undermine the soundness of the general
contention that some compound qualities are real. To support this

general contention, I think that we should draw a distinction betwee
compossible and compatible qualities. Two qualities are compossible
if they can be true of one and the same substantive. They are

compatible if they can be true of one and the same substantive in th
same respect or under the same conditions. Thus red and green are

compossible, but incompatible qualities. We might then maintain that
any conjunction of compossible qualities is a compound quality.
A difficulty may arise, however, when we attempt to explain what
we mean by a conjunction of qualities. Is it an actual, i.e., an

existent conjunction, or a merely possible conjunction? By an actual
conjunction I mean a conjunction of qualities which are true of a

single substantive. A merely possible conjunction, on the other hand
is a conjunction of qualities which is not true of any single

substantive. I think that the most plausible case for the reality of
conjunctive qualities depends on the assumption that the only real
conjunctive qualities are those which are analysable into qualities

which are true of a single substantive. A conjunctive quality, we ma
say, is an actual conjunction of qualities. And qualities are
actually conjoined insofar as they are true of one and the same
substantive. An actual compound quality is thus a conjunction of
compossible qualities. If we understand the notion of a conjunctive

or compound quality in this way, then there is, I suggest, no reason
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to doubt that they are real. As long as the existent has more than

one quality, then we may conclude that there are compound qualities.

10. The concept of a compound quality is directly related to that
of the nature of the existent.

Since any two or more qualities form a compound quality, all
the qualities possessed by any particular thing form a compound
quality. And this compound quality may be called the Nature of
that thing.38

With the qualification mentioned in the previous section

concerning what count as actual compound qualities, we can, I think,
accept this conclusion. The nature of an entity is distinct from a

compound quality of that entity insofar as any two or more qualities

of the entity will make up a compound quality of that entity; whilst

the nature of the entity will comprise all those qualities which are
true of it. A compound quality which does not include all the

qualities which are true of an entity can be said to make up part of

the nature, or to be a partial description of that entity. A partial

description of an entity is itself a description of that entity, but
a part of the nature of that entity is not itself a nature.
Broad has claimed that the view that the nature of a term is a

compound quality comprising all those qualities which are true of an
entity is illegitimate. He raises two objections which are relevant
to our present discussion. The first concerns the notion of a

compound quality. Broad claims that the reality of compound qualitie
is to be doubted.
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No doubt such a sentence as "x is red and sweet" is
intelligible, and no doubt it is of the same grammatical form
as "x is red" where the grammatical predicate "red" is the name
of a characteristic. But it would be most unwise to assume, on
this ground alone, that the phrase "red-and-sweet" must be the
name of a characteristic. And I know of no other ground for
assuming it. I should have thought that "x is red-and-sweet"
was simply a short way of saying "x is red and x is sweet",
i.e., of recording the fact that the two characteristics,
redness and sweetness, both inhere in the common subject x. If
there is anything that could properly be called a "compound
characteristic" it would seem to be the relational property, if
such there be, expressed by the phrase "co-inhered in by
redness and sweetness" and not anything expressed by the phrase
"red-and-sweet".37

He then puts his objection in more general terms.

It seems to me that McTaggart's doctrine of simple, compound,
and complex characteristics stands on two sadly weak legs. One
is an a assumed analogy with certain fact about spatial wholes
and our perception of them, which, when clearly stated, would
appear not to hold. The other is a child-like trust in the
guidance of the structure of sentences in the Indo-European
languages, which would appear to be unwarranted,3'

Now it seems to me that it is Broad himself who, while quick to
point out what he considers to be McTaggart's naive and probably
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unjustified trust in the syntax of the English language as an

accurate reflection of the ontological structure of the world, might
fairly be charged with displaying that very same naivety. In making
this criticism Broad has, I believe, ignored two important points.
The first is that, from an epistemic point of view, it is equally
legitimate to say that we are presented with the qualities of an
entity as a whole or unity, and that the distinct elements of that
whole are reached by a process of abstraction from that whole. In
other words, we might maintain, in opposition to Broad, that the
compound quality is both epistemologically and ontologically more
fundamental than the elements into which it can be analysed; and,
that statements of the form "x is red-and-sweet", insofar as they
emphasise the unity of the distinct qualities which are true of x,
are perhaps a more accurate guide to the ontological status of
compound qualities than statements of the form "x is red and x is
sweet". Put simply, it is possible that statements which stress the
unity of the nature of an entity are more accurate than those which
stress its diversity. Broad's criticism embodies a common fallacy that of assuming that the elements into which a complex can be
analysed are ipso facto more fundamental, in an ontological sense,
than the unity of that complex.
The second point is that McTaggart did, in fact, more or less

anticipate the kind of criticism which Broad has raised when he drew
a distinction between unities of composition and unities of
manifestation.

We can say just as correctly that the unity of the nature of A
is differentiated into the qualities X,Y, and Z (taking these
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to represent the whole number of the qualities) as we can say
that the qualities X,Y, and Z are united into the nature of
A.n

It would seem that Broad has simply ignored this fact when
criticising McTaggart's views on the concept of the nature of an
entity. He is not alone, however, in invoking the fallacy mentioned

above when objecting to the reality of compound or complex qualities

It is implicit, for example, in Reinhardt Grossmann's recent critiqu
of complex qualities*0. Despite F.H. Bradley's sustained polemic
against this fallacy, Grossmann's views are evidence that it
persists,

11, Broad's second objection to the concept of the nature of a
term is that there cannot be a compound quality which comprises all

of the qualities of a term - since such a compound quality would hav
to contain itself as a component. And this, he insists, is
nonsensical'1.
I think that this objection can be easily met if we modify the
definition in a way which was originally suggested by McTaggart
himself'2, and endorsed by S.V. Keeling in his review of Broad's
Examination*1. The suggestion is that the definition be amended so
that the nature of an entity is understood to be made up of all the

non-compound qualities which are true of that entity. This definitio

eliminates the possibility of the nature of an entity being included
as a part of itself, and thus undermines Broad's criticism.
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12. I have argued that compound or conjunctive qualities are, in a
qualified sense, real. But it does not follow from this conclusion
that such qualities are ultimately made up of simple qualities.
McTaggart argues, however, that unless we assume that all compound

qualities are ultimately made up of simple qualities we will be face
with a vicious infinite regress.
Let us assume that the analysis of a compound quality always
yields further compound qualities, such that no analysis of our
original compound quality can ever yield qualities which are
incapable of further analysis. Such a situation is, according to
McTaggart, imposs ibIe.

If we ask what any particular quality is - what we mean when we
predicate it of anything - the answer, in the case of any
quality which is not simple, is that this depends on what the
terms are into which it can be analyzed. And, therefore, if in
any case the analysis could go on endlessly, what the quality
is, and what we mean when we predicate it, would depend on the
final term of a series which had no final term. Thus it would
be nothing in particular, and we should mean nothing by
predicating it. This is impossible in a quality. The series of
analyses, then, cannot be endless, but must end in an analysis
consisting entirely of simple characteristics."

McTaggart then adds that the vicious regress does not arise in
case the compound quality has an infinitely differentiated analysis
that is to say, in case the quality is analysable into an infinite
number of simple qualities.
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In spite of, and perhaps because of, this qualification, I do not
think that the argument is conclusive. In the first place, the

vicious regress we are supposedly involved in, by denying that there
are any simple qualities, is essentially a semantic one. Let us
assume, for example, that we wish to predicate a compound quality,

red-and-square, of some entity x. Our judgement can then be expresse
in the proposition "x is red-and-square". Now McTaggart's argument,

it seems to me, is based upon the assumption that we cannot know the

meaning of this proposition unless we know the meaning of each of it
constituents which have meaning'5. Assuming that "red-and-square" is
a constituent of the proposition which has meaning, it is then
claimed that we could not, in turn, know the meaning of this
constituent unless we know the meaning of each of its constituents
which have meaning. It is clear that this process cannot go on
indefinitely, and that, if our original proposition is to have
meaning, we must eventually reach some constituents of that

proposition which have meaning, but which do not themselves have any

constituents which have meaning. These can be said to be the "simple

or "unanalysable" constituents of the proposition. In the case of th
proposition "x is red-and-square" it is assumed that "red" and
"square" are among its simple or unanalysable constituents.
Apart from the questionable assumption that the meaning of a
proposition is dependent upon the meaning of its constituents, the
argument is so far plausible. Let us assume, then, for the sake of
the argument, that we could never understand the meaning of a

proposition which does not have simple or unanalysable constituents;

hence, that we could never understand the meaning of the predicative

judgement that x is red-and-square unless the proposition "x is red-
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and-square" has simple or unanalysable constituents. Let us also

assume that "red" and "square" are among those simple or unanalysabl
constituents. McTaggart draws two conclusions from these premisses.
The first is that if we are to know the meaning of "x is red-and-

square", we must know the meaning of "red". The second is that, since

"red" is a simple or unanalysable constituent of the proposition, th
meaning of "red" - i.e. the quality denoted by "red" - must be
simple, otherwise we could not know the meaning of our original
judgement.
The first of these conclusion is justified, given the truth of the
premisses. But the second obviously is not. We may accept that, to
know the meaning of "x is red-and-square", we must know the meaning
of "red"; and that to know the meaning of "red" we must have

knowledge of the quality denoted by that term. But it does not follo
that, to have knowledge of a quality, we must have knowledge of all
its constituents. If we assume that "red" is, in fact, the name of a
compound quality, it does not follow that, to have knowledge of that

quality, we must have knowledge of all those qualities which make it
up. To suppose otherwise is, as Broad has pointed out48, to confuse
knowing a characteristic with knowing its ultimate analysis. It is
therefore possible to know the meaning of a judgement which
predicates a compound quality of an entity without thereby knowing
each of the qualities which make up that compound quality.
It might help to clarify this point if we appeal to a distinction
which Leibniz drew between clear and distinct ideas. We can be said

to have a clear idea of a compound quality insofar as we are able to
recognise instances of that quality and distinguish them from
instances of other qualities. And we can be said to have a distinct
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idea of a compound quality insofar as we can analyse that quality
into its constituent parts. In both cases we have knowledge of the
quality; but the fact that we have clear knowledge of it does not

necessarily imply that we have distinct knowledge of it. McTaggart's
attempt to prove that there must be simple qualities seems to me to
be ultimately based upon the failure to recognise the importance of
this distinction.
But even if we do accept McTaggart's argument in principle we are

still faced with difficulties. In Section 64 McTaggart claims that i
is possible that there should be a compound quality which has an
infinitely differentiated analysis - i.e., which comprises an
infinite number of simple qualities. He also claims that such a

quality could not be known by the human mind. But in the footnote to
Section 64 on page 65 he suggests that it is possible for such a
quality to be true of the existent - hence, that a predicative

judgement involving such a quality would be meaningful. According to

his earlier view, however, it would be impossible to know the meaning
of a judgement involving a compound quality unless we knew the

complete analysis of that quality. And since it is impossible to kno

the complete analysis of any compound quality which has an infinitel
differentiated analysis, any judgement involving such a quality must

be meaningless - which contradicts his previous assumption that such
a judgement would be meaningful. His argument to prove that there
must be simple qualities is therefore incompatible with his claim
that there may be qualities which have an infinitely differentiated
analysis.
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13. Even though McTaggart's attempt to prove that there must be

simple qualities is inconclusive I think it is almost certainly true

that some qualities are simple or unanalysable in McTaggart's sense.
Perhaps the most obvious examples are determinate instances of
colour-qualities - e.g, determinate shades of red; or the qualities

of painfulness and pleasurableness which characterise certain mental
states.
The claim that such "sensible" qualities are simple has, however,
been criticised by D.M. Armstrong'7. In formulating his criticism
Armstrong draws a distinction between what is epistemologically
simple and what is ontologically simple; and between what is
epistemologically complex and what is ontologically complex. A

determinate shade of colour, he suggests, might be epistemologically
simple, whilst being ontologically complex. The same, I suppose,
would be said of an instance of painfulness. The reluctance which
some philosophers have shown towards accepting the validity of such

distinction is determined, according to Armstrong, by "the fantasies
of infallibility and omniscience which have bedevilled enquiry
generally, and philosophy in particular, from the beginning."

Most of us have painfully learnt the lesson which the
Phenomenalists have not fully learnt: that the general nature
of physical objects is given to us by perception only very
imperfectly. But the repressed appetite for infallibility and
omniscience then retreats to the universals which the objects
instantiate. Among these universals, at any rate for British
Empiricists, it settles in particular upon the perceived
qualities and relations. In fact, however, perceived qualities
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and relations are as much epistemological icebergs as any other
aspect of reality.
If we ask what in fact the colours are, the physical ist
reductions of those properties to light-emissions of different
wave-length promises to reproduce the required logical
characteristics."

Insofar as this objection is not merely an argument ad hominem it
appears to me to be quite inconclusive. In the first place, it
ignores the fact that, for the proponents of such a view, the being
or existence of such qualities consists in, or is dependent upon,
their being perceived. They simply do not, and cannot have any
qualities other than those they are perceived as having. If a

sensible quality is perceived as being simple, then it is ipso facto
simple. The claim that our knowledge of physical objects is given to
us only imperfectly in perception is one which most, if not all,

proponents of the view under discussion would accept. But it does no

follow from this that our knowledge of the sensible qualities caused
by such objects is therefore imperfect.
Secondly, the objection ignores the fact that, ultimately, every

inquiry, be it scientific or philosophical, rests upon the assumption
that something, whether it be a belief, a sense-datum, or a physical
object, can be known to have at least some of those characteristics
which it is cognised as having. Were it otherwise, we could never be

justified in attaching any degree of certainty to the results of any
inquiry whatsoever. And since, it is assumed, the existence or being
of the sensible qualities such as redness and painfulness, and that
of our own conscious mental states, consists in their being
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perceived, they, if anything, are the entities which are most likely

to be capable of being known to have those characteristics which the
are cognised as having. And it is the recognition of this fact,
rather than any repressed desire for omniscience or infallibility,
which, I would suggest, is the basis for the claims made by certain
philosophers" to know that certain sensible qualities are simple.
Thirdly, the attempt to identify sensible colours with
electromagnetic radiation of particular wavelengths seems to me to

simply conflate the proximate cause of a phenomenon with its effect.

The fact that the proximate cause of sensible redness is complex doe
not imply that redness itself is complex.

14. It is sometimes argued that determinate instances of colour

cannot be simple because they must have qualities such as brightness
and hue, as well certain formal qualities such as being a colour,
being existent, being a quality, etc. The reply to this argument is

that such qualities form part of the nature of the col our-instance.

And the fact that a quality has a complex nature does not imply that
it is, itself, complex. The distinction between a quality and its

nature is made by McTaggart in Section 90 of The Nature Of Existence

But the characteristics of a characteristic are no more parts
or elements of it than the characteristics of a substance are
parts of that substance. They are, indeed, parts of its nature,
but that is a very different thing.
This may be made clear by examples. It is a quality of
redness that it is the colour of doctors' gowns. It is a
quality of triangularity that it is an object of thought to a
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particular school boy at a particular time. These qualities are
parts of the nature of the qualities of redness and
triangularity. But they are not parts of the qualities redness
and triangularity themselves. Redness is a simple quality, and
has no parts or elements. And the parts of triangularity are
those which are given in its definition, which do not include
its contemplation by a particular schoolboy.50

The failure to acknowledge this distinction is, according to
Broad, responsible for many of the vicious infinite regresses which
F.H. Bradley maintained are involved in the categories of Relation
and Quality.

15. There are, then, very good reasons for believing that some
qualities are simple. And I know of no cogent argument against the
possibility of simple qualities. In any case, the reality of simple
qualities is not, in my opinion, essential to the soundness of

McTaggart's general metaphysical theory. The only time that an appea
to the reality of simple qualities is used to establish some
important metaphysical conclusion is in Section 420, where he
attempts to show that the species of cognition which he calls "the
awareness of characteristics" cannot fulfil the conditions required
to form a determining correspondence system. And even there, the
appeal to the reality of simple qualities is only secondary to the
main argument.
With the exception of the claim that existence, itself, is a
quality, we may agree, then, with McTaggart's conclusion that the
existent must have some qualities, and that these qualities may be

60
classified as being either simple, compound, or complex. Having
determined that the existent must have some qualities, the next step
is to determine what it is, if anything, that those qualities are
true of. And this, according to McTaggart, is Substance.

16. The transition from the category of Quality to that of
Substance occurs at the beginning of Chapter 6. The argument for the
reality of substance is as follows.

Whatever exists, then, has qualities . These qualities will
themselves be existent, and will have qualities, and so on
without end. But, at the head of the series, there will be
something which has qualities without being itself a quality.
The ordinary name for this, and I think the best name, is
Substance.51

The rest of that chapter is devoted to criticism of attempts to
eliminate the category of substance - specifically, to criticism of
attempts to either define a substance in terms of, or eliminate the
category in favour of, the category of Quality.
As it stands, the above argument is hardly adequate to sustain the
metaphysical weight which its conclusion has to bear. In the first
place, it is prima facie possible that the something which has
qualities, without itself being a quality, is a relation. This
possibility is subsequently ruled out by McTaggart's revised
definition of substance in Section 67. According to the revised
definition, substance is understood to be that which exists, and has
qualities and relations, without itself being a quality or a
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relation. The justification for this revision is, however, dependent
upon the unargued assumption that a relation cannot exist in its own
right. Although, as I shall subsequently argue, McTaggart is correct
in making this assumption, it has been claimed, by some adherents to
the doctrine of "external" relations, that a relation is both
logically and ontologically independent of the terms which it
relates. Even though this view is arguably false, it ought to have
been considered by McTaggart.
Secondly, McTaggart's deduction involves the tacit assumption that
qualities, like relations, are not ontologically independent
entities. Again, I believe that he was correct in making this
assumption. But it is an assumption which has been rejected by some

of those philosophers who hold the view that what we call "things" or
"substances" are simply bundles of qualities; and that these
qualities are the basic or most fundamental ontological entities.
It might be argued that, insofar as qualities are true of
something, it is impossible that qualities should be ontologically
fundamental entities. But to argue thus is to confuse a criterion of
a quality with a definition of Quality. If anything is true of
something, then it is a quality of that something. But it does not
follow that every quality is true of something. And, since McTaggart
has claimed that Quality is indefinable, he is not entitled to claim
that it is part of what we mean by Quality that a quality must be
true of something.
McTaggart's attempt to deduce the category of Substance from the
assumption that the existent has some qualities must, then, be
considered to be a failure.
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17. Although McTaggart's own attempt to deduce the category of

Substance from the assumption that the existent has some qualities is
unsuccessful, I believe that a valid deduction is possible.
Let us assume that the existent has some quality. The proposition
"some quality exists" will then be true. Now it seems to me that
there are only two plausible ways in which this proposition can be
analysed. It might be understood to mean that existence is true of
some quality. But this would imply that existence is a quality, and,
following Kant, we have rejected this view.
On the other hand, the proposition might be understood to mean
that some quality is true of existence. In that case, there would be

something, namely existence, which has a quality without itself being
a quality. And since existence is obviously not a relation, there

will be something which has a quality, without itself being a quality
or a relation; and this, as McTaggart points out in Section 67, is
the traditional definition of substance52.
From the premisses that the existent has some quality, and that
existence is not a quality or a relation, we may thus derive two
extremely important conclusions. The first is that the category of
Substance is a valid category of the existent. The second is that
existence is rightly categorised as substance. The importance of
these conclusions will become evident in our subsequent discussion.

18. I have argued that the category of Substance is a valid
category of the existent. Attempts have been made to avoid a
commitment to this category, and some of these are discussed by
McTaggart in Sections 66-70. Before considering this discussion it
should, however, be pointed out that it is not strictly necessary to
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discuss these views if our argument in the previous section is sound.
If it is sound, then any attempt to avoid a commitment to the
category of Substance must be unsuccessful. But it will help to
strengthen our position if we can show, independently of that
argument, that such attempts are inevitably unsuccessful.

19. The first view which McTaggart considers is that which
considers the category of Substance to be superfluous, and claims
that a consistent ontology need only employ the category of Quality.
The suggestion is that the group of qualities which are ordinarily

predicated of a substance may exist in their own right, without being
predicated of an underlying substance or substratum; and, that what
we mean by a "thing" is simply these qualities insofar as they are

related to each other in a particular way, or insofar as they form a
particular kind of unity. This suggestion might be interpreted in
either of two ways; and both, according to McTaggart, lead to
unacceptab1e cone1us ions.
If we understand the suggestion to mean that no quality is
predicable of anything, then, McTaggart argues, we are obliged to
accept the conclusion that the theory is incompatible with its own

truth; since, if the theory is true, we could not say of the group of
qualities which, it is assumed, make up the thing, that it is a
group, or that it is existent. Nor could we say of the qualities
themselves that they are qualities, or that they are existent,
I believe that this argument is quite conclusive if we accept the
implicit premiss that predication is not itself analysable in a way
which is consistent with the theory in question. But some "bundle
theorists", notably Stout53, have claimed that predication
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essentially involves the assertion that some quality is a constituent
of a whole or group comprising other qualities. For example, the
judgement "John is bald" is understood to mean that there is a group

of qualities, denoted by the term "John", which has, as a member, the
quality of baldness.
Now this might be an acceptable analysis of what I shall call
first order predications - i.e., those involving qualities which are

directly predicated of a concrete thing. But I do not think that such
a theory can provide us with a satisfactory account of the sort of
"higher order" predications mentioned by McTaggart. To say of the
group of qualities denoted by "John" that it is a group, cannot be
understood to mean that the quality of being a group is related, in
the same sense as is, say, the quality of baldness, with other

members of the group of qualities which make up John. What we want to
say is that the quality of being a group is predicable of the group
as a single entity; and to do this we have to introduce what
Grossmann has called a "break in style"5'. In order to accommodate

such higher-order predications, the analysis of predication must, for
the bundle theorist, take on two quite different forms. On the one

hand, it will be construed as involving a part/whole relation - or at

least something very like a part/whole relation. On the other hand it
will be understood in its traditional Aristotelian sense.
It may help to clarify this point if we consider the following
example. Let there be a group of qualities A,B,C and D, which, we
will assume, make up a thing, x. Let us also assume that we wish to
predicate the quality of being fourfold of this group. Now we cannot
interpret this predication as involving the assertion that the
quality of being fourfold is a member of the group denoted by "x",
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since this would imply that the initial judgment is false - the group
denoted by "x" would then be fivefold, comprising A,B,CtD and F,
where F is the quality of being fourfold. Hence, the attempt to
predicate such higher-order qualities of a thing must, if we accept
the analysis of predication offered by the bundle theorist, be
unsuccessful. And if we have recourse to the traditional view of
predication to accommodate such qualities, then we must reject the
original premiss that no quality is predicable, in the traditional

sense, of anything. The theory is therefore incompatible with its own
truth.

20. If, on the other hand, we understand the suggestion to mean
that all qualities are predicable of something, then, according to
McTaggart, we are faced with similar problems.
If we assume that all qualities are predicable of something, but
not of substance, then statements such as "Smith is happy", which
ostensibly predicate the quality happiness of a substance, Smith,
must be analysed in a way which does not involve predicating the
quality of a substance. The hypothesis is, however, that every
quality is predicable of something. Now, if happiness is not
predicable of a substance, Smith, then there is, according to
McTaggart, nothing, in fact, of which this quality can be truly

predicated. Let us assume, for example, that Smith's nature comprises
the qualities of wisdom, goodness, consciousness, and happiness. It
is clear, on the one hand, that happiness cannot be truly predicated
of these qualities taken severally. On the other hand, it cannot

consistently be predicated of these qualities taken as a group. If we
attempt to predicate happiness of the qualities taken as a group,
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then we must say that happiness is a "second-order" quality of the
group of qualities which comprises wisdom, goodness, and
consciousness. I am not sure that such a view makes sense. In any
case it does not solve our problem, since we must the determine what

the remaining qualities are predicable of. If we have recourse to the
strategy used in deciding what happiness is predicable of we will
inevitably involve ourselves in a vicious circle; since each quality
must then be construed as being a second-order quality of the
remaining qualities, with the result that there must be, and yet
cannot be, a group of original or first-order qualities.
Although McTaggart does not explicitly point out, as I have, that
the view in question ultimately involves a vicious circle, I think
that his objection is fundamentally sound. But it is not very well
expressed, and this has led Broad to claim that McTaggart has simply
begged the question against the proponent of the bundle theory.

The supporters of the theory under discussion could have
answered McTaggart as follows: "Our theory is that the sentence
Smith is happy can be replaced without loss or gain of meaning
by the sentence There is a certain complex quality, which
includes as a component the quality of evoking the use of the
name 'Smith' in certain men, and this complex quality contains
as a component the quality of happiness. You have no right to
insist that we shall interpret the copula in a way which is
appropriate only to your interpretation of the subject and
shall combine the unmodified copula with our modification in
the interpretation of the subject.55
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Broad has, however, missed the point of McTaggart's criticism by
conflating two quite different objections to the theory in question.

McTaggart has not claimed that an alternative analysis of predication
is unavailable to the bundle theorist. His initial objection is, in
fact, based upon the assumption that something like the analysis
proposed by Broad has a prima facie plausibility. His argument is
that such an analysis amounts to the claim that no qualities are
predicable, in the traditional sense, of something else. And such a
view, we have seen, is incompatible with the truth of that theory.
His second objection is that if we accept the traditional account
of predication, and assume that all qualities are predicable of
something, then, by denying that any qualities are predicable of
substances, we are forced to conclude that some qualities, namely
"first-order" qualities, are not truly predicable of anything.
So, whether the bundle theorist accepts the traditional account of
predication, or whether he accepts an alternative along the lines
proposed by Broad, he faces decisive objections; and his attempt to
avoid a commitment to the category of Substance must be pronounced a
failure.

21. The two objections to the attempt to eliminate the category of

substance which we have considered so far are, I believe, conclusive.
In Section 67 of The Nature Of Existence, however, we find an
objection of a quite different kind. This latter objection involves
an implicit appeal to the Aristotelian notion that qualities and
relations are not self-existent entities - that the existence of
qualities and relations is dependent upon their being the
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characteristics of some more fundamental entity which cannot be
categorised as a quality or a relation.

For no quality is existent in its own right. The only case in
which an assertion about a quality can be an assertion of
existence is that in which the assertion links the quality with
something else that exists - as when we say that courage was a
quality of Nelson. And if there was nothing to link it with
except other qualities, there would arise a vicious infinite
series. For the first term, with which we begin our series,
must be connected with something else that exists. If this
something else must also be a quality, it can only get its
existence by connection with a third existent thing, which,
being also a quality, can only get it by connection with a
fourth, and so on. And thus the connection of the first term
with the existent would depend on the last term of a series
which had no last term. It is therefore impossible to hold that
nothing exists but qualities. There must be something which
exists and has qualities without itself being a quality.
A similar argument will show that that which is existent and
has qualities without being a quality cannot be in every case a
relation. For a relation, like a quality, cannot be existent in
its own right, and a vicious infinite series would arise in the
same way as with qualities.58

The assumption that qualities and relations cannot exist in their
own right is, I believe, true. And if it is true, then McTaggart's
argument would conclusively undermine any attempt to eliminate the
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category of Substance. But it is not argued for by McTaggart, so we
must conclude that he considered it to be self-evident. I agree with
McTaggart, and with Aristotle57, that this premiss is self-evident;
and that, as such, it is pointless to try and demonstrate its truth.

What we can, and should do, however, is attempt to show why those who

might not accept it as true should fail to do so. This is clearly not
an easy task, and it is virtually impossible to anticipate every
negative response to this assumption. But I think we can isolate the
most likely reason why it might be thought to be false; and this is
that the meanings of the terms involved have not been understood.
There are two important things to bear in mind when considering
this assumption. The first is that both Quality and existence are
assumed to be indefinable. The second is that, following Kant, we
have assumed that all existential judgements are synthetic58. Any
judgement asserting the existence of a quality is, therefore,
synthetic. Given these assumptions it is evident that no quality can
exist in its own right. If we assume that Relation is also
indefinable, the same point can be made.
At this point a difficulty arises for McTaggart. If we assume that
no quality can exist in its own right, then his claim that existence
is a quality is incompatible with that assumption - since existence
would be a quality which exists in its own right. This is, in my
opinion, a serious inconsistency in McTaggart's general metaphysical

theory. It is, of course, avoidable, by rejecting the assumption that

existence is a quality; and this is what we have done by categorising
existence as substance. But it is clear that either the assumption
that no quality can exist in its own right, or the assumption that

existence is a quality, must be removed from McTaggart's theory. Both
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are important. But the former is, I believe, essential to his attempt

to prove the validity of the category of Substance; whilst the latter
is, as I have maintained, neither true nor essential to prove the
validity of that category. Nor is it, as we shall see, an essential
feature of his general theory.

22. We have considered the attempt to eliminate the category of
Substance in favour of the category of Quality, and concluded that
any such attempt is futile. There is, however, another objection to

the introduction of the category of Substance. It is sometimes argued
that the category of Substance ought to be dispensed with, since the
concept of substance as that which is the bearer of qualities and
relations, without itself being a quality or a relation, is
ultimately meaningless or vacuous. This type of objection, in its
most explicit form, can be traced to Locke's attempt to explain the
origin of our idea of substance.

And thus here, as in all other cases where we use words without
having clear and distinct ideas, we talk like children: who,
being questioned what such a thing is, which they know not,
readily give this satisfactory answer, that it is something:
which in truth signifies no more, when so used, either by
children or men, but that they know not what; and that the
thing they pretend to know, and talk of, is what they have no
distinct idea of at all, and so are perfectly ignorant of it,
and in the dark. The idea then we have, to which we give the
general name substance, being nothing but the supposed, but
unknown, support of those qualities we find existing; which we
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imagine cannot exist sine re substante, without something to
support them, we call that support substantia; which, according
to the true import of the word, is, in plain English, standing
under or upholding.5'

Our general idea of substance, according to Locke, is essentially
relative and obscure. It is relative in the sense that it is a
complex idea "constructed" from the ideas of qualities which we
perceive directly, and the supposition that, since these qualities

are not existent in their own right, there must be something in which
they inhere, or which supports them. And it is vague in the sense

that we cannot specify its nature other than by saying that it is the
idea of an indeterminate something which stands under or supports
qualities. The conclusion seems to be that such an obscure and
relative idea cannot give us any genuine knowledge of reality; and,
that the word "substance", insofar as it derives any meaning it has
by being "attached" to an idea, can have at best a rather vague and
ultimately relative connotation.

23. The cogency of this argument is, of course, debatable. It is
open to a number of replies, perhaps the most obvious of which is to
simply reject the epistemological premisses upon which it is based.
This is, essentially, the approach taken by Leibniz.

THEOPHILUS: I believe that this way of thinking is correct. And
we have no need to 'accustom' ourselves to it, or to 'suppose'
it; for from the very beginning we conceive several predicates
in a single subject, and that this is all there is to these
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metaphorical words 'support' and 'substratum'. So I do not see
why it is made out to involve a problem. On the contrary, what
comes into our mind is the concretum conceived as wise, warm,
shining, rather than abstractions or qualities such as wisdom,
warmth, light, etc., which are much harder to grasp. (I say
'qualities', for what the substantial object contains are
qualities, not ideas.) "

Leibniz makes a number of important points here. Firstly, he

attempts to remove the supposed obscurity attached to the concepts of
a "support" or "substratum" by claiming that the relation between a
substance and its qualities is simply the ontological correlate of
the perfectly familiar logical relation of predication. Secondly, he
undermines the force of Locke's objection that the idea of substance

is essentially relative by replying that it is unreasonable to expect
that anything more should be contained in the idea of substance;
since any attempt to further refine our idea of substance will
inevitably succeed only by adding to it ideas of its qualities. He

then points out that it is the idea of Quality, if anything, which is
abstract or relative; since the primary object of perception is the

substance as qualified in particular ways, and not a mere quality. To
clarify this point we might appeal to a distinction which Armstrong
has drawn between a "thick" and "thin" particular or substance81. A

"thick" substance is the substance as qualified by its many qualities
or properties. A "thin" substance is the substance considered apart
from its qualities - i.e., as the bearer or substratum of those
qualities. Perception, we may say, presents us with a "thick"
substance - i.e., a substance as qualified in a particular way, a
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state of affairs or concretum. The ideas of particular qualities are
only reached by a process of abstraction or selective attention.
I think that the most important point being made here is that it
is unreasonable, even question-begging, to expect that the idea of

substance should be more determinate than the idea of something which
is the bearer or substratum of qualities. McTaggart himself makes
this point in Section 68 of The Nature Of Existence.

To the conclusion that substance exists it has been objected
that a substance is nothing apart from its qualities, and that
therefore a conception of substance, as distinct from its
qualities, is impossible, and the name itself is a meaningless
word. But this is erroneous. It is, of course, quite true that
a substance is nothing apart from its qualities. And if we were
to try to form a conception of a substance which had no
qualities, the undertaking would be as hopeless as an attempt
to form a conception of a triangle without sides. But it does
not follow that, because a substance is nothing apart from its
qualities, it is not anything in conjunction with its
qualities. And it does not follow that, because we cannot form
a conception of a substance which has no qualities, we cannot
form a conception of a substance with qualities.

He then goes on to make a general point about the kind of
reasoning which, he believes, underlies Locke's criticism.

The fallacy which we have just discussed is of a type which
is not uncommon, and which is generally worked out with the
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same inconsistency as here. A and B can only exist in relation.
Then of one of them, say A, it is asserted that, since A
without B is nothing, A is nothing at all. And B, being left by
itself, is now asserted to be the sole reality in the matter,
and to be self-subsistent. But it does not follow that A is
nothing at all, because it would be nothing out of relation to
B. And if the argument were fatal to A it would be just as
fatal to B.u

24. McTaggart is certainly correct in pointing out that, if this
is the kind of reasoning which lies behind the commonly held
objection to the category of Substance, then it is fallacious. But
there is an assumption implicit in McTaggart's reply which is not
made explicit, if at all, until Section 69, where he considers an
objection to the category of Substance put forward by Stout. The
assumption is that even though a substance cannot exist except in
relation to its qualities, it is nonetheless something distinct from
those qualities and that relation; and it is something which is the
ground of, and not something that is generated by, that relation. It
is acceptable to say that A and B are mutually dependent; and, hence,
that neither could be without the other, as long as we assume that
since A, for example, cannot exist except in relation to B, it is
not, therefore, a merely formal product of that relation. The problem
with the concept of substance, according to Stout, is that it

threatens to collapse into the concept of a merely formal entity - as

the logical product of the fact that certain qualities are related in
a particular way.
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What then is the subject itself as distinguished from its
attributes? It would seem that its whole being must consist in
being that to which its attributes belong. But how can the
whole being of anything consist in its being related to
something else? There must be an answer to the question, What
is it that is so related?83

I think the essential point which Stout wishes to make is that if
the concept of substance is to have any "content" - i.e., if
substance is not to be a merely formal entity - then the fact that
various qualities are predicated of substance cannot be correctly
understood to mean that those qualities are simply related to each
other, or united with each other, in a particular way. What the
substance theorist must show is that there is a material distinction
between substance and its qualities. And he must be able to say in
what that distinction consists.

25. McTaggart's reply to this challenge is, however, quite

unsatisfactory and uncharacteristically vague, even question-begging.

It may be admitted that the whole being of a subject cannot
consist in its relation to its attributes - or, in our
terminology, that the whole being of a substance cannot consist
in its relation to its qualities. But, not to mention other
elements which enter into the being of substance, and confining
ourselves to its qualities, we must note that when we have said
that a substance is related to its qualities, we have not
mentioned the most important point. The substance is, no doubt,
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related to its qualities. If Smith is happy, then there is a
certain relation between the substance Smith and the quality of
happiness. But this is not all. He is not only related to the
quality of happiness. He is happy. And it is the latter which
is fundamental. The fact that he is happy is the primary fact,
and the fact that he is related to the quality of happiness is
only derivative. For if the fact of his happiness could be
reduced to his relation to the quality of happiness, then, on
the same principle, his relation to the quality of happiness
ought to be reduced to the two relations between that relation
and its two terms - Smith and happiness. And so we should have
started on such an infinite regress as has caused Mr Bradley to
deny the reality of all relations.
Thus we may reply to Dr Stout's question as to what it is
which is related by giving the qualities of the substance.
Smith, who is related, is happy, he is also a man, and so
on.8'

There are a number of ways in which this reply can be interpreted;
and none, I think, is satisfactory.
It might be understood to mean that McTaggart has attempted to
avoid the force of Stout's criticism by conflating two distinct
senses of the copula - the "is" of predication, and the "is" of
identity. But this is hardly satisfactory. When we say that Smith is
happy we do not mean that Smith is identical with the quality of
happiness. We mean that Smith, qua substantive, has the quality of
happiness. And the predicative sense of the copula, it is generally
understood, implies that the substantive term is a materially
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distinct entity from the predicative term. Thus we are still left
with Stout's question about what the material distinction between
Smith and happiness consists in. Now, as long as McTaggart wishes to

maintain a material distinction between Smith and happiness he cannot
simply conflate the two senses of the copula. And if we are to be
charitable, then we must assume that McTaggart's reply does not
involve such an obvious equivocation.
A second possibility is that McTaggart is implicitly appealing to
the category of Identity which Hegel introduced when describing the
way in which the "surface" of a thing is related to its "substratum".

Hegel's category of Identity is not, as McTaggart points out in his A
Commentary On Hegel's Logicei, equivalent to the logical Law of

Identity. The statement that the surface of a thing is identical with
its substratum is not, according to Hegel, a tautology. The category
of Identity recognises the reality of a distinction between the
surface and the substratum, but the distinction is a merely formal
distinction86.
The problem with both of these readings is that they do not allow
us to acknowledge the reality of a material distinction between
substance and its nature. The distinction, in each case, is merely
formal. This is not to say that a material distinction between
substance and its nature cannot be defended. An alternative reading
is to understand McTaggart as saying that, although Smith and
happiness are materially distinct entities, the judgement that Smith
is happy primarily means that Smith and happiness are united in a
non-relational manner; and that this non-relational unity of
substance and quality is what Stout has called the fundamentum
relationis - the ground of the of the existence of the relation
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between Smith and happiness87. This fundamentum relationis is not

reducible to the existence of that relation, and may be understood to

be a distinct kind of entity from either the substance or the quality
- as is the case with W.E. Johnson's ties™. Or else, it might be
understood to be a primitive and ultimate kind of unity which cannot
be analysed in terms of the existence of the substance Smith, the
relation of inherence, and the quality of happiness.
I believe that the latter reading is more or less the correct
reading of McTaggart's reply. But even though it allows us to
acknowledge the reality of a material distinction between substance
and its nature it does not really explain the ultimate ground for
that distinction. To understand the ultimate ground for that
distinction I think we need to come up with an answer to Stout's
question as to what the being of substance, as distinct from its
nature, consists in. And the answer to that question is that
substance, as distinct from its nature or qualities, is existence or
Being. As I argued earlier in this chapter, this is a legitimate
analysis of our initial assumption that something exists. It is
consistent with a valid deduction of the category of Substance from
that of Quality; and it allows us to explain why our general idea or
concept of substance is essentially relative and without positive
content. Our concept of substance is without content insofar as
content pertains only to the whatness or suchness of reality.
Substance, as existence, constitutes the that or this of reality.
Existence cannot, as such, be added (except in a purely formal sense)
to the content of our individual concepts, as Kant has rightly
pointed out. Existence is that which distinguishes an instantiated
from an uninstantiated concept, and therefore cannot be contained
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within a concept. Substance, as such, is not accessible by purely
discursive cognition. But it is given in perception, which McTaggart,
in Section 44 of The Nature Of Existence, appropriately describes as
the awareness of the existent.

26. The explicit categorisation of existence as Substance is,
perhaps, somewhat unusual. But it is, I think, implicitly endorsed by
a number of philosophers. It is, for example, implicit in Aristotle's
notion of substance as ousia, which, as D.W. Hamlyn has remarked68,

is naturally translated as "beingness". And it does allow us to offer
solutions to some important philosophical problems.
Apart from the fact that it provides us with answers to the
questions posed by Locke and Stout, the categorisation of existence
as substance enables us to avoid the criticisms which have been
raised against attempts to categorise it as a quality, whilst still
maintaining that existence is a genuine and irreducible feature of
the world.
The categorisation of existence as substance is also compatible
with Bradley's principle (which is, I believe, ultimately traceable

to Aristotle) that reality is essentially a union of the what and the
that, of content and existence, and that these elements are not
reducible the one to the other. It is also compatible with his
general theory of judgement, according to which all judgement
involves the predication of some ideal content of reality; and with
his view that all thought or discursive cognition essentially
involves the abstraction of content from existence, of the what from
the that.
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Thirdly, by categorising existence as substance we can, I think,
reconcile the theory that existence is a "first-level" quality (i.e.
a quality of individuals) with the theory that existence is a
"second-level" quality (i.e. a quality of concepts or other
qualities) in a way which preserves the insight that existence is a
genuine feature of the world. To say that an individual, say John,
exists, may be understood to mean that some part of existence has all
those qualities which make up John's nature. The claim that a concept
is instantiated will be understood to mean that some part of
existence, or existence as a whole, satisfies that concept. The
concept horse, for example, is instantiated if one or more parts of
existence combine all those qualities which are included in the
connotation of that concept. This is, I think, what is usually

understood by the claim that existence is a second-level predicate or
quality. The two theories are reconcilable by introducing what
Leibniz called an individual concept, or what others have called an
individual essence10. An individual, John, exists if the individual
concept of John is instantiated. And the claim that an individual
concept is instantiated simply means that some part of existence, or
that existence as a whole, has the qualities included in the
connotation of that concept.
Insofar as existence is not a quality, it is not predicable of any
entity. It is, in this sense, particular rather than universal. The
relation between existence and existences will accordingly be
understood to be a part/whole relation, rather than a relation
between a universal and its instances. Considered as a whole or
aggregate of all parts of existence, existence is identical with the
Universe.
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27. The categorisation of existence as substance allows us to
accept two characteristics which have traditionally been considered
to be distinguishing features of substance. The first is that
substance is that which remains identical in change. The second is
that substance is self-existent. That which remains identical in
change is existence. And naturally, if anything is self-existent, it
is existence.
We may also offer an account of what it means to say that a
quality or a relation exists. A quality exists if it is either
directly or indirectly true of existence. A quality is indirectly
true of existence if it is true of some quality of existence, of some
relation between existences or between existents, or of one or more
existents. An entity is existent if it exists, but is not itself
existence or part of existence. A relation exists if it relates parts
of existence, or relates existents. The traditional view that
qualities and relations have a merely dependent or derivative mode of
being is thus vindicated by our view.

28. The introduction of the concept of a dimension of a substance
will allow us to draw a distinction between substances and events. An
event, we may say, is a substance which has a temporal dimension.
Any attempt to reduce substances to events is circumvented by our
view. An event, in the ordinary sense, is, in our terminology, a
substance. And substances are more fundamental, in an ontological
sense, than events, because the existence of events can be explained
in terms of the existence of substances. It is impossible, on the
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other hand, to explain, without circularity, the existence of
substances in terms of the existence of events.

29. It remains for us to say something about the way in which a
substance stands to its nature. I suggested earlier that, in
agreement with McTaggart and Armstrong, we may say that, although a
substance is related to its nature, this fact is not fundamental.
What is fundamental is that the substance and its nature are united.
Whether or not this unity can be constituted by a relation will be
discussed in the next chapter.
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CHARTER TWO

TJtie Categories Of Existence — 2

1. In the previous chapter we reached two important conclusions
concerning the existent. The first was that the categories of
Substance and Quality are valid categories of existence. The second
was that existence, itself, is rightly categorised as substance. We
also concluded that there must be a material, as distinct from a
merely formal, difference between a substance and its nature. The
question then arose as the ontological status of this difference.
Substance is different from its nature; but it is also, we agreed,
united with its nature. The recognition of these facts will allow us
to deduce two further categories of existence - the categories of
Relation and Unity.

2. Let us consider, firstly, the fact that substance is different
from its nature. How are we to analyse this fact? The correct, and
perhaps the most natural response is, I suggest, that the fact
comprises three distinct entities: substance, its nature1, and a
relation of difference. I do not think that it is possible to defend
this analysis by any direct argument. It is, rather, based upon the
principle that any difference between entities involves a relation;
and I consider this principle to be self-evident2. Now, if this
analysis is correct, then we will have shown that the category of
Relation is a valid category of existence.
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We have seen that the categories of Substance and Quality are both
ultimate categories, in the sense that neither can be dispensed with
in favour of the other, or in favour of some other category. Can the
same be said of the category of Relation? In agreement with
McTaggart3, we must, I think, conclude that the category of Relation
is both ultimate and indefinable. Attempts have been made to show
that the category of Relation is either dispensable in favour of some
other category or internally inconsistent. The monadism of Leibniz,
for example, might be understood to be an attempt to show that the
category of Relation is dispensable in favour of the category of
Quality; whilst the views of F.H. Bradley in Appearance And Reality
might be understood to be an attempt to show that the category is
int erna11y i neons i stent.
There have also been attempts to define the category of Relation.
It is sometimes suggested, for example, that a relation is a "two,
three or n-particulared universal"*, or that it is a dyadic, triadic,
or n-adic adjectivei. I will now consider some of these attempts to
either dispense with, or define, the category of Relation.

3. What reasons are there, then, for believing that the category
of Relation is dispensable?
There is, of course, the view, traditionally ascribed to Leibniz,
that propositions which ostensibly assert that a relation exists
between two (or more) terms can be analysed in a manner which
involves only the predication of qualities of those terms. In
general, it is suggested, propositions of the form "aRb", which
ostensibly assert that a relation, R, relates a and b, can and should
be analysed into a conjunction of two predicative propositions - one

90
predicating a quality r1 of a, and the other predicating a quality r2
of b. The qualities r1 and r1 are what we might call relationgrounding qualities or foundations of R. The proposition "John is
taller then Paul" might accordingly be analysed into a conjunction of
two propositions - "John is 180cm tall" and "Paul is 175cm tall". In
this case, the qualities 180cm tall, and 175cm tall, are the
foundations of the relation is taller than.
This approach does, however, have several problems. The first is
that it might reasonably be accused of tending to conflate the fact
that relations are almost invariably determined by certain qualities
of their terms, with the claim that relations can be reduced to these
qualities. The fact that John is 180cm, and the fact that Paul is
175cm tall, are not equivalent, when taken in conjunction, to the
fact that John is taller than Paul - although they may, taken
conjointly, intrinsically determine this fact.
The second, and related problem is that such an approach cannot
provide a satisfactory analysis of propositions which ostensibly
involve asymmetrical relations. This is the classic objection to
monadism put forward by Bertrand Russell in The Principles Of
Mathematics* - an objection which has not, in my opinion, received a
satisfactory reply. Russell's point is essentially that any attempt
to analyse a proposition which ostensibly asserts that two or more
terms are related by an asymmetrical relation into a conjunction of
two or more predicative propositions will inevitably involve the
tacit acceptance of the reality of some other asymmetrical relation,
or else it will fail to convey the meaning of the original
proposition. In the case of our previous example, the proposition
"John is taller than Paul" might be analysed into a conjunction of
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the propositions "John is 180cm tall" and "Paul is 175cm tall". But
this conjunction can only preserve the meaning of the original
proposition insofar as it is tacitly assumed that 180cm is a greater
length than 175cm. In other words, we have dispensed with the
relation taller than only by tacitly accepting the reality of another
asymmetrical relation of greater length than. And it is evident that
there is no way in which the latter two propositions can be further
analysed so as to at once avoid the introduction of some asymmetrical
relation and preserve the meaning of the original proposition. As
Russell points out7, if we merely say that John is 180cm tall and
that Paul is 175cm tall, and then add that 180cm is different to
175cm, then we have not preserved the meaning of the original
proposition; since difference is a symmetrical relation, and is
therefore incapable of generating the kind of serial order among the
respective determinate lengths or magnitudes which is required for
the comparison of the heights of John and Paul which is expressed in
the original proposition.

4. If we cannot satisfactorily analyse relational propositions
into conjunctions of predicative propositions, it seems that there
are only two conclusions which we may draw. The first is that
propositions which ostensibly assert that there is a relation between
two or more terms are, when true, true in virtue of the fact that
there is a relation between the terms in question. The second is that
there are, in fact, no real relations; and that relational
propositions are always false, or, in case we accept the view that
there are degrees of truth and reality, that such propositions are
not completely true. The view that there are no real relations is the
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view which is traditionally attributed to Leibniz. And the view that
relations have a diminished degree of reality, hence that relational
propositions cannot be completely true, is the view which is
traditionally attributed to F.H. Bradley. Now, if we accept the first
conclusion, then the proposition that a substance is different from
its nature will be true in virtue of the fact that a relation of
difference exists between a substance and its nature. This would
vindicate our deduction of the category of Relation from the
categories of Substance and Quality. Before we accept this
conclusion, however, we ought to consider the alternative conclusions
and show why they are unacceptable.

5. Let us begin with the Leibnizian view that there are no real
relations. We have already seen that one part of the theory advocated
by Leibniz is unsound. It is impossible to preserve the meaning of a
relational proposition by analysing it into a conjunction of
predicative propositions. This is what we might call the "positive"
part of the theory. The "negative" part is that relational
propositions must be false because relations are not real entities.
What grounds, then, does Leibniz have for holding the negative
part of his theory? Ultimately, his reason for rejecting the reality
of relations is that they are not predicable of a single substantive
term in the way that qualities are.

I shall allege another example, to show how the mind uses, upon
occasion of accidents which are in subjects, to fancy to itself
something answerable to those accidents, outside the subjects.
The ratio or proportion between two lines L and M, may be
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conceived three several ways; as a ratio of the greater L to
the lesser M; as a ratio of the lesser M to the greater I; and
lastly, as something abstracted from both, that is, the ratio
between L and M, without considering which is the antecedent,
or which the consequent; which the subject and which the
object. And thus it is, that proportions are considered in
music. In the first way of considering them, I the greater; in
the second, M the lesser, is the subject of that accident,
which philosophers call relation. But, which of them will be
the subject, in the third way of considering them? It cannot be
said that both of them, L and M together, are the subject of
such an accident; for if so, we should have an accident in two
subjects, with one leg in one, and the other in the other;
which is contrary to the notion of accidents. Therefore we must
say that this relation, in this third way of considering it, is
indeed outside the subjects; but being neither a substance, nor
an accident, it must be a mere ideal thing, the consideration
of which is nevertheless useful.'

It has been pointed out by a number of critics' that this
objection to the reality of relations is of doubtful merit. It might
even be seen as question-begging. It is assumed that relations, if
they are to be real, must be predicable of a single subject in the
way that qualities are. It is then argued that no relation can be
consistently predicated of a single subject. The conclusion is then
drawn that relations cannot be real - although they might be ideal or
entia rationis, in the sense that they are creations of the mind10.
There is, however, no reason why relations should be predicable of a
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single subject unless, of course, we simply assume that they must
behave like qualities. But if we do not make this assumption, and
accept that relations typically fall between their terms (or between
a term and itself in the case of reflexive relations), then Leibniz'
objection to their reality is difficult to sustain. The recognition
of this fact is precisely why relations form a distinct category of
existents.
In claiming that relations are not predicable of their terms, and
that they typically fall between their terms (or between a term and
itself), we are not claiming that relations can be defined as
entities which fall between their terms. Any attempt to define the
category of Relation in this way would, as McTaggart points out11,
involve us in a vicious circle; since we can only explain the
relevant notion of "betweenness" as being the kind of "betweenness"
which relations typically have among their terms.

6. If we reject Leibniz' argument against the reality of relations
does it follow that relations cannot have a diminished degree of
reality? According to F.H. Bradley, there are reasons for concluding
that relations cannot be ultimately real. But, he insists, although
relations are not ultimately real, they do have a diminished degree
of reality. They are real or existent as appearances or as mere entia
rationis. And the fact that they are appearances does not, he would
insist, imply that they are unreal or non-existent.
Now I think that there are serious difficulties with Bradley's
theory of appearances12; and it is doubtful whether any consistent
account can be given of the principle of degrees of reality which
does not simply equate that principle with the view that an entity is
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more or less real according as it contains more or less of that which
is real, or with the view that an entity is more or less real
according as it is more or less independent in its existence. But let
us ignore these difficulties and concentrate upon the reasons which
Bradley gives for taking the view that relations cannot be ultimately
real. For if these reasons are unsound, there will be no basis for
concluding that they have a diminished degree of reality.

7. It seems to me Bradley uses two quite distinct lines of
argument in his critique of relations. One is based upon a vicious
infinite regress which allegedly arises when we attempt to explain
how a relation "stands" to its terms. The other line of argument is
based upon the claim that all relations are abstractions from, and
presuppose the existence of, a whole which comprises the relation and
its terms. The first line of argument is, I maintain, inconclusive.
But the second does draw our attention to an important, if neglected,
point in the philosophy of relations. I will now consider each of
these 1ines of argument.

8. In Chapter 3 of Appearance And Reality Bradley argues that the
categories of Quality and Relation are not, strictly, valid
categories of existence, or, rather, of ultimate reality. The
arguments in that chapter are sometimes understood to be directed
against the category of Relation alone. But this is not the case.
They are, in fact, criticisms of the attempt to categorise ultimate
reality in terms of qualities and relations; and part of the
criticism involves demonstrating that neither category can be
introduced without the other - i.e., that each implies the other. He
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then argues that, although each category implies the other, they are,
nonetheless, mutually incompatible. It is then concluded that neither
category is a valid category of ultimate reality.
We may agree with Bradley that each category implies the other.
But why should we believe that they are mutually incompatible?
Bradley offers two distinct reasons for drawing this conclusion. The
first is that the occurrence of a relation between two or more
qualities determines, in those qualities as its terms, a complex
nature which is incompatible with the unity of those qualities.

Hence the qualities must be, and must also be related. But
there is hence a diversity which falls inside each quality.
Each has a double character, as both supporting and as being
made by the relation. It may be taken as at once condition and
result, and the question is as to how it can combine this
variety.13

The contention is that any quality in relation, A, must combine
two distinct aspects: (i) its "original" nature upon which the
relation is grounded; and (ii) its "derivative" nature which is
determined by the relation. A, it turns out, is, in fact, a
combination of two distinct elements, a and a. And these two
elements, if they are to form A, must, in turn, be united by a
further relation - which relation will imply a diversity or
complexity within both a and a; and so on indefinitely.

Every quality in relation has, in consequence, a diversity
within its own nature, and this diversity cannot immediately be
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asserted of the quality. Hence the quality must exchange its
unity for an internal relation. But, thus set free, the diverse
aspects, because each something

in relation, must each be

something also beyond. This diversity is fatal to the internal
unity of each; and it demands a new relation, and so on without
limit.1'

There are two points which might be made in reply to this
argument. The first

is that Bradley has not,

I think, clearly

distinguished the concepts of unity and simplicity. Simplicity, we
may say, is the quality of being without parts, or of

lacking

structure or complexity. Unity, on the other hand, is not strictly a
quality of entities. A unity is a unity of or among entities whether these entities be substances, qualities, or relations. Unity,
in

this

sense,

simplicity.

If

implies
we

accept

complexity
this

and

is

distinction

incompatible
between

simplicity, then Bradley's argument would at best

with

unity

and

show that no

quality in relation can be simple. If we also agree to accept the
premiss that every quality must be a quality-in-relation, we might
even conclude that no quality can be simple. Now we have seen, in the
previous chapter, that McTaggart's argument in favour of the reality
of simple qualities was inconclusive; and Bradley himself offers no
reason to assume that there must be simple qualities, so the argument
would only seem to support the conclusion that there can be no simple
qualities.
The

second

point

is

that

Bradley

does

not

acknowledge

a

distinction between a quality and its nature. The nature of a quality
comprises all those qualities which are true of that quality. It is,
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for example, a quality of blueness to be the colour of the unclouded
sky in daylight; and this quality is part of the nature of blueness,
although it is not a part of blueness itself. Once we acknowledge
this distinction then it seems to me that the argument loses any real
cogency. For let us assume that we have a quality, A, and that part
of its nature, a, determines its relation with some other quality, B;
and, that another part of its nature, a, is determined by its
relation with B. Where is the inconsistency here? The qualities a and
a form part of the nature of A, but they are not parts of A. And even
if we assume that A itself is simple, this does not commit us to the
conclusion that it has a simple nature.

9. The second reason which Bradley gives for concluding that the
categories of Quality and Relation are incompatible is that the
occurrence of a relation between two qualities involves an infinite
regress of relations.

But how the relation can stand to the qualities is, on the
other side, unintelligible. If it is nothing to the qualities,
then they are not related at all;... But if it is to be
something to them, then clearly we shall now require a new
connecting relation.... But here again we are hurried off into
the eddy of a hopeless process, since we are forced to go on
finding new relations without end. The links are united by a
link, and this bond of union is a link which also has two ends;
and these require each a fresh link to connect them with the
old.15
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The suggestion is this. Let us assume that there is a relation, R,
between a and b. If R is not predicable of a, or of b, or of a and b
taken in conjunction, then it must be an entity distinct from either
a or b. The question then arises as to how R "stands to" a and b. The
obvious reply is that R relates a and b, and that if it did not
relate them it would not be a relation. This initial question should
be distinguished from another, namely, how do a and b, taken
severally, stand to R? And the reply to this question is that they
are related to R - i.e. there are two further relations, R1 and R2,
which relate a to R and b to R.
In neither of these cases, however, do we have any genuine
difficulty. In order that a and b should be related we need only
postulate the occurrence of the relation R to relate them. In virtue
of this original relationship aRb we might ask how a and b stand to
R, and find that we are faced with an infinite regress of relations.
But the regress is not vicious since we do not need to reach a final
term in the series of relations in order that our original terms, a
and b, should be related. They are related by R.

10. The conclusion to be drawn in the light of Bradley's arguments
is that relations relate their terms. This might seem a mere truism,
but it is often confused with the quite different conclusion that
relations unite their terms. Bradley, himself, does not clearly
distinguish these two conclusions. In the passage quoted above, for
example, he speaks of relations as "links" which are "united" by
other links. He also speaks of them as a "bond of union". What I
maintain is that Bradley has not shown that there is any genuine
incompatibility between, or inconsistency in, the categories of
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Quality and Relation; but he has, here and in subsequent writings,
drawn our attention to the fact that there is a genuine difficulty in
understanding how qualities and relations are united. The difficulty
is this. If terms and relations are distinct entities then we cannot
simply unite them without stating the ground of their unity. Bradley
assumed that the only ground for their being united was the
occurrence of a further relation between each term and the relation;
and it is clear that if we agree to this assumption then we will be
involved in a vicious infinite regress, since the ultimate ground for
the unity of the original terms and the relation can only come with
the final term of an infinite series of relations.

11. Various attempts have been made at supplying a ground for the
unity of terms and relations. Perhaps the most popular recourse,
among those philosophers who recognise that there is a genuine
problem to be solved, is to introduce a non-relational tie between
the terms in a relationship. This is the way in which W.E. Johnson,
for example, attempts to solve Bradley's difficulty.

The coupling tie...is of fundamental importance in
discussing one of the paradoxes that Mr Bradley and others have
found in the general notion of relation. The paradox is briefly
brought out in the following contention: when we think of x as
being r to y, we have first to relate x to y by the relation r,
and then relate the relation r to x by - say r' - and r to /by
- say r", another relation. This again will require that x
should be related to r' by the further relation rm', which will
lead to an infinite regress on the side of x, and a similar
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regress on the side of y. This paradoxical contention is met by
pointing out that in constructing an object out of the
constituents x, r, and y, we do not introduce another
constituent by the mere act of constituting these constituents
into a unity. The pretence of paradox is due to the assumption
that to the act of relating or constructing there corresponds a
special mode of relation; so that a tie is confused with a
relation.18

Unfortunately, it is not entirely clear from this passage what
ontological status we are to assign to the tie. If it is, in some
sense, a distinct entity (i.e. an entity distinct from the terms and

the relation) then we might reasonably ask how the tie is united with
the terms and the relation; that is, we might ask what the ground is
for their being united. If we introduce another tie to unite the
original tie, the terms, and the relation, we are faced with a
vicious infinite regress, since the original terms can only be united
by the final term in an infinite series of ties - i.e., they cannot
be united.
The correct interpretation of the tie is, I suggest, that it is

simply the unity comprising the terms and the relation, or what Stout
called the "fact of relatedness"17. This interpretation is supported
by Johnson's own statements in the first chapter of the book.

The general term 'tie' is used to denote what is not a
component of a construct, but is involved in understanding the
specific form of unity that gives significance to the
construct."
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I agree that the tie is not a component of a construct. Where I

would differ from Johnson is over the claim that the tie, rather than
being involved in understanding the specific form of unity, ought,
instead, to be identified with the form of unity. The coupling tie, I
suggest, is a form of unity. And Unity, I would further suggest, is a
distinct category of existence. A unity is not a substance, a
quality, or a relation - although it may comprise substances,
qualities, and relations, and is implied by the existence of any
relation.
Although a tie is a form of unity, the category of Unity

encompasses more than the kind of unity involved in the coupling tie.
A fact, I should say, is a form of unity encompassing the coupling
tie and what Johnson calls the "characterising tie"19 - i.e. the
form of unity implied by any assertion that a substantive term is
characterised by an adjective term or quality. McTaggart, for
example, defines a fact in this manner.

I should define a Fact as being either the possession by
anything of a quality, or the connection of anything with
anything by a relation. (In this definition I use "anything" to
include both substances and characteristics.)20

A fact, thus understood, is equivalent to what Armstrong calls a
"state of affairs".

State of affairs. A particular (including higher-order
particulars) having a property, or two or more particulars
being related.21
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Again, although a fact is a form of unity, there are forms of
unity other than facts. In general, we may say, the existence of any
relation implies a unity; and, conversely, every unity implies the
existence of a relation22. But what is perhaps even more important
is that the kind of relation determines the kind of unity. Thus,
where we have two existents which are spatially related, we shall
have a spatial unity which comprises the terms and the relation. It
also follows that where we have two terms related by two different
relations, we will have two different forms of unity determined by
those relations. Two substances might be spatially related, for
example, and therefore be comprised by a spatial unity. But the same
two substances might also be temporally related, and therefore be
comprised by a temporal unity.

12. Insofar as every unity implies the existence of a relation,
every unity, we may conclude, is complex.
This conclusion might be challenged by claiming that there are
some unities which do not involve a relation. Such unities we might
call simple unities. Now, the only kind of ostensibly simple unities
are those involved in the identity of an entity with itself. In what
sense, we might be asked, can such ostensibly simple unities involve
a relation?
The correct reply to this question is, I suggest, that there are
no simple unities. Unities of self-identity are, in fact, complex and
involve a relation - the relation of self-identity. An entity, x, is,
we will assume, identical with itself. We might then say that it is a
fact that x is identical with itself, and that this fact is simply a
unity comprising x and a relation of self-identity.
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13. The claim that self-identity is a relation has, however, been
criticised. In Chapter 19 of Universals And Scientific Realism D.M.
Armstrong argues that there are no reflexive relations, hence that no
particular or substance can be related to itself. Since self-identity
is ostensibly a reflexive relation, his arguments can be seen as
being directed against the view that there can be no unity or fact
describable as an entity's being identical with itself.
Armstrong puts forward three distinct arguments in defence of his
claim. The first is that we can determine a priori that an entity is,
in some cases, reflexively related.

We know a priori that a particular is identical with itself,
resembles itself, is the same size as itself, and so on.23

The objection is that if we know a priori that some characteristic
is true of an entity, then that is a sufficient reason to conclude
that the characteristic in question does not exist. This principle is
called the "Irish Principle". The reply to this objection is simply
that there is no reason to accept the principle upon which it is
based as true. Armstrong cannot consider the principle to be a selfevident truth, since we would then know a priori that it has the
characteristic of being true. The principle would then be
incompatible with its own truth. If it is not an a priori truth then
it might be an empirical truth. But if it is an empirical principle
which applies to all existents it can only be established
inductively; and I have argued, in the Introduction, that no
ontological principles can be established by inductive reasoning. On
the other hand, it might simply be a regulative or methodological
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principle, i.e. a principle the denial of which is inconsistent with
a particular method of inquiry - in Armstrong's case an a posteriori
or "scientific" realism. What this method amounts to is not, however,
clearly stated. In any case, the objection really only amounts to a
fundamental disagreement about metaphysical method; and we have seen
that the empirical method, insofar as it is dependent upon inductive
inference, is quite inappropriate in Metaphysics, and cannot provide
us with genuine ontological or cosmological knowledge.
The second of Armstrong's arguments is that all existents must
have causal powers, and that reflexive relations "appear to bestow no
causal power upon the particulars which are said to have them."2'
Unfortunately, without an analysis of causation or of causal powers,
which Armstrong does not give, the objection is of doubtful cogency.
In any case, similar objections can be made against this principle as
were made against the Irish Principle. If it is a self-evident
principle, it is an a priori truth. If it is not self-evident, then
it can only be established either inductively, or by a deductive
inference from a principle which is self-evident. But since it
professes to be an ontological principle it cannot be established
inductively. And since Armstrong does not attempt to support it by
any deductive argument, we can only assume that he considers it to be
a self-evident truth. My own reaction is to simply deny that it is
self-evident.
The third argument is that facts which ostensibly involve
reflexive relations can, for the most part, be analysed in such a way
as not to involve any genuinely reflexive relation.
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... in all such cases, it does seem rather easy to give an
account of the ontology of the situations involved without
invoking any such relations. One part of a rope is entangled
with another part of the same rope. One hand washes another;
both wash the rest of the body.... If a man loves himself, then
it is not that self-loving state which he loves, but other
aspects of himself.25

Although such analyses are acceptable in the case of some facts,
they are clearly unsuitable in the case of a relation of selfidentity - a case which Armstrong unfortunately does not consider. If
x is identical with itself, this does not mean that x is identical
with a proper part of itself. Any such analysis would, in fact, be
self-contradictory, since it would imply that a whole is identical
with a proper part of itself; and, by definition, a proper part is a
part which is not identical with the whole26 of which it is a part.
None of the above objections to the reality of reflexive relations
is conclusive, especially in the light of our discussion of
Metaphysical method in the Introduction. We may, therefore, dismiss
Armstrong's critique of reflexive relations.

14. A further argument against the reality of the relation of
self-identity is that, if it were a relation, it would be a monadic
relation; and such relations, it is claimed, are impossible. This
argument has been attributed to Meinong, but it is, I think, implicit
in Armstrong's definition of a relation as being a polyadic, as
distinct from a monadic, universal. If there were genuine monadic
relations - i.e., relations which have only one term - and if all
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relations are, as Armstrong maintains, universals, then he would have
no way of distinguishing properties, which are defined as being
monadic universals, from monadic or reflexive relations - since such
relations would also be monadic universals.
In reply to the claim that monadic relations are impossible we
ought, I think, to follow Grossmann27, and draw a distinction
between the terms of a relation, and the places of a relation.
Identity is a two-place relation insofar as it has a direction, or
what Russell called a sense11, between its first and second place even though one and the same term occupies both places. Identity
might thus be said to be a monadic relation, in the sense that it has
only one term; or a dyadic relation; in the sense that it has two
places. And we might agree that it cannot have only one place, but
still maintain that it has only one term. Although the distinction
between the places and the terms of a relation is not generally
acknowledged by philosophers, it was, I think, implicitly endorsed by
McTaggart in Section 79 of The Nature Of Existence.

Thus we cannot say that every relation has more than one
term. Yet that which stands in a relation, even if the relation
has only one term, has a certain aspect of plurality. For a
relation always connects something with something. Even when it
only connects something with itself, the term so connected with
itself is - to use a metaphor which is not, I think, misleading
- at both ends of the relation, and this does involve a certain
aspect of plurality, though not, of course, a plurality of
substances.
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The "aspect of plurality" to which McTaggart refers in this
passage is, I suggest, simply the fact that one and the same term
occupies both places of a reflexive relation.

15. The reality of reflexive or monadic relations is, as we shall
see, of importance for McTaggart's general cosmology, and for the
theory of Determining Correspondence in particular. For these reasons
alone, the above discussion is justified. But it is justified for
another reason. In Section 2 of this chapter I mentioned the fact
that relations are sometimes defined as polyadic universals, or
polyadic adjectives. We have seen, however, that relations cannot,
strictly, be considered to be adjectives. They do not, as we pointed
out in reply to Leibniz, inhere in or qualify their terms - or
anything else for that matter28. In this respect they differ from
qualities. The use of the term "adjective" in respect of relations
is, therefore, at best misleading, and at worst simply erroneous. But
we have also seen that relations cannot be defined as polyadic
universals, since some relations, namely reflexive relations, are
monadic or single-termed; and, since qualities are, according to the
view under consideration, to be defined as monadic universals, we
would be unable to distinguish reflexive relations from qualities.
Furthermore, as I shall argue below, it is doubtful whether
relations, or qualities for that matter, are, in fact, universals in
any generally accepted sense - in which case the definition of
relations as polyadic universals would be doubly erroneous.

16. The category of Relation is, I have argued, an indispensable
and indefinable category of existence. I have also argued that the
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occurrence of any relation determines a unity which comprises the
relation and its terms. This unity is not a substance, a quality, or
a relation - although it must comprise a relation. We may therefore
conclude that Unity is a distinct and valid category of existence.
Every existent is either a substance, a quality, a relation, or a
unity; and these four categories will henceforward be considered to
be the fundamental categories of existence30.

17. Having established what the fundamental categories of
existence are, we might now consider some implications of their
acceptance.
Concerning the category of Substance, it is sometimes claimed that
the concept of an event or process is more fundamental than that of a
substance31. Now, we have already considered one reason why such a
view is unacceptable - it is impossible to explain the existence of
events except in terms of the category of Substance. If an event
exists, then this means that existence has some event-like feature.
This feature, I have suggested in Section 28 of the previous chapter,
is that of a temporal dimension. In agreement with McTaggart32, I
should say that a substance has a temporal dimension according as it
either forms a temporal series or is a member of a temporal series.
An event may thus be defined as a substance which has a temporal
dimension. By defining an event in this way we do not appeal to any
categories other than those which we have already introduced. The
concept of an event is analysed in terms of the concept of a series,
and the concept of a series in terms of terms and relations33.
It follows from our view of substance that there can be no
ultimate distinction between occurrents and continuants3*. An
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occurrent is a substance which has a temporal dimension - i.e., it is
an event. A continuant, on the other hand, is a substance which is
the subject of various successive states or qualities. Now, to say
that a substance has a temporal dimension means that existence has a
temporal dimension; and this, in turn, means either that there is one
part of existence which is a member of a temporal series comprising
other parts of existence (which series is generated by the relations
earlier than and later than), or that there are two or more parts of
existence which form a temporal series. The important point is that
in any temporal dimension of existence there is something which
remains self-identical and which is the subject of various successive
qualities or states - and this is existence itself. Existence might
accordingly be said to be a continuant. But insofar as it only one
member of a temporal series, it might also be said to be an
occurrent35.

18. Regarding the categories of Quality and Relation, there are a
number of important conclusions which follow from the validity of
these two categories. Perhaps the most important is that the
occurrence of a relation between two or more terms implies the
occurrence of a further quality of those terms - the quality of
standing in that relationship. Consider, for example, the fact that
John is taller than Paul. We may say that this fact or unity
comprises three entities - the terms John and Paul, and the relation
taller than. This fact implies two other facts: the fact that John
has the quality of being taller than Paul; and the fact that Paul has
the quality of being shorter than John. These two facts comprise the
original terms, John and Paul, the relational qualities implied by
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the relation taller than, and relations of inherence between the
original terms and the relational qualities.
Those qualities of terms which are implied by relationships I
shall, following McTaggart38, call derivative qualities. The
occurrence of such qualities, and the fact that every relation
implies a unity comprising that relation and its terms, allows us to
agree with Ewing that all relations are "internal" in two senses.

To sum up, we must admit that all relations are internal in
the first and fourth senses, i.e. they always presuppose terms
which have the characteristic of standing in the relation in
question, and they involve a genuine, though perhaps very
partial and limited, unity between their terms.3'

Where I should disagree with Ewing is over his apparent assumption
that it is the relation itself which, in some sense, unites its
terms. Bradley's arguments have, I suggest, conclusively refuted that
view. Every relation implies a unity among its terms; but since the
relation is, itself, a distinct entity, it cannot constitute the
unity which comprises the terms and the relation. What is important
is that it is not just the terms, but the relation as well, which are
comprised by a unity. If it were only the terms themselves which were
comprised by a unity, then we would be faced with Russell's classic
objections to the Monistic theory of relations3'. Our view differs
from the Monistic theory insofar as we maintain that the relation
itself is a constituent in a unity which comprises the relation and
its terms.
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There is a further point made by Ewing with which I should agree
entirely. This is that the existence of such unities is compatible
with a high degree of separateness of the terms. Spatial relations
among terms will, for example, imply a unity, namely a spatial unity,
which comprises the terms and the relation. But spatial unities, it
is generally acknowledged, are consistent with a considerable degree
of independence among the terms which they comprise.

When we have said that a relation entails the unity of the
related terms we have said very little, for if we are asked
what the degree and nature of that unity is we can only answer
that it is just the kind of unity which consists in being
united by that specific relation. When we have given the
relation, we have already defined the unity which it involves.
This may be very slight, as when the relation is mere
coexistence at the same time, or very close as when it is
compresence as a part of the same state of consciousness. To
speak of the unity involved in all relation is of little value
except as a warning against the more extreme pluralists who
sometimes talk as if there were hardly any connection or unity
in the universe at all, but, since everything in the physical
universe is related in some way (if only by the relation of
spatial distance) to everything else, relation is compatible
with a high degree of separateness, unless some specific proof
can be given to show that the world is really much more of a
unity than it appears to be.39
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19. I have claimed that the kind of relation involved in a
relationship determines the kind of unity which comprises the terms
and the relation. But in addition to the kind of unity there is also
a determinable factor which I shall call the closeness of the unity.
The closeness of the unity comprising a relation and its terms is
dependent upon the extent to which the respective natures of the
terms are intrinsically determined by the fact that they are
constituents within that unity. The extent to which the natures of
spatially related terms are determined by that relationship is
apparently very slight. But, as Ewing points out, the extent to which
the natures of any two parts of the same state of consciousness are
determined by the fact that they are co-existent parts of the same
state of consciousness is quite considerable. Thus it is that the
natures of terms comprised by an organic unity are, it is generally
acknowledged, determined by the fact that they are thus related to a
far greater extent than are the natures of terms comprised by a
mechanical unity. This principle is, as we shall see, of fundamental
importance in Cosmology; and McTaggart's theory of Determining
Correspondence will, if sound, allow us to conclude that the Universe
is a much closer unity than it appears to be.

20. The principle that all relations determine a unity involving
their terms should be distinguished from the principle that all
unities involve a relation. Broad, for example, seems to accept the
first principle", but denies the second'1. His reason for rejecting
the second principle is that there are unities which do not
ostensibly involve a relation. The example which he gives of a "nonrelational" unity is the form of unity comprising a substantive term
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and a quality, and expressed in predicative judgements such as "x is
red". Such a non-relational unity is said to differ from the
relational unity expressed in the judgement "redness inheres in x",
which is admitted to be a relational unity, and to be a different
fact from the fact that x is red. The reason which Broad gives for
making a distinction between the two facts appears to be this. In the
first case we ostensibly have only two constituents, x and redness,
comprised by the unity expressed in the judgement "x is red". In the
second case we ostensibly have three constituents - viz., x, redness,
and a relation of inherence - which form the unity expressed in the
judgement "redness inheres in x". Each of these judgements is said to
correspond to a different fact.
The argument is, however, unsatisfactory. We may say that x and
redness are united. But we cannot follow Broad and describe this as
an inherence form of unity unless we know that there is a relation of
inherence between x and redness. The relation, itself, cannot,
however, be omitted from this unity, since it is the relation which
determines the form of unity. Without the relation as a constituent
in the unity, we could not distinguish the aggregate of x and redness
- which is determined by a relation of co-existence - from the fact
that x is red. And this, it seems to me, is a problem which confronts
any attempt, such as Armstrong's'2, to view the connection between a
substance and its nature as a non-relational unity or tie. A tie, as
such, does not have any intrinsic sense or direction. This can only
be supplied by the relation. And as Russell has pointed out, it is
the intrinsic sense of a relation which determines the order among
its terms, and thus the form of unity or fact which comprises them.
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In reply to Broad, then, I should say that the judgement "x is
red" corresponds to a different fact than the fact that redness
inheres in x. We should also distinguish the fact that x is red from
the fact that x has the quality of being inhered in by redness. Each
of these facts comprises a relation of inherence. The latter two
facts involve derivative qualities which are predicable of redness
and of x respectively. And although these facts are determined by the
original fact that x is red, they are not equivalent to, or different
ways of expressing, that fact. These latter facts are what we might
call derivative facts or unities. The first is a unity comprising
redness, the quality of inhering in x, and a relation of inherence.
The second is a unity comprising x, the quality of being inhered in
by redness, and a relation of inherence. Now, since we can
differentiate unities according to their constituents, and since each
of these unities has different constituents, we have three different
unities or facts.

21. The occurrence of derivative qualities, implied by original
relationships or unities, implies the occurrence of derivative
relationships. For example, the original relationship, x is red,
implies, in the nature of x, the derivative quality of being inhered
in by redness. This fact, in turn, comprises x, a relation of
inherence, and the quality of being inhered in by redness, and is
thus a relationship. This latter relationship implies the occurrence
of similar derivative qualities in the natures of each term of the
relation; which, in turn, determines the occurrence of further
inherence relationships comprising these qualities and the terms of
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the relations. We will thus have an infinite series of relationships
determined by the original relationship.

22. In addition to the distinction between original and derivative
qualities and relations, McTaggart introduces a distinction between
Primary and Repeating Qualities of a substance. Primary Qualities are
the original qualities of a substance, and qualities which are
directly implied by original relationships. Repeating Qualities are
simply those derivative qualities comprised by the nature of a
substance which are neither original qualities nor qualities directly
determined by original relationships.
I do not think that there is any problem with this distinction. As
McTaggart points out in Section 88 of The Nature Of Existence the
existence of Repeating Qualities is, perhaps, of lesser importance in
any metaphysical inquiry than the occurrence of Primary Qualities.
And the fact that there will be an infinite number of Repeating
Qualities comprised by the nature of any substance might make the
fact of their existence seem trivial or uninteresting.

It is true, no doubt, that the occurrence of these qualities
and re1ations[hips]" becomes of less interest and importance
as we go down the series. It may be very important that A is
good. But the additional fact that A has the quality of being a
term in the relationship of inherence between himself and
goodness could scarcely be interesting to any sane man, except
as an example of a derivative quality. But a fact does not
cease to be a fact because no sane man would be interested in
it.
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23. The existence of unities, and the fact that all existents are
either unities or constituents within unities, has sometimes led
philosophers to the belief that such unities are more fundamental, in
an ontological sense, than the constituents. This belief is, I think,
implicit in Wittgenstein's claim45 that the world is a totality of
facts, not of things. But such a conclusion is, I suggest,
unjustified for two reasons.
Firstly, the existence of such unities or facts is ultimately
dependent upon the existence of substances - insofar as we have
categorised existence as substance. No fact or unity can exist unless
it comprises existents. And all existents, we have seen, ultimately
derive their existence from substances.
Secondly, since every unity is complex, its complexity is
dependent upon a diversity of constituents. This does not imply that
the constituents are necessarily more fundamental than the unity. It
only implies that the unity cannot be more fundamental than the
constituents. Every unity, we may agree with McTaggart*8, is a unity
of Composition as well as a unity of Manifestation. By a unity of
composition I mean what is sometimes called a "compound" unity,
according to which the unity is made up of the constituents. A unity
of manifestation, on the other hand, is understood to be a unity such
that the constituents are considered to be differentiations of the
unity, rather than the elements out which the unity is constructed.
The difference, as McTaggart points out'7, amounts to a difference
of emphasis - in one case the emphasis is placed upon the unity, in
the other it is placed upon the diversity, Those unities which
display a high degree of closeness will naturally tend to be regarded
as unities of manifestation rather than unities of composition. But
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this should not blind us to the fact that they are nonetheless
unities of composition as well as unities of manifestation.
It might be pointed out that, in describing all unities as being
unities of composition and unities of manifestation I have departed
somewhat from McTaggart's own use of these descriptions - which he
restricts to the kinds of unity implied by part/whole relations. I
agree that I have made a significant departure from McTaggart on this
point. But I think that his restricted use of the descriptions is
somewhat unfortunate. It seems to be based upon the assumption that
all genuine unities are ultimately determined by part/whole
relations; and I see no reason to accept this assumption. Nor do I
see that its rejection is incompatible with any important feature of
his general metaphysical theory.

24. There remains one question about qualities and relations which
is not, I think, adequately addressed by McTaggart. This is the
question whether qualities and relations are particular or universal
entities. Despite the claim in Section 100 of The Nature Of Existence
that characteristics (i.e. qualities and relations) are universal,
McTaggart is, I maintain, committed to the view that existent
characteristics are particular instances of universals. The principle
of Extrinsic Determination, for example, is, as I shall argue in
Chapter 4, dependent for its validity upon the assumption that the
characteristics of substances are particular. Although he does not
explicitly discuss the question of the status of qualities and
relations in respect of their particularity or universality, there
are a number of important passages where he talks of the "particular
occurrence" of this or that quality or relation. In Sections 108 to
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109, for example, when introducing the principle of Extrinsic
Determination, he talks of this principle as being applicable to
particular occurrences of qualities, rather than to qualities per se.
And in Section 116, when discussing the concept of Manifestation, he
makes the following relevant comment.

Qualities can only occur as qualities of something, and the
substance is as essential to its qualities as they are to it.
The substance would not be what it is without these qualities,
but, on the other hand, this particular occurrence of the
quality would not take place unless it were a quality of this
substance. [My emphasis]

The evidence for this view is perhaps even more explicit in the
following passage from Section 118.

And, further, in the case of some such qualities we know
that they cannot apply to more than one substance. We do not, I
think, know this of any simple qualities. But it might
nevertheless be true of them. I do not see that we can be
certain that there is no simple quality which applies to one
substance, and to one substance only.
And, in the case of finitely compound and complex qualities,
we do know of many which could not apply to more than one
substance. We shall see in Chapter XVIII that the quality of
being a universe is one which, though not simple, is not
infinitely compound or complex; and we shall also see that it
does apply to one existent substance, and that it cannot apply
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to more than one. Again, "the most virtuous of all dogs" is a
quality which is not infinitely compound or complex, and which
obviously cannot apply to more than one substance, though it
might apply to none, if dogs should not be susceptible of
virtue, or if two equally virtuous dogs should excel all other
in that quality.

I do not think that there is any intrinsic difficulty in such a
view. A similar theory was held by Aquinas, and, more recently, by
Ramon Lemos in his Metaphysical Investigations. Lemos states the
theory thus.

Particulars, in short, exemplify the universal properties they
do in virtue of the fact that they possess properties that are
singular cases of the universals exemplified. Just as any
property exemplified by any particular is identical with some
universal it exemplifies, so also any property possessed by any
particular is identical with some singular case of some
universal it exemplifies. Although some property possessed by x
might exactly resemble some property possessed by y, and
although these properties are cases of some universal
exemplified by the two particulars, each property, since it is
a singular case of the exemplified universal, is uniquely
possessed by the particular that possesses it."

Although such a view of the status of qualities and relations is
defensible, it is, perhaps, rather more difficult to refute the
contrary thesis - that such characteristics are universal. In the
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case of qualities, it seems to me that the best case that can be made
against their being universals consists in establishing a prima facie
case for their particularity, and then arguing that there is no
genuine difficulty involved in such a view. Now I think that Stout
has, in his many writings on the subject*9, certainly succeeded in
establishing a prima facie case for regarding the qualities of
substances as particular, rather than universal, entities. Whether or
not he has shown that such a view is without genuine difficulties is
debatable, In any case, the more recent objections to the theory put
forward by Armstrong50 and Grossmann51 are, as I have argued
e1sewhere52, inconc 1usive.

25. In the case of relations, on the other hand, it is, I believe,
possible to show that Realism (i.e. the view that the relations
between particular entities are universal) is false. The argument is
as follows.
Let us assume, in the first place, that the qualities universal
and particular are contradictory; so that an entity, any entity, must
be either one or the other - if it is not universal, then it must be
particular. By refuting the view that relations are universal we
shall thereby prove that they are particular. Now, given the
assumption, for which we have argued earlier in this chapter, that
relations relate their terms, we can, by reductio ad absurdum, show
that the relations between particular entities are, themselves,
particular.
Following Russell53, I will call any term which has the relation
R to some term or other the referent of the relation R, and any term
to which some term has the relation R the relatum of R. Accordingly,
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if John is taller than George, John is referent, and George relatum,
of the relation taller than.
Again following Russell I will assume that all relations are
either symmetrical, not-symmetrical, or asymmetrical". A relation
is symmetrical if it is the same as its converse; it is asymmetrical
if it is incompatible with its converse; and it is not-symmetrical if
it is compatible with, but not necessarily the same as, its converse.
The relation taller than is an example of an asymmetrical relation if John is taller than George, then George cannot be taller than
John. The relations of identity and difference are examples of
symmetrical relations - if red is different to blue, then blue is
different to red. The relation of implication is an example of a notsymmetrical relation - if p implies q, then q may or may not imply p.
If a term has a relation to itself, then that relation is a
reflexive relation. It is evident that all reflexive relations must
be either symmetrical or not-symmetrical, and that no term can be
both referent and relatum of one and the same relation unless that
relation is either a symmetrical or a not-symmetrical relation.
The following premiss follows from our definitions.

(1) No term can be both referent and relatum of an
asymmetrical relation - i.e. no term can be related to
itself by an asymmetrical relation.

Let us now assume that Realism is true, and that one and the same
relation can be a constituent of two or more distinct facts or states
of affairs. Let us also assume that the following propositions, each
corresponding to a different fact, are true.
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(2) John is taller than Fred.
(3) Bill is taller than John.

John, Fred, and Bill are assumed to be numerically distinct or
diverse particular entities. Now the Realist would assert55 that the
relation taller than, which relates John and Fred, is one and the
same entity as, i.e. is numerically identical with, the relation
which relates Bill and John - that it is, in this sense, a universal
entity,
It is, however, impossible that one and the same relation should
be a constituent of both facts. According to our definitions, John
and Bill are referents, and Fred and John are re lata, of the two
occurrences of the relation taller than™. But if Realism is true,
then we must conclude that the ostensibly distinct instances of the
relation are identical, and that Fred and John are relata of one and
the same relation, the relation taller than. And this fact or state
of affairs implies the further fact that John is taller than himself,
which is clearly impossible. In other words, given the assumption
that the relation taller than is an asymmetrical relation, the
realist is committed to the conclusion that one and the same term can
be both referent and relatum of that relation. But this contradicts
premiss (1). Hence the realist is refuted,

26. I have argued that no asymmetrical relation can be universal.
I will now use a similar argument to show that no symmetrical
relation can be universal. It should be pointed out, however, that
such an argument is not required to disprove Realism. Insofar as it
is a theory about the ontological status of all relations, Realism is
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refuted by the provision of a single counter-example. And the
previous argument has provided us with a counter-example. But it is
often believed that symmetrical relations in general, and resemblance
relations in particular, are especially amenable to a Realist
interpretation of their ontological status. It will, therefore, be
especially significant if we can show that such an interpretation
cannot be true.
I will begin with the following premisses.

(4) John resembles Fred.
(5) Bill resembles George.

John, Fred, Bill, and George, we will assume, are numerically
distinct particular entities. Resemblance, we will assume, is a
symmetrical relation. Let us also assume the truth of the following
propositions.

(6) John does not resemble George,
(7) Fred does not resemble Bill.

Now, if Realism is true, the John and Bill are referents of one
and the same resemblance relation. It follows that John and George
are respectively referent and relatum of one and the same resemblance
relation - i.e. it follows that John resembles George. This, of
course, contradicts (6). Similarly, Fred and Bill, being respectively
referent and relatum of one and the same resemblance relation, must
resemble one another - which contradicts (7). Again, the Realist is
refuted.
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27. The types of arguments presented in the previous two sections
can, I believe, be used to show that no other symmetrical or
asymmetrical relation can be universal. Furthermore, since any
particular occurrence of a not-symmetrical relation must be either
symmetrical or asymmetrical, depending upon its terms, it follows
that the above arguments are sufficient to show that no relations can
be universal; since every relation, we agreed, must be either
symmetrical, asymmetrical, or not-symmetrical.
These arguments are not, however, effective against the monadistic
view that the relations between particular entities are reducible to
qualities of those entities. Nor are they effective against the
monistic view that relations are predicates or qualities of the whole
which comprises the terms which they relate. But neither of these
views postulates the reality of relations as a distinct ontological
category. In any case, we have already seen, in this chapter, that
neither of these views is an acceptable view of the nature and status
of relations.

28. In this and the previous chapter I have argued that there are
four fundamental categories of existence: Substance, Quality,
Relation, and Unity. I have also considered some of the implications
of the validity of these categories. Until now we have not, however,
reached any conclusions about the number of substances which make up
the Universe. Is the Universe a single substance, or does it comprise
a plurality of substances? And if a plurality, upon what basis is
substance differentiated? In the next chapter we will attempt to
answer these questions.
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same reasons, to be true of all other relations;
relations do not have instances, but are strictly the
same in all propositions in which they occur.
Russell's views are criticised, on quite different grounds, by
H.H. Joachim in The Nature Of Truth, Chapter 2.
56. It is to be noted that the terms involved are understood to be
referents and relata of the relation, and not of the fact or
state of affairs of which they are constituents.
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CHAPTER THREE
The Differentiation Of Substance

1. The question whether the Universe is a plurality of substances,
or whether it is a single substance1, is the question whether
substance is differentiated. This question is treated by McTaggart in
two different ways. In Chapter 7 he appeals to perception, which, he
maintains, provides us with evidence that there is more than one
substance. In Chapter 22, on the other hand, an appeal is made to the
premiss that substance is infinitely divisible. In each case, it is
maintained, we can be certain that substance is differentiated.

2. Although McTaggart goes to some trouble in Chapter 7 to dispel
any doubts we might have about founding the belief that substance is
differentiated upon empirical evidence, his arguments are, I suggest,
both redundant and of doubtful cogency.
They are redundant insofar as the premiss, introduced in Chapter
22, and considered to be self-evident, that substance is infinitely
divisible, is sufficient to establish that substance is
differentiated. And they are of doubtful cogency insofar as they are
based upon certain unargued assumptions about the nature of
cognition. In Section 76 of The Nature Of Existence, for example,
McTaggart concludes that the existence of a single perception is
sufficient to establish that substance is differentiated. But this
conclusion is based upon the implicit assumption that perception
typically involves a distinction between the perception as such -
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which is considered to be either a state of the self, or a relation,
one term of which is the self - and what he calls the perceptiondatum; and, that this distinction amounts to, or involves, a
distinction between two (or more) substances. This assumption is,
however, controversial. It was rejected by Berkeley and Hume, for
example, and, more recently, by William James and F.H. Bradley2. And
even though the reasons which have been given by these philosophers
for denying the ultimate validity of such a distinction might be
unsound, I do not think that McTaggart is entitled, at this stage, to
simply assume, without argument, that the distinction is valid.
A similar difficulty arises if we attempt to found our conclusion
that substance is differentiated upon a consideration of the nature
of discursive cognition. As McTaggart acknowledges3, our answer to
the question whether the existence of a thought or judgement implies
that substance is differentiated depends upon our particular theory
of the nature of thought and judgement. If we accept the commonly
held view that thought involves a relation between the self and a
proposition, then we will not be entitled to conclude that the
existence of a thought or judgement implies that substance is
differentiated unless we assume that the proposition itself is a
substance - and this is a view which is not generally accepted.
McTaggart does admit that there is a difficulty with concluding
that substance is differentiated from the premiss that a thought or a
judgement exists. But he maintains that even if the existence of a
thought or judgement is not sufficient to establish that substance is
differentiated, our knowledge of the existence of a thought or a
judgement is sufficient; since that knowledge, he insists, is based
upon the awareness of the thought or judgement, and that awareness
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must, he assumes, be a different substance from the original thought
or judgement.
The problem with this argument is that it involves the implicit
assumption that the awareness of a thought or a judgement must be a
different cognition from the original thought or judgement. But this
assumption is controversial. It was rejected by Brentano, for
example*. And to the extent that it is controversial, the cogency of
McTaggart's argument is brought into question.

3. Rather than attempting to establish the conclusion that
substance is differentiated upon empirical evidence, I think that
McTaggart would have been better served at this stage of the inquiry
by simply appealing to the self-evidence of the premiss that
substance is infinitely divisible. The truth of this premiss is
essential to his general metaphysical theory, and its acceptance, as
I mentioned above, renders the arguments in Chapter 7 redundant. I
propose, then, to ignore empirical considerations and appeal directly
to the self-evidence of the premiss that substance is infinitely
divisible to establish that substance is differentiated.
This approach has the advantage of reducing the empirical
premisses in our theory to one - the premiss that something exists.
It also has the advantage of avoiding a rather unfortunate step in
McTaggart's overall argument. In Section 78 of The Nature Of
Existence, McTaggart derives the category of Relation from the
premiss, which he claims to have established empirically, that
substance is differentiated.

133
We have now a plurality of substances, and it is therefore
evident that there will be Relations among substances,

The problem here is that if the category of Relation is to be
derived from the premiss that substance is differentiated, and if
that premiss is to be established by empirical evidence, then,
insofar as the empirical considerations do not, as we saw in the
previous section, conclusively establish the truth of that premiss,
the validity of the deduction of the category of Relation is brought
into question.
We have, however, avoided this problem by deriving the category of
Relation from the premiss that a substance is different from its
nature. And this premiss was not established by empirical evidence that is, apart from the initial premiss that something exists. But we
might also follow McTaggart and derive the category of Relation from
the premiss that substance is differentiated; and this deduction
would be valid providing that we establish that premiss by means of
the premiss that substance is infinitely divisible. The fact that
there might be more than one way of establishing the validity of a
particular category does not, of course, conflict with any
methodological principle which we have adopted. On this point we can
agree with McTaggart when he claims5 that it is possible to
demonstrate the validity of various stages in a system of metaphysics
in more than one way.

4. The proposition that substance is infinitely divisible I
consider, then, to be self-evident. And, on the basis of this premiss
I conclude that substance is differentiated. Insofar as the premiss
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is considered to be self-evident it is, of course, pointless to try
and demonstrate its truth. If anyone doubts that it is true, then we
can only hope to convince him of its truth by removing possible
obstacles in the way of his directly intuiting that it is true. We
might do this in either of two ways: (i) by clarifying, as far as
possible, the meanings of the terms involved in the proposition; (ii)
by showing that those arguments which profess to establish the truth
of the contrary view are unsound. I will consider each of these
approaches in turn.

5. One obstacle in the way of acknowledging the truth of the
premiss that substance is infinitely divisible might be the view,
which we discussed in Chapter 1, that the concept of Substance is a
merely relative or negative concept. Insofar as our concept of
substance is without positive content, it might be argued that it is
difficult, if not impossible, to decide whether the proposition that
substance is infinitely divisible is true or false.
I think that this is a reasonable objection to make against most
substance theorists, including McTaggart, for whom the concept of
substance remains a merely relative concept. But I do not think that
it is a reasonable objection to our own view, according to which
existence is categorised as substance. Although we cannot form a
positive concept of existence, existence is given in perception or
intuitive cognition. And it is, I suggest, given as a continuum i.e., as infinitely divisible. Furthermore, our awareness of
existence, as such, might be said to be an a priori intuition,
analogous to Kant's view of the nature of our intuitions of space and
time, in the sense that existence is the material condition of all
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possible perception. And, in the same way that the recognition of
such a priori intuitions provided Kant with a novel solution to the
question how Arithmetic and Geometry, as a priori sciences, are
possible, so the recognition of the a priori nature of our awareness
of existence may provide us with a novel solution to the question how
Metaphysics, as an a priori science, is possible6.
But even if one is unable to directly intuit that existence is a
continuum, it is, I think, possible to show, by reductio ad absurdum,
that it must be a continuum. The argument is this. Let us assume that
existence is not a continuum. Then, between any two given parts of
existence it must be possible that nothing should exist. But to say
that nothing exists between two parts of existence simply means that
there is a part of existence, between these two parts, which has no
determinate nature. Hence, between any two parts of existence there
must be another part of existence. Existence is therefore a
continuum.

6. In reply to the above argument, and to the claim that the
infinite divisibility of substance is self-evident, some philosophers
have argued that substance must be simple - in the sense that it is
without parts. I will now consider the most important of these
arguments, and argue that they are either unsound, irrelevant to our
particular view of substance, or both unsound and irrelevant to our
particular view of substance.
The proposition that substance is simple might be understood to
mean either (i) that there is only one substance - the Universe or
God - which is simple; or (ii) that there is an indefinite, and
perhaps infinite, number of substances, each of which is simple. The
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first view finds its typical advocate in Spinoza. The second view is
typically represented by Leibniz. The reasons given by each

philosopher for believing that substance must be simple are, however,
quite different; and I will consider them in turn.

7. In the Ethics Spinoza argues that the following two
propositions are true, and together sufficient to prove that
substance must be simple.

PI2: No attribute of a substance can be truly conceived from
which it follows that the substance can be divided.
P13: A substance which is absolutely infinite is indivisible.1

Let us consider, firstly, Proposition 12. The proof of this
proposition is as follows.

Dem: For the parts into which a substance so conceived would
be divided either will retain the nature of substance or will
not. If the first tNS: viz. they retain the nature of the
substance], then (by P8) each part will have to be infinite,
and (by P7) its own cause, and (by P5) each part will have to
consist of a different attribute. And so many substances will
be formed from one, which is absurd (by P6). Furthermore, the
parts (by P2) would have nothing in common with their whole,
and the whole (by D4 and P10) could both be and be conceived
without its parts, which is absurd, as no one will be able to
doubt,

137
But if the second is asserted, viz. that the parts will not
retain the nature of substance, then since the whole substance
would be divided into equal parts, it would lose the nature of
substance, and would cease to be, which (by P7) is absurd.1

Clearly, the central concept in this proof is that of an attribute
of substance. This has proved to be a notoriously difficult concept
to understand; and any interpretation of what Spinoza meant by
attribute must, unfortunately, to some extent remain conjectural.

Perhaps the best way of trying to understand what Spinoza meant is to
consider an attribute to be an ultimate or supreme determinable or
genus, the determinate forms of which are the modes*. Spinoza claims
that substance has an infinite number of attributes10; and, that
thought and extension are two among these attributes. Any particular
thought or any particular (spatially extended) body is a determinate
mode of one of the infinite attributes. Now, according to Spinoza,
there are two kinds of infinity: an entity might be absolutely
infinite - in which case it is not limited by any other kind of
entity; or, it might be infinite according to its kind - in which
case it is not limited by any other entity of that kind. The
attributes are considered to be infinite in the latter sense.
Substance is considered to be infinite in the former sense.
If we consider the actual demonstration of Proposition 12 it is

clear that the cogency of the first part of the demonstration depends
upon the claim that, if substance is divisible, then any part of
substance must retain the essential nature of substance. Among the
essential properties of substance are the following: (1) it is

absolutely infinite; (2) it is self-caused; (3) no two substances can
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share the same attribute. Should substance be divisible, then,
according to Spinoza, the parts could not retain these essential
properties of substance - hence they could not, themselves, be
substances. Our reply to Spinoza must, accordingly, show either (a)
that the above properties are not essential properties of substance;
or (b) that the parts can retain these essential properties; or that
both (a) and (b) are true.

8. Let us consider, firstly, whether the three properties
mentioned by Spinoza are, in fact, essential properties of substance.
The first problem that confronts us is whether the definitions
upon which the axioms are based are intended to be real or merely
stipulative definitions. If they are merely stipulative, then it is

possible for someone to stipulatively define the concept of substance

in such a way that the "essential" properties attributed to substance
by Spinoza are not, in fact, essential - i.e., are not included in,
or do not follow from, the definition. If, on the other hand, they
are meant to be real definitions, then it is possible that they are
simply erroneous - in which case, once again, the properties
mentioned by Spinoza might not be essential properties of substance.

For example, if the definition of substance as "what is in itself and
is conceived through itself"11 is merely stipulative, then it is an
open question whether there is anything which satisfies that
definition. The same problem arises if the definition is meant to be

a real definition. The difficulty with Spinoza's view of substance is
that he attempts to argue that, from the definition of substance, it
follows that substance must exist. This conclusion is reached by
means of Definition 1 - viz., that which is cause of itself is that,
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the essence of which involves existence. According to Spinoza, it

follows from the definition of substance that substance is causa sui;
hence, that its existence is involved in its essence. The crucial
question here, however, is whether anything can be causa sui, in
Spinoza's sense. He has simply assumed that this is a self-consistent
concept. But as I have argued in Chapter 1, and as Kant, and others,
have pointed out in reply to the Ontological Argument for the
existence of God, there cannot be an entity whose essence or nature
involves existence, since existence is not itself a quality, and
therefore cannot be involved in the essence or nature of any
entity12.

9. If we reject the concept of causa sui as internally
inconsistent, then it cannot be an essential property of substance.
The first of Spinoza's "essential" properties of substance must
therefore be rejected.
What are we to say, then, about the claim that substance is
essentially infinite? I think that, when rightly understood, this
claim is true. But then the claim that substance is infinite, when
rightly understood, rather than being incompatible with the claim
that substance is divisible, actually implies that substance is
divisible - that it is a continuum. But before introducing what I

consider to be the correct view of the infinite, we should attempt to
determine exactly what Spinoza means when he says that substance is
essentially infinite. The proposition that substance is essentially

infinite is Proposition 8 of Part 1 (1P8) and the argument with which
it is defended is as follows,
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Dem.: A substance of one attribute does not exist unless it
is unique (P5), and it pertains to its nature to exist (P7). Of
its nature, therefore, it will exist either as finite or
infinite. But not as finite, For then (by D2) it would have to
be limited by something else of the same nature, which would
also have to exist necessarily (by P7), and so there would be
two substances of the same attribute, which is absurd (by P5).
Therefore, it exists as infinite, q.e.d.13

The claim that substance is infinite amounts, then, to the claim
that substance is unlimited. Now, why does Spinoza claim that
substance cannot be limited? The first reason, which is given above,
is that if substance were finite it would have to be limited by
something of its own kind - namely, by another substance. And, in
order for one substance to be limited by another substance they must
share the same attribute - i.e., the same ultimate determinable. But
according to Proposition 5 (1P5), no two substances can share the
same attribute. Hence, no substance can be finite.
The problem with this argument is that it only proves, at best,

that no substance with a particular attribute can be finite according
to its kind. It does not prove that substance must be absolutely
unlimited. To prove that substance must be absolutely unlimited
Spinoza would have to prove that it must have an infinite number of
attributes. Now he does attempt to prove this with Proposition 11
(1P11) - the proposition that God necessarily exists. But the proof

of this proposition involves the fallacious premiss that God is causa
sui. And, without this premiss, there is no reason to believe that
substance must be absolutely infinite.
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But why, we may ask, might there not be a plurality of substances
- each finite in the sense that it is limited by another substance
with the same attribute? Spinoza gives two reasons for rejecting this
possibility - both, I maintain, unsound. The first (lP5:Dem.), is
that if two substances shared the same attribute, they could only be
distinguished by their affections or modes. (I will take a liberty
here and equate the modes with what we have called "qualities".) And
this, according to Spinoza, is impossible, since a substance is
claimed to be prior, in its nature, to its affections or qualities.

...if the affections are put to one side and [the substance] is
considered in itself, i.e. (by D3 and A6), considered truly,
one cannot be conceived to be distinguished from another, i.e.
(by P4), there cannot be many, but only one [of the same nature
or attribute], q.e.d.1'

It seems to me that this reply begs the question. Of course, if we
ignore the modes or qualities of any two substances, then they will
be indistinguishable. But our contention is that what distinguishes
one substance from another are the modes or qualities. Let us assume,
for example, that we have two spatially extended, and adjoining,
squares. One is red, the other blue. Let us also assume that they
have no other non-spatial qualities which might differentiate them.
If we ignore the redness and blueness of these substances, and
consider them simply as spatially extended figures, then it will be
impossible to distinguish one from the other. But our claim is that
it is the redness and the blueness which differentiate the two
substances. It is evident that one and the same substance cannot be
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both red and blue in the same respect - i.e., the same part of a
spatially extended substance cannot be both red and blue at the same
time. These qualities must belong either to different parts15 of the
substance or to different substances. If they belong to different

parts of the same substance then we will have shown that substance is
divisible. And if they belong to two different substances, then we
will have shown that two substances can share the same attribute. In
either case Spinoza's argument is refuted.
The second reason which Spinoza gives for concluding that
substance must be infinite is to be found in Scholium 1 to
Proposition 8 (lP8:Schol.1).

Schol.i: Since being finite is really, in part, a negation,
and being infinite is an absolute affirmation of the existence
of some nature, it follows from P7 alone that every substance
must be infinite. [NS: For if we assumed a finite substance, we
would, in part, deny existence to its nature, which (by P7) is
absurd.]

The essential flaw in this argument is that it appeals to
Proposition 7, the proposition that substance is causa sui, to
establish its conclusion. And proposition 7, we have seen, is false.

But the argument also appeals to the principle that finitude involves
negation. It is then concluded, on the basis of this principle, that
any finite substance would, in some sense, lack existence.
The argument, as it stands, is clearly unsound. The principle that
finitude involves negation, when applied to substance, can only mean
that a finite substance is not an unlimited substance. But this is
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not a contentious claim. The contentious claim is, that by insisting
that a substance might be finite, we are thereby denying existence of
it. And this claim, it seems to me, is false. Insofar as we have
categorised existence as substance we have seen that it is impossible
to deny existence of any substance. Now, it is a truism that any
proper part of substance cannot contain the whole of existence. But
what Spinoza seems to have done is to argue that, since no proper
part of substance can contain all of existence, it therefore lacks
any existence. And this is an obvious non sequitur. It is analogous
to the claim that, since a finite volume does not contain all of
space, it therefore lacks any volume.

10. We have shown, then, that none of the three properties
mentioned by Spinoza in the Demonstration of Proposition 12 is an
essential property of substance. It is possible that substance should
be finite and divisible, and that two substances should share the
same attribute. It is therefore possible that each part should retain
the nature of substance - i.e., that each part is itself a substance.
Now, although substance need not be absolutely infinite, there is a
sense in which every substance must be infinite; and according to
which its infinitude, rather than being incompatible with its
divisibility, is a natural consequence thereof.
In order to understand in what way the divisibility of substance
is consistent with its infinitude I shall appeal to the classic
definition of an infinite system put forward by Richard Dedekind in
his "Was sind und was sollen die Zahlen?"16,
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64. Definition. A System S is said to be infinite when it is
similar to a proper part of itself (32); in the contrary case S
is said to be a finite system.11

The important undefined concepts in this definition are those of

similarity and proper part. These concepts are defined by Dedekind in
the following ways.

6. Definition. A system A is said to be a proper [echter]
part of S, when A is part of S, but different from S. According
to (5) then S is not a part of A, i.e., there is in S an
element which is not an element of A.l>

32. Definition. The systems R, S are said to be similar when
there exists such a similar transformation 0 of 5 that 0CS)=R,
and therefore 0(i?)=5. Obviously by (30) every system is similar
to itself.10

To show how the above definition of an infinite system is
applicable to substance we need to introduce the concept of a set of
parts of a substance. Following McTaggart, we will define a set of
parts of a substance thus.

A Set of Parts of any whole is any collection of its parts
which together make up the whole, and do not more than make it
up, so that the whole would not be made up if any of those
parts, or of their parts, should be subtracted.20
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Let us assume, for example, that we have a substance, A,
represented by the square below [Figure 3.1].

Figure 3.1
If we divide A by a vertical line we will then have two parts of
A, which we will call B and C [Figure 3.2].

B

Figure 3.2

C
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Let us now divide A by a horizontal line. We will then have two
parts of A, namely, the top half and the bottom half, which we will
call D and E respectively [Figure 3.3].

D

E

Figure 3.3

But we will also have, as a result of our previous divisions, four
parts of A: the top left-hand quarter; the top right-hand quarter;
the bottom left-hand quarter; and the bottom right-hand quarter. We
will call these parts F,G,H and I respectively [Figure 3.4].
Each of the collections of parts formed by our successive
divisions of A is, in accordance with McTaggart's definition, a set
of parts of A. {B,C}, {D,E}, and {F,G,H,I} are therefore distinct
sets of parts of A. Each of B,C,D,E,F,G,H,I is thus a part of A as
well as being a member of a set of parts of A. Each of
B,C,D,E,F,G,H,I is also, in accordance with Dedekind's definition, a
proper part of A - since each is a part of A, but different from A.
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F

G

H

I

Figure 3.4
Let us now assume that substance is a continuum, and that each
part of substance is itself a substance. Assuming that A is a
substance, it follows (i) that A has a set of parts with an infinite
number of members; (ii) that any proper part of A has a set of parts
with an infinite number of members. Let us call the set of parts of

A, a, and the set of parts of a proper part B, of A, j3. A and B might
thus be said to be "systems" of substances. Now, the systems A and B
are "similar" insofar as there is a one-one correspondence between
the members of a and the members of J3. And, since Bis a proper part
of A, A is an infinite system in accordance with Dedekind's
definition (at §64). But, ex hypothesi, substance is infinitely
divisible. Therefore, since every part of substance is, itself, a
substance (and therefore infinitely divisible), every part of
substance will be an infinite system. In this sense, then, every part
of substance will retain the nature of substance and be an infinite
system.
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11. I have argued that Spinoza has given us no conclusive reasons
for believing that substance must be simple, or for believing that
the Universe is a single, indivisible substance. We will now consider
the reasons given by Leibniz for believing that substance must be
simple or indivisible, and that the Universe is an infinite aggregate
of simple substances, and not itself a substance.
Ultimately, Leibniz' reasons for believing that substance must be
simple can be summed up by the following opening passages of The
Monadology.

1. The Monad, of which we shall here speak, is nothing but a
simple substance, which enters into compounds. By 'simple' is
meant 'without parts'.
2. And there must be simple substances, since there are
compounds; for a compound is nothing but a collection or
aggregation of simple things.21

The suggestion is, I think, that the existence of an aggregate or
a compound is dependent upon the existence of its constituent
elements. A heap of stones, for example, insofar as it exists as a
heap, is dependent upon the existence of the individual stones which
make it up. If we accept this principle, then, it might be argued,
the claim that substance is infinitely divisible would amount to the
claim that every substance is a compound - the existence of which is
dependent upon its constituents, whose existence is dependent upon
their constituents, and so on to infinity. Such a regress would seem
to be vicious since no compound could exist unless it comprises
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elements which were not themselves compounds, and whose existence did
not depend upon the existence of further constituents.

12. There are a number of difficulties with this argument. In the
first place, Leibniz, like Bradley, has not, I maintain, clearly
distinguished the concepts of unity and simplicity. A tacit premiss
in the argument is the principle, which he states elsewhere22, that
what is not truly one entity is not truly an entity - where unity is
equated with simplicity. But we saw in the previous chapter that
unity, rather than being incompatible with complexity, actually
implies complexity - so that there is no obvious inconsistency
involved in claiming that an aggregate of substances is either a
genuine unity or a genuine entity.
Secondly, as Broad has pointed out, when discussing Kant's
restatement of Leibniz' argument in the Second Antinomy23, there is
no formal contradiction involved in maintaining that substance is
infinitely divisible. If a contradiction is involved, then it can
only arise as a result of a consideration of substance itself. And
this is where our view of substance has a distinct advantage over
most, if not all, other views. By categorising existence as
substance, it can be demonstrated, firstly, that any aggregate of
substances is a substance; and, secondly, that the existence of the
aggregate is not dependent upon, in a vicious sense, the existence of
its constituents.
To demonstrate that any aggregate of substances is a substance we
must first determine in what sense an aggregate is a unity. In
accordance with the principle, introduced in the previous chapter,
that the kind of relation between two or more entities determines the
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kind of unity which comprises them, I should say that the unity of an
aggregate is determined by a relation of co-existence between its
constituents. If x co-exists with y, then x and y form an aggregate,
or, rather, they are comprised by a unity of aggregation. To say of
two or more qualities, for example, that they co-exist means that
they are predicable of, or inhere in, some existent. And to say of
two or more relations that they co-exist means that they relate two
or more existents. But to say of two or more substances that they coexist can only mean that they are parts of existence. Now, any two
parts of existence must form either the whole of existence, or a
whole within existence; and both existence as a whole, and any whole
within existence, are substances. Thus, any aggregate of substances
is a substance.
Secondly, it follows that the existence of any aggregate of
substances is not dependent upon the existence of its constituents in
a vicious sense, since the existence of the aggregate is identical
with the existence of its constituents. Once again, we may draw a
favourable analogy with Kant's views on Space. A spatial whole
comprising a number of parts is not dependent upon these parts for
its spatiality - it is simply identical with the space of its parts.
Analogously, the existence of an aggregate of substances is not
dependent upon the existence of its members for its existence, it is
simply identical with the existence of these members.

13. On the basis of the previous discussion we are, I believe,
entitled to conclude that neither Spinoza nor Leibniz has given any
conclusive reasons for believing that substance is simple or
indivisible. And, since the arguments put forward by these
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philosophers are, in my opinion, the only plausible arguments that
have been put forward in defence of the view that substance must be
simple, we are, I believe, entitled to accept the principle that
substance is infinitely divisible as true.

14. Having established that substance is infinitely divisible,
hence that there is a plurality of substances, we may now consider
the question of what differentiates one part of substance from
another.
McTaggart's answer to this question, and, I believe, the only
possible answer, is that substance is differentiated by its nature.
The principal argument which McTaggart uses to establish the
principle that substances are differentiated by their natures is as
follows.

Can there, then, be two things which are exactly similar? I
think that the answer must be that there cannot. The connection
between diversity and dissimilarity is, no doubt, synthetic. "A
and B are two things," and "A and B are dissimilar," are not
two ways of stating the same fact. But it seems clear to me
that diversity implies dissimilarity - that two things cannot
have the same nature. If we make the experiment of removing in
thought all difference of nature from two substances, we shall
find that, when we have succeeded, we are no longer
contemplating two substances, but one. And this does not, as I
conceive, come from the impossibility of our distinguishing the
two substances - which would not prove there were not two - but
from the recognition of the impossibility of diversity without
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dissimilarity. The nature of a substance expresses completely
what the substance is. And the same complete expression of what
a substance is cannot be true of each of two substances. The
substance is made this substance by its nature, and, if the
nature is the same, the substance is the same.24

Before considering the merits of this argument a number of points
should be noted. Firstly, in claiming that the above principle which McTaggart calls the principle of the Dissimilarity of the
Diverse - is a necessary truth, we are not, as he remarks, claiming
that it is an analytic truth. When we say, for example, that A and B
are diverse, or numerically distinct substances, we do not mean that
they are dissimilar. Diversity of substances implies dissimilarity,
but the concepts of diversity and dissimilarity are not equivalent.
Secondly, following Armstrong25, we may distinguish a "strong"
from a "weak" version of the principle. The strong version amounts to

the claim that no two substances can be exactly similar in respect of
their Original Qualities. The weak version amounts to the claim that
no two substances can be exactly similar in respect of their Primary
Qualities. The difference lies in the fact that the Primary Qualities
of a substance include those qualities which are directly determined
by the Original Relationships into which the substance enters.
McTaggart does not claim that the strong version of the principle is
a necessary truth - only that the weak version is. This point is
important, since many objections to the principle - including some of
Armstrong's own - are objections to the strong version. Armstrong,
for example, rejects the strong version of the principle and accepts
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the weak version - although he denies that the latter is a necessary
truth.
Thirdly, we should distinguish the claim that no two substances
can have one and the same nature from the claim that no two
substances can have natures which resemble each other exactly. Given
that the characteristics of substances are, as I have argued in the
previous chapter, particular entities, the first claim is self-

evident. But it is not equivalent to, nor does it directly imply, the

second claim. And it is the second claim which is, I think, generally
understood to be what is meant by the principle of the Dissimilarity
of the Diverse.
Fourthly, we should distinguish the claim that we cannot
distinguish one substance from another unless they are dissimilar
from the claim that the diversity of substances is implied by their
dissimilarity. The former is an epistemological claim - which may or
may not be true. The latter is an ontological claim, and it is what
McTaggart means, and what I shall mean, by the principle of the
Dissimilarity of the Diverse.
The principle of the Dissimilarity of the Diverse will, then, be
understood to be (a) a necessary, but not an analytic, truth; (b) an
ontological, rather than an epistemological principle; and (c)
equivalent to the claim that no two substances can resemble each
other exactly in respect of their Primary Qualities. Having thus
clarified the nature of the principle, we may now attempt to
determine whether it is true.

15. In agreement with McTaggart, I consider the Dissimilarity of
the Diverse to be self-evident. Insofar as it is considered to be
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self-evident it is, of course, pointless to try and demonstrate its
truth. But we can, and should, attempt to establish its truth
indirectly - by showing that objections to it are either unsound or
irrelevant.
Let us consider, firstly, the claim that the principle is not a
necessary truth. In Chapter 9, Section 1, of his Universals And
Scientific Realism, David Armstrong puts forward a number of reasons
for concluding that the Dissimilarity of the Diverse is not a
necessary truth. The first argument, which is to be found on pages
94-95 of Volume 1, is an attempt to show that, if the principle is
accepted by someone who endorses a "bundle" theory of substance i.e., the view that a thing or substance is simply a bundle or
aggregate of qualities - then he or she is involved in a vicious
circle.
Now we are not, I think, strictly obliged to reply to the
argument, since we do not accept a bundle theory of substance. But
Armstrong does seem to think that his argument, if sound, is
sufficient to refute the claim, which we do endorse, that the weak
version of the principle is a necessary truth. So, if we are to
defend the weak version we ought to consider Armstrong's argument.
The argument is this. Let us assume that we have two substances
which resemble each other exactly in respect of their Original
Qualities. Let us also assume, in accordance with the weak version of
the Dissimilarity of the Diverse, that the substances are
differentiated by their natures. It follows that they must be
dissimilar in respect of their Primary Qualities; and the only
Primary Qualities which are not Original Qualities are those
qualities which are determined by Original Relationships - i.e.,
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relational qualities. Armstrong then argues that, unless the
substances are differentiated by their Original Qualities, the
defender of the Dissimilarity of the Diverse is involved in a vicious
circle.

The relational properties of a particular will be a matter of
its having relations to other particulars of a certain sort.
But the notion of a particular is the notion to be analysed. So
the Bundle theorist must analyse the situation where a
particular has a relational property by saying that one bundle
of properties has a certain relation to another bundle of
properties.
Every relational property that a particular has, then, will
be a matter of a bundle of properties standing in a certain
relation to other bundles of properties. The bundles of
properties themselves will therefore have to be bundles of nonrelational properties. Only so can there be bundles to have
relations to other bundles. Each of these bundles is a
different particular, so no two bundles can contain exactly the
same non-relational properties. That is to say, the Bundle
theory is forced to appeal to the Strong version of the
Identity of Indiscernibles. Relational properties cannot be
used to differentiate particulars. But we have seen that the
Strong form of the Principle is not a necessary truth, and may
not even be true.2'

There are a number of reasons why this argument fails to affect
our position. Firstly, as I remarked earlier, it is only relevant to
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a "bundle" theory of substance - a theory which we rejected in
Chapter 1.
Secondly, it is based upon the assumption that all qualities and
relations are universal, rather than particular, entities. If, on the
other hand, all characteristics of substances are particular, then
there is no circularity involved in maintaining that the relational
qualities of substances are determined by their relationships with
other particular entities - since these particular entities may be
qualities or relations.
Thirdly, Armstrong has not, I think, clearly distinguished two
different senses of the term "particular" - with the result that his
argument might be claimed to involve an equivocation. In the first
sense, which we might call the "substantive" sense, the quality of
particularity is equivalent to the quality of substantiality - i.e.,
the quality of not being predicable of an entity. In the second
sense, which we may call the "predicative" sense, the quality of
particularity is equivalent to the quality of uniqueness or nonrepeatability. An entity which is particular in the second sense need
not be particular in the first sense, and vice versa. It seems to me,
however, that Armstrong's argument involves two tacit assumptions
arising from the failure to clearly distinguish these two senses of
"particular". The first is that the only unique entities are
substantial entities. The second is that the only substantial
entities are things or "particulars". Now, we have seen that the
first assumption is false in the case of existent characteristics;
and Armstrong has not given us any reasons for accepting the second.
In any case, even if we assume that existent characteristics are
universal, it still does not follow that the only unique entities are
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substantial entities. And if we do assume that the only unique
entities are substantial entities, it still does not follow that the
only substantial entities are things or "particulars", All that the
defender of the weak version of the principle of the Dissimilarity of
the Diverse is committed to, however, in order to avoid Armstrong's
criticism, is the claim that the relational quality or qualities in
question are determined by a relation between the Original Qualities
and some unique entity. A vicious circle only arises if the unique
entity in question is claimed to be another "bundle" of Original
Qualities.

16. Armstrong's second objection to the Weak version of the
Dissimilarity of the Diverse is that, even if it is in fact true, it
might not be a necessary truth, since, he claims, there are logically
possible cases in which the principle does not hold.
The first of the counterexamples we are asked to consider is
attributed to Max Black. Unfortunately, the passage quoted by
Armstrong on page 95 of Volume 1 of Universals And Scientific Realism
does not make it entirely clear what the actual objection to the
principle is. So, I think we ought to turn to Black's original
article for the relevant argument. The first of the passages quoted
below states the nature of the supposed counterexample. The second,
which is the passage quoted by Armstrong, introduces a refinement of
the original example, and its relevance to the argument is not
obvious when cited in isolation.

Isn't it logically possible that the universe should have
contained nothing but two exactly similar spheres? We might
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suppose that each was made of chemical ly pure iron, had a
diameter of one mile, that they had the same temperature,
color, and so on, and that nothing else existed. Then every
quality and relational characteristic of the one would also be
a property of the other. Now if what I am describing is
logically possible, it is not impossible for two things to have
all their properties in common. This seems to me to refute the
principle.27

Let me abandon the original idea of a plane of symmetry and to
suppose instead that we have only a center of symmetry. I mean
that everything that happened at any place would be exactly
duplicated at a place an equal distance on the opposite side of
the center of symmetry. In short, the universe would be what
the mathematicians call "radially symmetrical". And to avoid
complications we could suppose that the center of symmetry
itself was physically inaccessible, so that it would be
impossible for any material body to pass through it.21

The suggestion is this. If we suppose that there are two
substances, viz. the iron spheres, one on either side of the centre
of symmetry, which resemble each other exactly in respect of their
original qualities and relations, then, it is claimed, the substances
could not differ in respect of their Primary Qualities - hence their
diversity cannot be determined by a difference in their natures.
Clearly, the cogency of this example depends upon what we consider
to be logically possible. On the one hand, it might be replied, as
Brand Blanshard did, in fact, reply2', that the example begs the
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question by assuming what needs to be proved - namely, that there
might be two substances which resemble each other exactly in respect
of their Primary qualities.

Now I think we can see on reflection that even this
specially devised example begs the question it is supposed to
settle. When Mr Black says that each of the spheres has similar
characteristics, that the one has all the properties and
relations of the other, what does he mean by 'each', and what
by 'the one' and by "the other'? Are these phrases translatable
into 'this one' and 'that one', sphere No.l and sphere No.2?
No, because he is maintaining that if the characters are
indistinguishable, there can be no ground on which we could
call either of them 'this' rather than 'that', 'No.l' rather
than 'No. 2'. Now we who hold that twoness is based on
dissimilarity are maintaining that where you have nothing on
which you could base a 'this' and 'that', you cannot have two
things; and hence to begin by saying in effect, 'Take a world
consisting of two things that do not even differ as this and
that', is asking us to do what we are maintaining we cannot do.
The directions sound as if they could be fulfilled, but with no
'this' and 'that' they cannot be.30

I think that this reply is adequate - so far as it goes. But it
does rest upon the assumption that there are no "bare" particulars or
substances which might serve to differentiate one instance of a
quality from another. Should there be such bare particulars, then we
would have an objective basis for distinguishing 'this' sphere from
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'that' sphere. Blanshard rejected such "bare" particulars for much
the same reasons as McTaggart did. And, on this basis, his objection
is quite sound. Black does not commit himself to the existence of
such bare particulars, but without them I do not think he can
overcome Blanshard's objection. Furthermore, he explicitly rejects
the one view which might seem to be a genuine alternative to the bare
particular theory - namely, the view that spatial and/or temporal
position is equivalent to, or determines, the particularity of a
substance.
On the other hand, there is, I think, a certain vagueness
associated with the notion of a supposal in this context. If we are
asked to suppose that there are two substances such as those
described by Black, this might be understood to be either a request
to image two such substances; or else it might be understood to be a
request to contemplate the proposition "there might be two substances
which resemble each other exactly in respect of their Primary
qualities", and to decide whether it is true or false. If supposing
means imaging, then clearly the two imaged spheres will be dissimilar
in respect of their positions, hence their relational qualities,
within the imaged spatial field which contains them. For example, one
sphere might be to the left of, or above, the other. If, on the other
hand, supposing means something like making an assumption - in
Meinong's sense - then what we will be contemplating, in making such
a supposal, is a proposition, rather than two existent substances.
And in that case the question-begging becomes explicit; since we will
have been asked to assume the truth of a proposition which is claimed
to be false by the defender of the principle of the Dissimilarity of
the Diverse.

161
17. The second of Armstrong's proposed counterexamples consists in
the assumption that the Universe, or, rather, the temporal series of
events which make up the Universe, might be eternally recurrent - so
that there might be two or more distinct time-series which resemble
each other exactly.
The cogency of this counterexample is, however, somewhat
questionable. At best it shows that there might be two substances
which resemble each other exactly in respect of their temporal,
relational, qualities. It does not show that the substances must be
exactly similar in respect of their other relational qualities. If,
on the other hand, we assume that the two substances are exactly
similar in respect of all their qualities, then the supposed
counterexample again begs the question.

18. The third proposed counterexample mentioned by Armstrong was
originally put forward by CD. Broad in his Examination Of
McTaggart's Philosophy. The suggestion is this.

I am inclined to think that the Dissimilarity of the Diverse
has seemed plausible because those who tried to envisage the
possibility of exceptions, and failed to do so, unwittingly
restricted their field of view in two respects. In the first
place, they confined their attention to physical events and
things, and forgot about sensibilia, experiences, and minds.
Secondly, they assumed uncritically that there must be a single
spatio-temporal system in which every particular has its place
and date. Now, even if this be in fact true, there is, so far
as I can see, no kind of necessity about it. It might be, as
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Bradley suggested in the chapter on "Nature" in Appearance and
Reality that, whilst every particular has its place and date in
some spatio-temporal system, there is a plurality of such
systems, and a particular in one has no spatio-temporal
relation whatever to a particular in another.31

Again, the cogency of this counterexample is questionable. Let us
assume that there are two such spatio-temporal systems, and that each
contains a particular or substance which resembles a substance in the
other spatio-temporal system in respect of its spatio-temporal,
relational qualities. It does not follow that the two substances are
exactly similar in respect of their other qualities; and if we assume
that they do resemble each other exactly in respect of all their
qualities, then the example begs the question.
And it begs the question in another way. We are asked to assume
that there can be two spatio-temporal systems which are not
differentiated by their relations to some other spatio-temporal
system, or by their spatio-temporal relations to each other. The
question-begging is, I think, again evident. We are asked to assume
that there might be two spatio-temporal systems which resemble each
other exactly. And this is an assumption which a defender of the
principle of the Dissimilarity of the Diverse would reject as
impossible.

19. I think that the reason why each of the proposed
counterexamples has seemed plausible is that it is implicitly assumed
that there is something which differentiates one substance from
another other than a difference in their Primary qualities. In
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Armstrong's case, it is the assumption that substantiality is
equivalent to particularity or uniqueness - that substances are
essentially particular. But there is nothing in the definition of
substance which implies that substance is essentially particular in
the sense that it is essentially unique. It does follow from our
definition that substance is essentially particular in the sense that
it is not predicable of anything. But this is not the sense of
"particular" which Armstrong uses when he talks of particulars.
If, on the other hand, we accept the view that all existent
characteristics are particular, then we can consistently maintain
that it is the particularity of the characteristics which determines
the particularity of a substance. And this, as I understand it, is
the essential truth expressed by the principle of the Dissimilarity
of the Diverse. Existence, qua substance, is differentiated by its
nature.

20. The conclusion that substance is differentiated by its nature
allows us to draw the further conclusion that every substance must
have what McTaggart calls an Exclusive Description. An exclusive
description of a substance is a description which applies to that
substance only, and is such that the substance is absolutely
identified by it12. An exclusive description may, or may not, be a
complete description of a substance. It follows from the
Dissimilarity of the Diverse that every substance must have an
exclusive description; and, since any complete description of a
substance will include an exclusive description, any complete
description will be an exclusive description. But not every exclusive
description is a complete description. An exclusive description might
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consist of a single complex quality, such as the quality of being the
only son of the supreme deity, or the quality of being the tallest
man in Australia - as long as there is no other substance which has
that characteristic. And even though the substance is identified by
that description, it may, and in most cases will, have more
characteristics than that which is included in the description,

21. I do not see that there is any genuine problem with the
concept of an exclusive description - once we accept the principle of
the Dissimilarity of the Diverse. Problems do arise, however, when we
consider the concept of a Sufficient Description. A sufficient
description of a substance is an exclusive description which does not
introduce an undescribed substance. The distinction between a
sufficient and an exclusive description might be illustrated by the
following examples. Let us assume the truth of the traditional
account of the genealogy of Christ. In that case He might be
exclusively described as "the only son of God"; or, as "the only son
of the supreme deity". Both descriptions are exclusive, since they
identify Him absolutely. But the second is, and the first is not, a
sufficient description since it introduces no undescribed substance.
The first description is not sufficient because "God" is understood
to be a logically proper name - hence it introduces an undescribed
substance.
The controversial part of McTaggart's views on exclusive and
sufficient descriptions is the claim that every substance must have a
sufficient, as well as an exclusive description. As we shall see,
this principle is an essential premiss of the argument to show that
the infinite divisibility of substance involves a contradiction. But
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it is a principle which a number of critics have rejected as either
unsound or unproven. So, it is essential that we consider the
principle itself, and the arguments which McTaggart uses to establish
it, in some detail.

22. What reasons, then, does McTaggart give for concluding that
every substance must have a sufficient description? The principal
argument for this conclusion is to be found in Section 105 of The
Nature Of Existence. But before considering it we should note that
McTaggart is not simply claiming that, as a matter of fact, every
substance has a sufficient description - although he does attempt to
show that this is the case in Sections 103 and 104. He is making the
stronger, and more controversial claim that every substance must have
a sufficient description.
It seems to me that there are at least two different ways in which
the principle of Sufficient Descriptions can be established. The
first, which is not McTaggart's own argument, but which is similar to
it, is as follows. We know, in virtue of our acceptance of the
Dissimilarity of the Diverse, that every substance has an exclusive
description. Let us assume, then, that we have three substances, A,B,
and C; that these three substances make up the Universe; and, that
each has an exclusive description. Let us also assume that the
exclusive descriptions of B and C each involve a relation to A; and,
that B and C cannot be exclusively described except by including the
fact that they stand in some relation to A in those descriptions, B,
for example, might be exclusively described as "the only daughter of
A", and C might be described as "the only son of A". Now, these
exclusive descriptions of B and C can be rendered sufficient if we
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can give a description of A which does not introduce any undescribed
substance. If A is describable as "the only existent parent", then B
will be sufficiently described as "the only son of the only existent
parent"; and C will be sufficiently described as "the only daughter
of the only existent parent". In that case, every substance will have
a sufficient description.
If, on the other hand, we assume that A cannot be sufficiently
described then it is clear that we will be involved in a vicious
circle. If A cannot be sufficiently described, then it must, in
accordance with the Dissimilarity of the Diverse, have an exclusive
description which introduces some undescribed substance. Now, ex
hypothesi, the only other substances in the Universe are B and C. So,
if A is to have an exclusive description, that description must
introduce either B or C as an undescribed substance. Let us assume
that the description introduces B, so that A is exclusively described
as "the parent of B". This description will, however, only be an
exclusive description if there is some description which
distinguishes B from C and from A. Now, if the only characteristic
which distinguishes B from C and from A is the quality "the only son
of A", then the dissimilarity of B from all other substances, hence
the existence of B, will be dependent upon the dissimilarity of A
from all other substances. But we have seen that the dissimilarity of
A from all other substances is determined by the exclusive
description "the father of B". Hence the dissimilarity of A from all
other substances is dependent upon the dissimilarity of B from all
other substances, which, in turn, is dependent upon the dissimilarity
of A from all other substances. Thus we have a vicious circle. The
dissimilarity of A from all other substances, hence the existence of
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A, is dependent upon the dissimilarity of B from all other
substances. But the dissimilarity of B from all other substances,
hence the existence of S, is dependent upon the dissimilarity of A
from all other substances. The existence of B is thus dependent upon
the existence of A, which, in turn, is dependent upon the existence
of B. The circle thus generated is clearly vicious.

23. McTaggart does not use the same kind of argument as the above
to establish his conclusion. His own argument depends, instead, upon
the generation of a vicious infinite regress. The argument is as
fo11ows.

By the results in the last chapter, A must be dissimilar to all
other substances. The possibility of this depends on the
existence of B, and the existence of B depends on its
dissimilarity to all other substances. And this depends on the
existence of C, and this on its dissimilarity to all other
substances, and so on. If this series is infinite, it is
vicious. For, starting from the existence of A, each earlier
term requires all the later terms, and therefore requires that
the series should be completed, which it cannot be. If,
therefore, the series is infinite, A cannot be dissimilar to
all other substances - and so cannot exist. Therefore, if A
does exist, the series cannot be infinite. And if the series is
not infinite, A has a sufficient description. Every substance,
therefore, must have a sufficient description.33

168
The relevant difference between my argument and McTaggart's is
that my argument assumes only that there is a finite number of
substances which make up the Universe. McTaggart's allows for the
possibility that the number is infinite.
McTaggart's argument has, however, been criticised by Broad. I
will now consider these criticisms and argue that they are not valid.

24. Broad's criticisms occupy pages 181 to 185 of Volume 1 of his
Examination Of McTaggart's Philosophy. The first part of this
critique consists in an attempt to show that it is conceivable that
every substance should have an exclusive, without a sufficient,
description. In the second part he criticises McTaggart's actual
argument, and claims to show that it contains at least three "gross
formal fallacies"34. I will consider each part of Broad's critique
in turn, and argue that neither constitutes a conclusive objection to
McTaggart's principle that every substance must have a sufficient
description.

25. The principle that every substance must have a sufficient
description is claimed to be refuted by the following example.

Imagine a universe consisting of just three minds, A,B, and C.
We will suppose that none of them has a sufficient description.
Now, suppose it were the case that A is jealous of B on account
of C, that B is jealous of C on account of A, and that C is
jealous of A on account of B. Then I maintain that each of
these particulars would have an exclusive description, in spite
of the fact that none of them had a sufficient description. A
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would have the characteristic of being jealous of B on account
of C. Call this 0. B could not have this, since no one can be
jealous of himself. C could not have this, since no one can be
jealous on account of himself. Hence B and C both have the
characteristic non-0. Now take the characteristic of being
jealous of C on account of A. Call this •. B has f, and, for
similar reasons to those mentioned before, C and A have non-f.
Lastly, if we denote the characteristic of being jealous of A
on account of B by %, it is plain that C has % and that A and B
have non-%. Thus A is the only particular in the universe which
has 0, B is the only one that has +, and C is the only one that
has x- By hypothesis A,B, and C are the only particulars in the
universe, and have no sufficient descriptions. Nevertheless, we
see that each will have an exclusive description.35

I think that this argument is surprisingly weak. As Geach has
pointed out38, the qualities 0,+ , and % are exclusive descriptions
only if A,B, and C are differentiated by some principle or
description other than these descriptions. In fact, it is difficult
to see that this argument has any relevance at all to McTaggart's
view. The important question here is not whether A,B, and C can have
exclusive descriptions, but whether these descriptions are adequate
to differentiate A,B, and C in a way which does not presuppose that
they are already differentiated. And it is clear that Broad has not
shown this to be the case. Furthermore, 0,1f, and % can be readily
converted into sufficient descriptions in the following way. If "A",
"B", and "C" are logically proper names, then 0 is equivalent to the
quality of being jealous of the only substance called "B" on account
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of the only substance called "C"; • is equivalent to the quality of
being jealous of the only substance called "C" on account of the only
substance called "A"; and % is equivalent to the quality of being
jealous of the only substance called "A" on account of the only
substance called "B". Each of these qualities applies to one and only
one substance; and, since none introduces an undescribed substance,
each is a sufficient description of that substance. So, the exclusive
descriptions of A,B, and C mentioned by Broad are either equivalent
to, or directly imply, sufficient descriptions of these substances.
Broad's supposed counterexample to the principle of Sufficient
Descriptions would seem, therefore, to be self-refuting.

26. The second part of Broad's criticism of the principle of
Sufficient Descriptions involves pointing out what he considers to be
a number of fallacies in McTaggart's argument. The first of the
supposed fallacies is as follows.

McTaggart assumes that, if A had no sufficient description,
any exclusive description of A would have to describe it by a
certain relation to a certain other particular, B. This is not
so. The relation might be to A itself.3'

He then goes on to give an example in which a reflexive relational
quality is adequate to be an exclusive description of a substance.

Suppose, for example, that the universe consisted of two minds,
A and B, each of which respected itself and despised the other.
Then the property of respecting A would belong to A and to
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nothing else. It would therefore be an exclusive description of
A.3'

There is an obvious reply to this criticism. On the one hand,
unless A and B are differentiated by some other descriptions, the
descriptions "respecter of A" and "respecter of B" would not be
sufficient to differentiate A from B; and, in that case we would be
faced with a vicious circle similar to that mentioned in the previous
section. If, on the other hand, "A" and "B" are logically proper
names of the two minds, then each will have a sufficient description
implied by that fact: A will have the quality of being a respecter of
the only substance called "A"; and B will have the quality of being a
respecter of the only substance called "B", Each is an exclusive
description, since it applies to one and only one substance. And each
is a sufficient description since it introduces no undescribed
substance.
The second fallacy which Broad claims to find in McTaggart's
argument is as follows.

McTaggart assumes that, if A has to be described by
reference to a particular B which is other than A, and if B has
to be described by reference to a particular C which is other
than B, then C must be other than A. This is, of course,
completely fallacious. "C might be simply another name for the
particular of which "A" is a name.39

Again, the reply to this criticism is obvious. The important
question is not whether it is possible for two or more substances to
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have exclusive descriptions, but whether these descriptions are
sufficient to differentiate the substances. And in the example given
by Broad it is clear that they are not. The relational qualities of a
substance can only be exclusive descriptions of that substance if the
terms of the relation which determines those qualities are
differentiated independently of the occurrence of that relation. A
might be described as the substance which has R to B. And B might be
described as the substance which has R to C. But unless A,B, and C
have exclusive descriptions determined independently of the fact that
they are thus related, the qualities of each determined by R will not
be exclusive descriptions of those substances. Furthermore, if "A",
"B", and "C" are logically proper names, then the relational
qualities of each substance determined by the fact that they have R
to some other substance will imply sufficient descriptions of the
substances. A will have the quality of having R to the only substance
named "B", and B will have the quality of having R to the only
substance named "C". And the fact that "A" and "C" are both names of
one and the same substance does not alter the fact that these
qualities are sufficient descriptions of A and B.
The third fallacy which Broad claims to find in McTaggart's
argument is this.

Even if the series had to start, and had then to continue
without end and without recurrence, McTaggart's conclusion
would not follow. His conclusion is that A would have no
exclusive description. But, so far as I can see, this is a
complete non-sequitur. A has the exclusive description of being
the only particular that has R to B. How could this be altered
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by the fact that B has no sufficient description, that its
exclusive description must be of the form "having S to C", and
that the same must be true, mutatis mutandis, of C and of every
particular in a certain endless and non-recurrent series? Even
if we accepted both the false premises which McTaggart tacitly
assumes, the only conclusion which could legitimately be drawn
is the following. "If every particular has an exclusive
description, and there were any particular A which lacked a
sufficient description, then there must be an endless and nonrecurrent series of particulars starting with A and all lacking
sufficient descriptions".40

As with the previous examples, the reply here is, I think, quite
straightforward. McTaggart's claim is that every substance must have
an exclusive description which is sufficient to differentiate it from
every other substance. That is, the existence of a particular
substance depends upon the fact that it is dissimilar to every other
substance. The important point is that if the exclusive description
of A, which differentiates it from every other substance, and which
thus determines the existence of A, introduces an undescribed
substance, B, then the existence of A is dependent upon the fact that
B has an exclusive description. Now, if the exclusive description of
B which differentiates it from all other substances, including A, and
which thus determines the existence of B, introduces an undescribed
substance, C, then the existence of B, hence the existence of A, is
dependent upon the fact that C has an exclusive description. I think
that it is quite clear that unless there is some term in the series
which has an exclusive description which does not introduce an

174
undescribed substance - i.e., unless there is some term in the series
which has a sufficient description - then no term in the series can
have an exclusive description; hence no term can exist. Assuming that
the series of terms is endless and non-recurrent, it is clear that
the dissimilarity of every earlier term from every other substance is
dependent upon the term which succeeds it - i.e. upon its immediate
successor. And, since the series is, ex hypothesi, infinite, the
existence of the initial term A is dependent upon there being a final
term in a series which has no final term. The regress is therefore
vicious. Every substance must, therefore, have an exclusive
description which, ultimately, involves a relation to a substance
which has a sufficient description. Hence, every substance must have
a sufficient description.
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CHARTER FOUR
Determinat ion And Detej-mini sm

1. In the previous chapter we established two conclusions which
will prove to be of fundamental importance in Cosmology. The first is
that substance is infinitely divisible. The second is that every
substance - hence every part of every substance - has a sufficient
description. In the next chapter we will see that, except under one
condition, the acceptance of these two propositions leads to a number
of contradictions. But before we consider the reasons why these
contradictions arise it is, I think, important for us to consider two
relations which figure prominently both in McTaggart's attempt to
resolve the contradictions and in his subsequent general Cosmological
theory. The relations in question are the relations of Intrinsic and
Extrinsic Determination. I will consider each of these relations in
turn.

2. The relation of Intrinsic Determination is described by
McTaggart in the following way.

108. Corresponding to implication between propositions,
there is clearly a relation between characteristics. If it is
true that, whenever something has the quality X, something has
the quality F, this involves that, besides the relation between
the two propositions "something has the quality X", and
"something has the quality Y", there is a relation between the
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qualities X and Y. I propose to call this relation Intrinsic
Determination The quality X will be said to determine
intrinsically the quality Y whenever the proposition that
something has the quality X implies the proposition that
something has the quality Y.1

Concerning this description two things should be noted. The first
is that McTaggart is not, at this point, offering a definition of
Intrinsic Determination2. The second is that when McTaggart talks of
a relation of implication between propositions he is not talking
about Russell's relation of material implication. As Broad points
out , McTaggart's relation of implication is more or less equivalent
to Russell's relation of entailment, and is thus more in keeping with
the traditional concept of implication implicit in both philosophical
and non-philosophical discourse.
To illustrate the nature of the distinction between McTaggart's
concept of implication and that of material implication, we might
appeal to Broad's distinction between consistent and inconsistent
propositions. Two propositions, p and q, are mutually consistent if
it is possible for the conjunction of the two propositions, i.e. the
conjunctive proposition pq, to be true. The propositions are mutually
inconsistent if it is impossible for the proposition pq to be true.
Now, if p implies q, in McTaggart's sense, then p and q are mutually
consistent, and p and not-q are mutually inconsistent. On the other
hand, if p materially implies q then p and q are mutually consistent:
but so are p and not-q.
Clearly, the validity of the distinction between the two senses of
implication depends upon the assumption that there are mutually
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inconsistent propositions. If there are no mutually inconsistent
propositions, then there will be no valid distinction between the
concept of material implication and McTaggart's concept of
implication.
Now it is, I think, clear that there are mutually inconsistent
propositions. The proposition "Something exists" is inconsistent with
the proposition "Nothing exists" - i.e. the former implies the
negation of the latter. And we have accepted the proposition
"Something exists" as almost certainly true. We may, then, draw a
valid distinction between the two senses of implication; and, as long
as we accept the truth of the proposition that something exists, we
may conclude that there is at least one instance of McTaggart's
relation of implication,

3. Having accepted the fact that there are inconsistent
propositions, hence that there is at least one instance of
implication, the question of the grounds for these inconsistencies
arises. In order to answer this question I shall begin by appealing
to Broad's distinction between logically and ontologically
inconsistent propositions. To illustrate this distinction let us
consider two different sets of propositions. In the first set we have
the following two propositions.

(1) Some trees are deciduous.
(2) No trees are deciduous.

In the second set we have the following propositions.
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(3) The table in the corner of my room is square.
(4) The table in the corner of my room is circular.

In both sets of propositions we have two mutually inconsistent
propositions. In the first set the mutual inconsistency is determined
by the respective forms of the propositions. One proposition is of
the form "Some S are P", and the other is of the form "No S are P",
And we can see that the propositions are inconsistent because they
have these forms. If two propositions are inconsistent in virtue of
their respective forms, then we shall say that they are formally
inconsistent.
In the second set, on the other hand, the mutual inconsistency is
determined not by the forms of the propositions, rather by their
content. In each case a quality is ascribed to one and the same
subject - the table in the corner of my room. This, in itself, is not
enough to generate an inconsistency. Were we to say that the table is
wooden, and that the table is square, we would not have two
inconsistent propositions; since it is possible that the table is
both wooden and square. The inconsistency of the two propositions is
determined, rather, by the fact that square and circular are
considered to be incompatible qualities when ascribed to one and the
same subject under the same conditions. This incompatibility is not,
however, understood to be merely formal. It is, instead, considered
to be a material or ontological incompatibility. If two propositions
are mutually inconsistent in virtue of their content, then we may say
that they are ontological ly inconsistent.
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4. Now, if two propositions, p and q, are formally inconsistent,
then we may say that p logically implies not-q. And if two
propositions, r and s, are ontological ly inconsistent, then we may
say that r ontologically implies not-s.
Once we accept the validity of the distinction between logical and
ontological implication we might then ask what it is that determines
that one proposition ontologically implies another. In the previous
section we saw that ontological inconsistency among propositions is
determined by the incompatibility of their respective contents; so
that, where we have two incompatible qualities, we may conclude that
any proposition which ascribes one of these qualities to a subject
implies the negation of the proposition which ascribes the other
quality to that subject. In such a case we have an ontological
inconsistency between characteristics; and this inconsistency is not
a merely formal inconsistency. If we now ask what determines this
ontological inconsistency among characteristics, McTaggart's reply is
that the occurrence of one characteristic intrinsically determines
the absence of the other; or, alternatively, that the occurrence of
one characteristic intrinsically determines the occurrence of the
corresponding negative characteristic.
So, given that there are ontologically inconsistent propositions,
we are, according to McTaggart, entitled to conclude that intrinsic
determination exists between characteristics of existents.

5. At this point two questions arise. The first is whether there
are any ontologically inconsistent propositions; hence, whether there
are inconsistent or incompatible characteristics of the existent. The
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second concerns the nature of the relation of intrinsic
determination. I will consider each of these questions in turn.

6. We have previously concluded that there are inconsistent
propositions. The propositions "Something exists" and "Nothing
exists" are mutually inconsistent. And we can see that these
propositions are inconsistent merely by inspection - the
inconsistency is self-evident. But it is a formal rather than a
material or ontological inconsistency; and the question we wish to
answer at this stage is whether there are any ontological ly
inconsistent propositions.
It would seem that we have already provided an example of two
ontologically inconsistent propositions. The propositions "The table
in the corner of my room is square" and "The table in the corner of
my room is circular", it was suggested above, are ontologically
inconsistent. It was also suggested that the basis for this
inconsistency is the fact that square and circular are incompatible
qualities. Another example of ontological inconsistency would seem to
be provided by the following two propositions.

(5) The surface of my table is red.
(6) The surface of my table is blue.

In fact, it is generally admitted that any two determinate
qualities which fall under a single determinable, such as shape or
colour, are incompatible. If we accept this principle, and I believe
that we ought to accept it, then we are entitled to conclude that any
propositions which ascribe different determinates of a single
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determinable to one and the same substantive, under the same
conditions, are ontologically inconsistent.
A more direct way of establishing that there are ontological ly
inconsistent propositions is to admit the reality of negative
qualities. The propositions "The table in the corner of my room is
circular" and "The table in the corner of my room is not-circular"
are inconsistent. And they are ontologically inconsistent insofar as
the latter proposition is understood to involve the ascription of a
negative quality, not-circular, to my table. If we accept the reality
of negative characteristics, then we may readily conclude that there
are ontologically inconsistent propositions, hence that there are
incompatible characteristics of the existent. In favour of this
conclusion we may argue that, for any characteristic, X, and any
particular existent, a, either X is true of a or not-X is true of a.
That is to say, the propositions "a is X" and "a is not-X" are
ontologically inconsistent; and yet one or the other must be true. We
may conclude, then, that there are incompatible characteristics of
the existent.

7. The conclusion that there are incompatible characteristics has,
however, been questioned. I will now consider some of the reasons
which have been given for believing that there are no incompatible
characteristics.

8. The view that there are no incompatible characteristics might
be understood in a number of ways. It might be understood to mean
either: (a) there are no incompatible qualities; (b) there are no
incompatible relations; or (c) there are no incompatible qualities or
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relations. Since we have used the generic term "characteristic" to
cover both qualities and relations we will understand the claim to
mean that there are no incompatible qualities or relations.
Now, the claim that there are no incompatible qualities or
relations might be understood in a number of ways. It might be
understood to mean either (i) there are no qualities which are
incompatible with other qualities; (ii) there are no relations which
are incompatible with other relations; or (iii) there are no
qualities which are incompatible with any relations. The view that
there are no incompatible characteristics is generally understood to
mean that there are no incompatible qualities. I will, however,
consider each of these interpretations and argue that none of them is
true.

9. Let us begin with the claim that there are no qualities which
are incompatible with other qualities. In its most plausible version
it is the claim that there are no incompatible simple qualities. It
is this version which is generally attributed to Leibniz4.
Simple qualities should be distinguished from compound and complex
qualities. In accordance with our definitions in Chapter 1, we may
say that a compound quality is analysable into other qualities (which
qualities we may call the "parts" of that quality), and that a
complex quality is analysable in terms of other characteristics
(which characteristics we may call the "constituents" of that
quality). A simple quality, on the other hand, is neither analysable
into, nor analysable in terms of, other characteristics. That is to
say, it has neither parts nor constituents.
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In Chapter 1 we concluded that there are no sound reasons for
believing that there are no simple qualities. Let us assume then,
that some qualities are simple. Perhaps the most obvious examples of
ostensibly simple qualities are the sensible colour qualities, such
as red and blue. I think it is evident that such qualities are
incompatible, in the sense that they cannot both be true of one and
the same substantive in the same respect. And this view has, I
believe, been held by most philosophers. To say that they are
incompatible does not, however, imply that they are incompossible.
Clearly, one and the same entity can be both red and blue - although
not in the same respect.
I think that those who deny that such qualities are genuinely
incompatible have failed to clearly distinguish the concepts of
compatibility and compossibility. I do not believe that Leibniz, for
example, would have denied that some simple qualities are
incompatible. What he is committed to saying, however, is that all
simple qualities are compossible in the sense that they may all be
true of one and the same substance or substantive, namely God. The
same, I would argue, is true of Spinoza's attributes. The infinite
attributes of God or substance are all compossible, although, like
thought and extension, incompatible.

10. Although it might be agreed that some sensible qualities, such
as red and blue, are incompatible, it has been argued that this
incompatibility can be attributed to the fact that such qualities,
although ostensibly simple, are actually complex or compound5. The
difference between their ostensible and their actual nature may be
attributed to the distinction between the way things are, and the way
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things seem to be - the distinction between reality and appearance.
This type of argument has recently been used by D.M. Armstrong6 to
support the conclusion that there is no genuine incompatibility among
the sensible qualities - such as colours. In brief, Armstrong claims
that the incompatibilities in question arise from the fact that such
qualities are actually, although not ostensibly, extensive
quantities. And incompatibilities among extensive quantities, he
argues, arise from the attempt to identify a whole with a proper part
of that whole.

My suggestion is that this is a model for the logical
incompatibilities of properties, or at least for their typical
cases. Ranges of determinates falling under a determinable are
extensive quantities. These are structural properties,
involving parts lying outside parts, that is, involving
conjunctions of states of affairs where the individuals
involved in the states of affairs are wholly distinct from each
other. The attempt to bestow two different determinates of such
quantities on the one individual must fail. If the individual
has the larger value of the quantity, then the only relevant
individuals that have the smaller value are proper parts of the
individual.'

This type of approach is used to explain why one and the same
entity cannot be said to have a mass of just five kilograms and a
mass of just one kilogram.
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For something to be just five kilograms in mass is (among other
things) for it to be the conjunction of five states of affairs
involving five wholly distinct individuals each just one
kilogram in mass, where the original something is the
mereological sum of these five distinct individuals. Given this
it becomes clear why the very same thing cannot be both five
and one kilogram in mass. To attempt to combine the two
properties in the one thing would involve the thing's being
identical with its proper part.'

11. I think it is clear that there are a number of problems with
this view. Some of these are considered by Armstrong in his
subsequent discussion. One of the problems which is discussed is the
question of the status of the mereological principle invoked in the
proposed solution. The principle in question is that no entity can be
identical with a proper part of that entity. Armstrong claims that
this principle is analytically true. And if it is analytically true,
then, according to Armstrong, it is true in virtue of the meanings
which we attach to the terms "whole" and "proper part".
This reply is unsatisfactory for two reasons. The first is that by
labelling a truth as "analytic" we do not mean that it is therefore
less true than what we might call a "synthetic" truth. The important
question here is whether such truths are true by convention or
stipulation, or whether they are true because they correspond to some
objective feature of the world. I think it is quite clear that
Armstrong would not want to deny that such a principle corresponds to
some objective feature of the world, and that it is this
correspondence which makes it true. It is true that we come to know
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that the principle is true by analysing the meanings of the terms
involved. But this is not what makes the principle true. To assert
otherwise is to confuse the method of ascertaining that a principle
is true, with the conditions or fact which make it true. What is
disturbing, for Armstrong, about such a principle is that it is, or
at least professes to be, a necessary truth about the world. And yet
its truth is not ascertained by any empirical means. It is, in this
sense, an a priori truth about the world. The acknowledgment of the
existence of such truths is obviously at odds with Armstrong's
professed philosophical method, and yet the truth of the principle in
question is presupposed in almost everything he has to say on certain
metaphysical subjects.
The second reason why Armstrong's reply is unsatisfactory is that
the mereological principle in question involves genuinely
incompatible relations. The principle states that no entity can be
identical with a proper part of that entity. Ostensibly, this
involves a relation between an entity and a proper part of that
entity. It states that if Y is a proper part of X, then Y is not
identical with X. And this means that the relations being a proper
part of and being identical with are incompatible. This might not be
a problem for someone who accepts the reality of incompatible
relations. But in Section III of Chapter 6 of A Combinatorial Theory
Of Possibility Armstrong claims that all "wholly distinct" relations
are compossible. It is quite clear, however, that the relations in
question are both wholly distinct and incompossible.

12. A second problem with this view is that it ultimately involves
the rejection of the distinction between intensive and extensive
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magnitudes or quantities. The suggestion seems to be that those
sensible qualities, such as determinate colours, which appear to be
incompatible in virtue of their ostensibly non-quantitative nature,
are, in fact, incompatible because they are actually extensive
magnitudes or quantities. It is also claimed that such qualities do
not actually have any irreducibly intensive magnitudes. Any
incompatibilities are based upon the mereological principle that no
whole is identical with a proper part of that whole.
Although Armstrong does not give explicit definitions of the
concepts of Extensive and Intensive Quantity, I think we may assume
that what he means by an extensive quantity is more or less
equivalent to the traditional concept of an Extensive Magnitude.
According to the traditional view an entity has extensive magnitude
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if it is made up of parts which are homogeneous in kind. McTaggart's
definition of an extensive magnitude8 as a magnitude in which the
difference between two magnitudes is another magnitude of the same
kind, is in keeping with the traditional concept. We might illustrate
the concept of extensive magnitude by considering the line, AB, below
[Figure 4.1].
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AB has extensive magnitude, namely length, insofar as it is made
up of the parts AD,DC,CE and EB, which themselves have length, and
the difference between, say, the length of AB and AD is another
length, the length of DB - i.e. another extensive magnitude.
It is, however, somewhat more difficult to understand what
Armstrong means by an intensive quantity. Traditionally, an intensive
magnitude is defined in a negative way - as a magnitude which is not
made up of other magnitudes of the same kind. McTaggart accordingly
defines an intensive magnitude as a magnitude in which the difference
between any two measures is not another measure of that kind10. An
example of an intensive magnitude is the degree of brightness of
colours. Thus, one colour might be brighter than another; or,
alternatively, a particular colour might have brightness to a greater
or lesser degree.
If we accept that this is what is traditionally meant by the
distinction between intensive and extensive magnitudes, then I would
maintain that Armstrong has not really provided us with a plausible
analysis of the incompatibility of some of the sensible qualities such as determinate colours. In order to demonstrate that the
incompatibility of these sensible qualities is based upon the
mereological principle that no proper part of a whole can be
identical with that whole, Armstrong would need to show, firstly,
that all intensive magnitudes are reducible to extensive magnitudes;
and, secondly, that such qualities are, themselves, either intensive
or extensive magnitudes. And it seems to me that Armstrong has failed
to provide sound arguments to support either of these conclusions.
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13. Let us begin with the claim that all intensive magnitudes are
reducible to extensive magnitudes. As I mentioned above, I do not
think Armstrong has clearly stated what he means by an intensive
quantity. The definitive feature of a magnitude is that if an entity
has magnitude, then there might be more or less of that entity. In
the case of extensive magnitude, we may speak of there being more or
less of that entity insofar as the mereological principle that a
whole is more than or greater than a proper part of that whole is
applicable to that entity. Perhaps the most obvious examples where
this mereological principle is valid are certain spatial or temporal
wholes. In such cases the mutual externality of the parts - hence the
extensive nature of the whole - is evident. But the principle does
not apply only to spatially or temporally extended entities; and we
may speak of "wholes" and "parts" whenever we have a unity comprising
a plurality of co-existent entities of the same ontological kind or
category11.
In the case of an intensive magnitude, on the other hand, whilst
we may speak of there being more or less of any entity which has
intensive magnitude, this is not because the mereological principle
that a whole is greater than a proper part of that whole is
applicable to that entity. Rather, the opposite is the case; and we
may say that an entity has intensive magnitude insofar as the
mereological principle is not applicable to that entity. Accordingly,
we may summarise the distinction between extensive and intensive
magnitudes by saying that extensive magnitudes are divisible, and
that intensive magnitudes are indivisible.
Now, if we accept that the distinction between extensive and
intensive magnitudes consists in the distinction between divisible
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and indivisible magnitudes or quantities, then it is clear that
intensive magnitudes are not reducible to extensive magnitudes. Any
such reduction would imply that the definitive characteristics of
these magnitudes are compatible or compossible. But divisibility and
indivisibility are clearly contradictory, hence incompatible,
characteristics; and since indivisibility is understood to be a
definitive characteristic of intensive magnitudes, such magnitudes
are not, therefore, reducible to extensive magnitudes.

14. Having thus clarified the basis for the distinction between
intensive and extensive magnitudes, we are now in a better position
to see what is wrong with Armstrong's proposal for dealing with
irreducibly intensive quantities. The suggestion is this.

It may be, however, that whatever quantities natural science
sees fit to postulate, there is never any need to treat them as
anything but superficially intensive. The problem with an
irreducibly intensive quantity is that there would be no way of
representing the 'parts' of a particular degree of that
quantity as numerically different things, as one can where
extension and duration are involved in the nature of the
quantity. The underlying assumption here is that if a and b are
numerically different, then they must be in different places,
or, perhaps better, different place-times. Now difference of
place-time seems to be sufficient (for individuals) to ensure
non-identity. But the idea that sameness of place-time ensures
identity of individuals is a more controversial notion, and one
that has been quite frequently challenged in recent

193
discussions. So why should we not say that if science sees fit
to postulate apparently irreducible intensive quantities, then
what is really being postulated is the simultaneous presence of
many individuals at the same place? An individual at a certain
place has a certain determinate of determinable quantity Q. No
individual at that place and at that time has any greater value
of Q. But to have this quantity is, essentially, to be made up
of numerically different parts, but where the numerically
different parts are individuals all to be found at that place
and time.12

Now the problem with an irreducibly intensive quantity is not, as
Armstrong suggests, that there would be no way of representing the
parts of a particular measure of that magnitude as numerically
different things; it is, rather, that if there are any irreducibly
intensive quantities or magnitudes, then they cannot have any parts,
since they are, by definition, indivisible. Armstrong's proposal for
dealing with such magnitudes seems plausible, I suggest, only because
he never clearly states what the distinction between intensive and
extensive magnitudes essentially consists in. Once the actual basis
for this distinction is clarified, it becomes obvious why Armstrong's
proposal is unacceptable. An extensive magnitude does not differ from
an intensive magnitude insofar as the parts which make up any
determinate measure of that magnitude do or do not have the same
spatio-temporal location. They differ insofar as the one is, and the
other is not, a genuine whole made up of distinct parts. Whether or
not the parts are spatio-temporally distinct from one another is,
quite simply, irrelevant to the validity of the distinction.
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15. I have argued that intensive magnitudes are not reducible to
extensive magnitudes. I will now consider whether there are any
cogent reasons for concluding that incompatible sensible qualities such as determinate colours, sounds, etc. - are either intensive or
extensive magnitudes.
I think it is quite clear that some sensible qualities are
incompatible because they have different measures or degrees of some
magnitude. Two pleasures, for example, insofar as they are
comparable, might resemble each other exactly except that one has a
greater intensity than the other. Similarly, one shade of blue might
resemble another exactly except that it is brighter than the other.
In both cases the two qualities being compared are incompatible in
virtue of the fact that one has more or less of some given magnitude
than the other - in the case of the two pleasures it is the magnitude
of intensity13, and in the case of the two instances of blue it is
the magnitude of brightness. Now, I think it is generally assumed
that the magnitudes involved here are intensive rather than
extensive; and I believe that this assumption is correct. But even if
it could be shown that the magnitudes in question are actually
extensive, hence that the incompatibility of the qualities is
attributable to the mereological principle that a whole is greater
than a proper part of that whole, this does not imply that the
qualities themselves are either intensive or extensive magnitudes.
Nor does it imply that the incompatibility of all sensible qualities
is capable of being explained in this way. Pain and pleasure, for
example, are incompatible. And so are red and green. But these
qualities are not incompatible because one is more or less of
something than the other14. We might say that one instance of red is
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brighter than another, or even that red is brighter than green; and
that they are incompatible in virtue of the fact that they have
different degrees or measures of some intensive magnitude - namely
brightness. Similarly, we might wish to say that one instance of pain
is more intense than some instance of pleasure, and that they are
incompatible in respect of their different intensities. But it is one
thing to say that colours, pleasures, and pains have intensive
magnitudes. It is another thing to say that they are intensive
magnitudes; and there is nothing in the manifest nature of these
qualities to suggest that they are intensive, or indeed, extensive
magnitudes. If they are incompatible, it is because they are simply
incompatible, and not because one is more or less of something than
another.

16. At this point I think we need to draw a distinction between
characteristics which are simply incompatible, and qualities which
are incompatible in virtue of some characteristic or magnitude which
they possess. The former I shall call directly, and the latter
indirectly incompatible characteristics. Now, for Armstrong's
analysis to be plausible, he would need to show (a) that there are no
irreducibly intensive magnitudes; and (b) that no qualities are
directly incompatible. And I do not believe that he has provided us
with any sound reasons for believing that either of these
propositions is true.
In the first place he has not shown that there cannot be any
irreducibly intensive magnitudes. The only argument which he puts
forward against the reality of such magnitudes is that if science
should need to posit the reality of intensive magnitudes, then they
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could be reduced to extensive magnitudes. But we have seen that if
there are any intensive magnitudes, then they cannot be reduced to
extensive magnitudes; they are irreducibly intensive. Any
incompatibility between measures of intensive magnitude must,
therefore, be a direct incompatibility. And if we accept Armstrong's
view that all such measures or quantities are properties or
qualities15, then we must conclude that the existence of
incompatible measures of intensive magnitude implies the existence of
qualities which are directly incompatible.

17. In the second place, he has not shown that there are no
qualities which are directly incompatible. Perhaps the most obvious
examples of qualities which are, or appear to be, directly
incompatible are pleasure and pain, and determinate colours such as
red and blue. Armstrong's suggestion for dealing with such examples
is as follows.

The correct way to deal with them, I believe, is to say that
they are structured properties like volume, duration and mass,
but that their structure does not present itself to perception
in the relatively perspicuous way that is the case with these
primary qualities.18

Against the obvious objection that such qualities are not
perceived as having structure, Armstrong offers the following reply.

Suppose the identifications of secondary qualities with
primary quality structures are correct. We are certainly not
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perceptually aware that these qualities are identical with
primary qualities. Phenomenologically, this lack of awareness
translates into 'awareness' of a lack. The same point holds in
the case of lack of awareness of the complexity (a positive
factor) of the primary-quality structures. This translates
again into 'awareness' of a lack of complexity.17

The plausibility of such a response depends upon whether or not it
makes sense to say that the sensible qualities in question might be
identical with the primary qualities of some entity; and I think that
we must conclude that this is not possible. In order for such an
identification to be possible we would need to show that there is
nothing in the perceived nature of the sensible qualities which is
inconsistent with their actually being primary qualities.
Unfortunately for Armstrong, there are such qualities. As I remarked
previously, the sensible qualities in question are invariably
perceived as having certain intensive magnitudes1', and as having
these magnitudes essentially. And we have seen that such magnitudes
are not reducible to extensive magnitudes or quantities. Now, the
essential distinction between primary and secondary qualities must,
for Armstrong, consist in the fact that the primary qualities have
extensive magnitudes only. Were they to have any irreducibly
intensive magnitudes then his analysis of the incompatibility of
qualities in general would have to be rejected. But if the primary
qualities cannot have any irreducibly intensive magnitude, then the
sensible qualities, which are cognised as having such magnitudes
essentially, cannot be identical with them.
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It is, I think, clear why Armstrong's claim that a "lack of
awareness" translates into "an awareness of a lack" will not work
here. It is not that we do not perceive the sensible qualities as
having some of the characteristics which they do have; it is, rather,
that we perceive them as having characteristics which they cannot
have if, as is maintained, they are identical with certain primary
qualities. Every pain, for example, is perceived as having a measure
or degree of intensity, and this intensity is an irreducibly
intensive magnitude. Furthermore, it is impossible for a pain not to
be perceived as having some measure of intensity - i.e. as not having
an intensive magnitude. The same principle is true of colours, and
other sensible qualities. No colour can be perceived except as having
a certain measure of brightness. No sound can be perceived except as
having a certain measure of loudness. And so on. Now, if the sensible
qualities in question cannot be identical with certain primary
qualities, then their incompatibility cannot be explained in the
manner proposed by Armstrong. The possibility that they are directly
incompatible remains.
It might be pointed out that this reply to Armstrong does not, as
such, establish that the sensible qualities themselves, as distinct
from the intensive magnitudes which they possess, are directly
incompatible. At best it establishes only that they are indirectly
incompatible. But they are indirectly incompatible because the
measures of intensive magnitude which they possess are directly
incompatible. And this is sufficient to undermine Armstrong's thesis,
since such measures are themselves, according to his theory of
quantities, sensible qualities.
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The direct incompatibility of the sensible qualities in question
must, I think, be considered to be self-evident. The claim that such
qualities, as distinct from the entities which they qualify, might be
other than they appear to be is, I maintain, unintelligible1'. Once
we accept this fact that they are transparent to consciousness, the
incompatibility of some of these qualities, such as pleasure and
pain, is evident.

18. Having argued that the claim that there are no incompatible
qualities is false, we may now consider the claim that there are no
incompatible relations. This view is, I think, even less plausible
than the view that there are no incompatible qualities. But it is a
view which has recently been endorsed, once again by Armstrong20. I
will now consider the arguments offered in its defence.
We might begin by pointing out that, in the case of relations,
Armstrong's appeal to the mereological principle that a whole is
greater than a proper part of that whole, as a general model for the
understanding of the incompatibility of measures of extensive
magnitudes, is not acceptable here. Even if we are willing to accept
the possibility that some incompatible qualities are measures of
extensive magnitudes, and their incompatibility explicable in
accordance with this principle, it is impossible for Armstrong to
account for the incompatibility of relations in this way. In the
first place, as I remarked earlier, relations, unlike qualities or
substances, are not generally divisible. If they are magnitudes, they
must, therefore, be irreducibly intensive magnitudes - in which case
the mereological principle is not applicable. Secondly, if, as
Armstrong elsewhere maintains21, all quantities are qualities or
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properties, then no relations can be extensive magnitudes; hence
their incompatibility is not susceptible to analysis in terms of the
incompatibility of measures of extensive magnitude.
It seems to me that there are two quite conclusive reasons for
believing that there are incompatible relations. The first is that
the incompatibility of some relations, such as identity and
difference, is presupposed in the formulation of any sound logical or
metaphysical principle. If A is identical with B, then it is
impossible for A to be different from S22. The second is the
generally accepted logical and metaphysical principle that if r is an
asymmetrical relation, then r is incompatible with the converse of r
- i.e., r. If John is taller than Paul, then John cannot be shorter
than Paul, Again, the truth of this principle is, I think,
presupposed in some of the most fundamental instances of valid
logical and metaphysical reasoning. How, then, does Armstrong deal
with these arguments?

19. Armstrong does not give any direct reply to the first of these
arguments. He does accept the premiss that identity is a relation23;
and if he accepts this premiss, then he ought to accept the premiss
that difference is a relation. But identity is claimed to be an
internal relation, and an internal relation, according to
Armstrong24, is a supervenient entity. Now, if something is a
supervenient entity, then, according to Armstrong, it is not "wholly
distinct" from the entity upon which it supervenes. If we put this in
more concrete terms, Armstrong's contention is that if A is identical
with itself, then A and the relation of identity are not wholly
distinct entities - the relation is supervenient upon A.
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Although we have tried to express what Armstrong's views on the
status of the relations of identity and difference are, I don't see
that this sheds any light upon the way in which he would reply to our
initial argument. In the first place, the notion of something being
"wholly distinct" from something else is not explained. If it means
that the two entities are what he refers to elsewhere25 as being
"Hume distinct", then it means that the entities are logically
independent. On the other hand, if two entities are not wholly
distinct, then it would seem to follow that they cannot be logically
independent. But where does this get us? No-one would deny that if A
is identical with itself, then A and the relation of identity are not
logically independent. The important question is whether they are
different entities, and I don't see how it is possible to
consistently deny that they are. But if they are different, why
should we not accept (i) that there is a relation of identity; and
(ii) that this relation is incompatible with the relation of
difference? The fact that identity is an internal relation (i.e. a
supervenient entity) is, quite simply, irrelevant to the question
whether identity and difference are incompatible. So far as I can
see, Armstrong's response does not assist us in attempting to answer
this question.

20. His response to the second argument is, I suggest, equally
unsatisfactory. The suggestion is this.

We now turn to asymmetry. If a is before b, then it is
entailed that b is after a, and apparently excluded that b is
before a. With respect to the first entailment, once again it
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seems correct to say that we have the one state of affairs
described in two different ways. The inseparability of the
'two' states of affairs seems good evidence for this: Compare a
causes b if and only if b is caused by a. Fairly obviously,
this is just one state of affairs. The fact that if a is before
b we do not say '£> is befored by a' instead of 'Z> is after a'
would appear to be a relative linguistic accident.2"

It is not clear whether Armstrong wishes to maintain that all
ostensibly asymmetrical relations can be dealt with in this manner.
On the one hand he insists that only those which are "external" to
their terms are susceptible to this kind of analysis. On the other
hand, in the footnote on page 85, he seems to implicitly endorse the
view that all ostensibly asymmetrical relations can be treated in
this way. In either case, I would maintain, the position is
unacceptable.
In the first place, I think we need to be clear about some of the
implications of such a view. Let us begin with the extreme view, that
all ostensibly asymmetrical relations can be treated in this way.
Now, what this view amounts to is the claim that there are no
asymmetrical relations - since an asymmetrical relation is, according
to the traditional definition27, a relation which is incompatible
with its converse. A symmetrical relation, on the other hand, is
defined as being a relation which is identical with its converse. In
other words, this extreme view amounts to the claim that all
relations are symmetrical. One consequence of such a view is that
there can be no order among existents, since, as Russell has
argued2', the presence of transitive asymmetrical relations is
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essential to the genesis of order among any terms. And, since the
concept of order is, according to Russell, essential to the
development of mathematics and geometry, the claim that there are no
asymmetrical relations would amount to the claim that there can be no
mathematics or geometry as such.
The consequences of such a view go much further than this,
however. Not only must we reject what has come to be accepted as the
traditional basis of mathematics and geometry, we must also reject
some of the most fundamental principles of logic. Arguably the most
fundamental relation in any logical theory is that of implication.
Now, if we claim that all relations are symmetrical, then it follows
that every proposition which implies another proposition is, in turn,
implied by that other proposition. In other words, acceptance of the
principle that all relations are symmetrical involves the rejection
of the assumption that there is any fallacy involved in the principle
of the Consequent1* - i.e., affirming the consequent. The
implications of such a view for any traditionally accepted logical
theory are obviously disastrous. For these reasons the extreme view
is, I think, untenable.
Let us consider, then, the views which Armstrong does explicitly
endorse. The first claim which he makes is that ostensibly
asymmetrical relations which are "external" to their terms are, in
fact, symmetrical. What the distinction between "internal" and
"external" relations consists in is not entirely clear, but I think
we can safely assume that an "external" relation, for Armstrong, is
one which is logically independent of its terms. An "internal"
relation, by contrast, is a relation which is not logically
independent of its terms. In order to avoid any difficulties about
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which relations are, and which relations are not, internal, we will
consider the case of a relation which Armstrong himself considers to
be external. The example we are asked to consider is a relationship
of temporal precedence. If a is before b, then, it is generally
inferred, b is after a. The basis for this inference is generally
understood to be the fact that there are two different relations
involved, and that the existence of one relation implies the
existence of its converse. The two relations are also understood to
be incompatible, so that they may not share the same referent and
relatum. Now, Armstrong claims that what we have in this case is not
two mutually implicative facts or states of affairs, but one fact
described in two different ways.
There are, I think, a number of reasons why this proposal is
unacceptable. Firstly, it is generally accepted that the relation
between a relation and its converse is the relation of implication;
so that aRb implies bRa. Armstrong's claim that the "inseparability"
of the two states of affairs is good evidence for their being two
different descriptions of one and the same state of affairs is simply
not justified. We might just as well claim that their inseparability
consists in the fact that they are two distinct, but mutually
implicative facts or states of affairs.
Secondly, there is a definite order involved in the two facts; and
this order is given by the fact that the before and after relations
have different senses. Without this difference of sense, there could
be no order among the terms. And this is what is wrong with
Armstrong's proposed analysis - it fails to preserve the intrinsic
sense or order in the initial relationships. Insofar as the
proposition "b is befored by a" does preserve the sense of the
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relation after, the relation is befored by cannot be identical with
the relation before. To be befored by something is not the same as
being before something. It is equivalent to being after something.
But then this is just the point at issue - namely, that after and
before have different intrinsic senses, and that it is this
difference of sense which determines their incompatibility.
Thirdly, insofar as Armstrong does not deny the reality of
asymmetrical relations altogether, we are still faced with the fact
that all such relations are incompatible with their converse
relations - whether they are "internal" or "external" does not alter
this fact. If a is taller than b then a cannot be shorter than o i.e., the relation taller than is incompatible with its converse
relation, shorter than. Nor does the assumption that internal
relations are not "wholly distinct" from their terms. Unless "not
wholly distinct from" means "identical with", the relations still
exist and retain their incompatibility.
It might be pointed out that, according to Armstrong, internal
relations are not wholly distinct from their terms in the sense that
they are supervenient upon those terms. But Armstrong's concept of
supervenience does not, I suggest, imply that supervenient entities
are not different from the entities upon which they supervene.
Supervenience is defined by Armstrong in the following way.

... If there exist possible worlds which contain an entity or
entities R, and if in each such world there exists an entity or
entities S, then and only then S supervenes on R.30
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To the obvious question whether this implies that such
supervenient entities are not really entities, Armstrong's answer is
rather vague. On the one hand, he does not deny outright that these
entities exist. On the other hand, he suggests that ostensibly
supervenient relations might actually be non-relational structural
properties of their terms. For example, if a is taller than b, then
what is ostensibly an asymmetrical relation, taller than, relating a
and b, is actually, according to Armstrong, a non-relational
structural property predicable of both a and b.
Again there are a number of difficulties with this latter view.
Firstly, it is not clear whether Armstrong intends to apply this type
of analysis to all "internal" relations, or whether it is intended to
apply only to the example mentioned. If it does not apply to all
"internal" relations, then we are still faced with our initial
difficulty about accounting for the incompatibility of asymmetrical
relations. Secondly, and most importantly, by removing the relation
as such, and suggesting that it is, in fact, a property of the terms,
we thereby remove the intrinsic sense or direction implicit in the
original "relational" fact. Without this sense there is no order
among the terms. Armstrong's only example, the relation having the
same shape as, appears susceptible to this type of analysis only
because it is a symmetrical relation, which does not have an
intrinsic sense. If, on the other hand, we attempt to analyse
asymmetrical relations in this way, we lose the sense, hence the
order which is conveyed by the original relationship. For this
reason, the proposed analysis must be rejected.
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21. We may conclude, then, that Armstrong has not really given us
a plausible means of avoiding a commitment to the existence of
incompatible relations. We are still faced with the fact that some
relations, specifically asymmetrical relations and their converse
relations, are incompatible. Whether or not they are "internal" or
supervenient does not, as we have seen, materially affect this
conclusion.

22. I have argued that there are qualities which are incompatible
with other qualities, and that there are relations which are
incompatible with other relations. Let us now consider the question
whether there are any qualities which are incompatible with certain
relations.
I should begin by pointing out that we are not attempting to
answer the question whether qualities are compatible with relations
per se. That more general question was answered in Chapter 2, where
we considered Bradley's contention that the categories of Quality and
Relation are incompatible. Our question here pertains to specific
instances of the categories - that is, to specific qualities and
relations.
Next, I think we need to clearly state what we mean by the claim
that some qualities and relations are incompatible, I should say that
a quality, Q, is incompatible with a relation, r, if it is impossible
for Q to be a term, i.e. a referent or relatum, of that relation.
Having stated what we mean by the proposition that some qualities and
relations are incompatible, it is, I think, clear that this
proposition is true. It is impossible, for example, for the colour
blue to be taller than Mt. Kosciusko. It is also impossible for some
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particular intensity of sound to be heavier than my desk. In each of
these cases we have examples of "external" relations which are
incompatible with one or more of their terms31. Furthermore, such
relations, insofar as they are "external" to their terms, are, in
Armstrong's sense, "wholly distinct" from these terms. And yet the
terms and the relations are not compossible. The implications of the
existence of such ontological incompatibilities for a combinatorial
theory of possibility, such as that endorsed by Armstrong, are
disturbing, to say the least. The possibility of such
incompatibilities is not, however, mentioned in his discussion of de
re incompatibilities and necessities in Chapter 6 of A Combinatorial
Theory Of Possibility. The omission of such a discussion does, I
think, seriously affect the cogency of Armstrong's overall argument
for that theory.

23. I have argued that there are ontological incompatibilities
among qualities, among relations, and among particular qualities and
relations. I shall now argue that the existence of these
incompatibilities provides us with the basis for understanding the
nature of the laws of existence, and for the kind of universal
determinism propounded by McTaggart.

24. In Section 6 of this chapter we posed two questions. The first
was whether there are any incompatible characteristics of the
existent. The second concerned the nature of the relation of
intrinsic determination. Our affirmative answer to the first question
will, I believe, provide us with an answer to the second. And it is
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the second question which, in turn, provides us with an insight into
the nature of the laws of existence.
In Section 5 I suggested that the incompatibilities which, we
concluded, exist among some characteristics of the existent, entitle
us to affirm that there are instances of intrinsic determination. I
also pointed out that, according to McTaggart, these
incompatibilities could be explained by the fact that certain
characteristics of the existent intrinsically determine the absence
of certain other characteristics; or, alternatively, that certain
characteristics of the existent intrinsically determine certain
negative characteristics of the existent. The relation of intrinsic
determination itself, however, remained undefined. This might be
because McTaggart considered it to be, like the relation of
implication, indefinable. On the other hand, when discussing the
incompatibility of certain relations, I mentioned the fact that the
v

relation between a particular relation, R, and its converse, R, is
traditionally considered to be a relation of implication - i.e., the
occurrence of a relation, R, between two terms, a and b, implies the
occurrence of the converse relation, R, between b and a. And it is
this fact which, I suggest, provides us with a definition of
intrinsic determination. Intrinsic determination, I suggest, is to be
defined as a relation of existent implication32.

25. This definition allows us to answer a number of criticisms
raised by Broad in his discussion of McTaggart's concept of intrinsic
determination. The first of these criticisms is to be found on page
197 of the Examination.
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When McTaggart begins to give examples he uses phrases which
seem inconsistent with his definitions. Thus, at the bottom of
p. Ill, he says that "the occurrence of blueness intrinsically
determines the occurrence of spatiality". (My italics.) And, at
the top of p.112, he says that the quality of one person to be
a husband intrinsically determines the occurrence in someone
else of the quality of being a wife. (My italics, again.) Here
we have a mass of verbal inconsistencies. "Intrinsic
determination" was defined at the beginning of §108 as a
relation between characteristics. Yet in the very same section
it is said, in the first example, to relate two occurrences,
and, in the second example, to relate a quality and an
occurrence of a quality. Now, for McTaggart, a quality is a
characteristic and not a fact, whilst an occurrence of a
quality is either a fact or an event, and is certainly not a
characteristic.33

In reply to this criticism we may make a number of points.
Firstly, as I have already pointed out34, McTaggart does not offer a
definition of intrinsic determination in Section 108 of The Nature Of
Existence. If we accept that McTaggart's statements about intrinsic
determination in that section do not constitute a definition, and if
we accept the definition of intrinsic determination as a relation of
existent implication, then the inconsistencies which Broad cites can
be shown to be merely verbal.
In the first place, we may insist that even though intrinsic
determination is a relation between characteristics, it is not
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necessarily a relation between characteristics only. It may relate
facts, for example.
Secondly, by defining intrinsic determination as a relation of
existent implication we may claim that it relates existent
characteristics. Now, existent characteristics are not facts although they are necessarily constituents of facts. An existent
quality might therefore be considered to be a constituent of an
occurrence of that quality. But it does not follow that the quality
itself is an occurrence. It is a constituent of the occurrence; and
the occurrence itself may be considered to be either a fact or an
event. Insofar as two or more constituent characteristics of these
facts or events are related by intrinsic determination, and insofar
as these characteristics are constituents of different facts or
events, then we may say that one fact or event intrinsically
determines another fact or event. In other words, intrinsic
determination relates characteristics insofar as these
characteristics are themselves existent - i.e., insofar as they are
constituents of facts or events. In this sense we may say that
intrinsic determination directly relates characteristics, and that it
indirectly relates occurrences of these characteristics - i.e., facts
or events.

26. Our definition of intrinsic determination also allows us to
dispense with the need to appeal to Broad's relation of conveyance in
order to resolve the apparent inconsistencies in McTaggart's views.
Broad argues that McTaggart failed to distinguish intrinsic
determination from the relation of conveyance, and that the failure
to recognise this distinction is the source of the inconsistencies in
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his statements about intrinsic determination. Broad defines
conveyance in the following way.

I define the statement that 0 "conveys" • to mean that, if
anything has 0, it necessarily follows that that same thing has
• ; i.e., conveyance is the relation which 0 has to if if and
only if 0x-*zifx. Thus, for example, the characteristic of having
shape conveys the characteristic of being extended.35

Having thus defined conveyance, he then argues that this is, in a
sense, a more fundamental relation than intrinsic determination.

Now it follows logically from 0x-*,1fx that
(3x).0x:~:Gx).ifx.
If, for example, nothing could have shape without being
extended, then it is impossible that something should have
shape whilst nothing had extension. Thus the proposition that 0
conveys t entails the proposition that 0 intrinsically
determines if. But this entailment is not reversible. It is
logically possible that 0 should intrinsically determine • ,
although 0 did not convey •. Thus the assertion of conveyance
is a stronger and more definite assertion than that of
intrinsic determination between the same characteristics. Now
every instance of intrinsic determination which McTaggart gives
is one in which conveyance also holds, and in which our
knowledge that there is intrinsic determination is inferred
from our knowledge that there is conveyance. It is not at all
easy to think of any instance of intrinsic determination which
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is not inferred from conveyance. This being so, McTaggart
sometimes tended to ascribe to intrinsic determination
properties which belong only to conveyance.30

There are two basic criticisms contained in this passage. The
first consists in the claim that conveyance is a "stronger" and "more
definite" relation than intrinsic determination. The second consists
in the claim that our knowledge of intrinsic determination is
generally, if not universally, inferred from our knowledge of
conveyance.

27. Let us begin with the claim that conveyance is a stronger and
more definite relation than intrinsic determination. Unfortunately,
the significance of the adjective "strong" in this context is not
entirely clear. The suggestion seems to be that, since the
proposition "0 conveys if" entails the proposition "0 intrinsically

determines if", whilst the proposition "0 intrinsically determines if"
does not entail the proposition "0 conveys •", conveyance is
therefore a stronger relation than intrinsic determination. I think
that this criticism might have some point if we were to assume that
conveyance and intrinsic determination are wholly distinct
relations37. But this assumption is not justified. The relation of
conveyance is, I suggest, actually a compound relation, analysable
into a relation of intrinsic determination and a relation of
extrinsic determination. The quality 0 conveys the quality • if:

(1) 0 intrinsically determines •;
(2) 0 extrinsically determines •.
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Extrinsic determination is a relation between two or more
qualities in virtue of the fact that they are true of one and the
same substantive. It is such that if one quality extrinsical ly
determines another then neither can be true of a particular
substantive unless the other is true of that substantive3'. It
differs from conveyance insofar as it is a symmetrical relation, and
it differs from intrinsic determination insofar as it relates
qualities of a single substantive.
I shall discuss the principle of Extrinsic Determination in more
detail later in this chapter. It is mentioned at this point only to
show that Broad's contention that conveyance is a stronger and more
definite relation than intrinsic determination need not amount to
anything more than the fact that conveyance is a compound or complex
relation of which intrinsic determination is a part or constituent.

28. Let us now consider the claim that our knowledge of intrinsic
determination is inferred from our knowledge of conveyance. At this
point I think we need to draw a distinction between epistemic and
ontological priority. If, as a matter of fact, our knowledge of some
entity is inferred from our knowledge of some other entity, then we
may say that our knowledge of the former is epistemically prior to
our knowledge of the latter. If, on the other hand, some entity
implies, without being implied by, some other entity, then we may say
that the former is ontological ly prior to the latter. Now, I think
that it is clear that epistemic priority does not entail ontological
priority. At best, then, Broad's argument would establish only that
our knowledge of conveyance is epistemically prior to our knowledge
of intrinsic determination. It does not show that conveyance is
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ontologically prior to intrinsic determination; and it is this latter
claim alone which is of any real significance in this context.
In any case, it is doubtful whether Broad has shown that our
knowledge of conveyance is epistemically prior to our knowledge of
intrinsic determination. If we accept the analysis of conveyance
given in the previous section, then there is no real justification
for Broad's contention that our knowledge of conveyance is inferred
from our knowledge of intrinsic determination - since every instance
of knowledge of conveyance is ipso facto an instance of knowledge of
intrinsic determination. What is, perhaps, justifiable is the claim
that our knowledge of intrinsic determination is not made explicit
until the correct analysis of conveyance is provided. But this does
not mean that our knowledge of intrinsic determination is inferred
from our knowledge of conveyance.
The only other reason we are given for believing that our
knowledge of conveyance is epistemically prior to our knowledge of
intrinsic determination is the contention that, in the two examples
mentioned by McTaggart, our knowledge of intrinsic determination is,
in fact, inferred from our knowledge of conveyance. But even this
contention is, I think, unjustified. The first example of intrinsic
determination we are asked to consider is given by the proposition
"the occurrence of blueness intrinsically determines the occurrence
of spatiality". Broad argues that, in this case, our only ground for
asserting this proposition is our knowledge that if anything were
blue, then that same thing would be spatial - i.e., that blueness
conveys spatial ity. But this conclusion is not justified for the
following reason. As I mentioned in Chapter 1, some philosophers have
argued that what we call a "thing" is, in fact, simply an aggregate
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or "bundle" of distinct quality-instances; and, that the knowledge of
a single substantive of which these quality-instances can be
predicated is not something which is simply given in experience. The
belief that there is a single substantive of which they can be
predicated is claimed to be the product of a relatively basic
metaphysical theory31. Now, if we were to accept such a view, it
would follow that our knowledge of intrinsic determination among the
quality-instances could not legitimately be inferred from our
knowledge of conveyance among them, since the belief that blueness
conveys spatiality can only be reached as the result of a process of
metaphysical reasoning - i.e., as an inference from the premiss that
there are distinct substantives of which these qualities can be
predicated. And this premiss, as Bradley and others have argued40,
is not self-evident. The proposition "the occurrence of blueness
intrinsically determines the occurrence of spatiality", on the other
hand, is self-evident. And it is clear that we cannot legitimately
infer the truth of a proposition which is self-evident from the truth
of a proposition which is not self-evident.
We may reply to Broad's criticism of McTaggart's second example
along similar lines. McTaggart's second example is that the quality
of being a husband intrinsically determines the quality of being a
wife. Broad argues that, even though the quality of being a husband
does not convey the quality of being a wife, it does convey the
quality of having a wife; and, that our knowledge that the quality of
being a husband intrinsically determines the quality of being a wife
is inferred from our belief that the quality of being a husband
conveys the quality of having a wife. Again, I think that this
conclusion is unjustified. The quality of having a wife, insofar as
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it is distinct from the quality of being a husband, is a relational
quality which is intrinsically determined by the relationship xHy where H is the relation is a husband to. Now, in order for the
relationship to exist there must be an instance of the quality of
being a wife. That is to say, the quality of having a wife is
intrinsically determined by the relationship xHy. It cannot,
therefore, be ontologically prior to that relationship. In other
words, our knowledge that the quality of having a wife is conveyed by
the quality of being a husband depends upon our belief that there
exists a relationship xHy; and this belief, in turn, is inferred from
our belief that the quality of being a husband intrinsically
determines the quality of being a wife.

29. Having thus defined, and defended, the concept of intrinsic
determination, we are now in a better position to appreciate its
importance in understanding the nature of the laws of existence.
We may begin by considering McTaggart's own views on the nature of
such laws. A summary statement of these views is to be found in
Section 258 of The Nature Of Existence.

Any statement that any quality intrinsically determines any
other quality is a law.41

As it stands, I think that there are a number of difficulties with
this statement. The first is that no clear distinction is drawn
between a law as such, and a statement of a law. The statement "the
occurrence of blueness intrinsically determines the occurrence of
spatial ity" is a statement of a law. The law itself consists in the
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fact that the occurrence of blueness intrinsically determines the
occurrence of spatiality. The second difficulty is that it restricts
the range of laws to relationships involving qualities only; whereas
I would argue that there are laws which consist in relationships
among relations, among qualities and relations, and among qualities,
relations and unities. The third difficulty is that the suggestion
that laws involve a relation of intrinsic determination would seem to
restrict the realm of laws to the realm of existents; and yet, as
McTaggart himself admits42, there are laws which do not seem to
involve existents.
Each of these difficulties can, I believe, be met by revising this
statement in accordance with our definition of intrinsic
determination. A statement of law, we may say, is a statement that
some entity implies some other entity. A law, accordingly, consists
in a relationship of implication between two or more entities, or
between an entity and itself. A law of existence, on the other hand,
is distinguished from a law as such insofar as the former consists in
a relationship of implication between existents. And, since any
relation between existents is itself existent, we may say that a law
of existence consists in a relationship of existent implication i.e., a relationship of intrinsic determination - between existents.

30. In addition to the distinction between a law as such, and a
law of existence, we may draw a distinction between singular and
general laws. A singular law is a relationship between two or more
particular entities (or between a particular entity and itself). A
general law, on the other hand, is a kind of law.
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To fully appreciate the nature of this distinction between
singular and general laws we need to be clear about the nature of the
distinction between particular entities and kinds of entities. Let us
assume, for example, that we have two particular instances of
redness, Tj and r2. Now these two instances, we will assume, resemble
each other exactly; and the occurrence of a relation of exact
resemblance between them will, in accordance with the principle which
we introduced in Chapter 2, determine a unity which comprises rl5 r,,
and the relation of exact resemblance. This unity, I suggest, is the
unity of the kind. It is redness as such, as distinct from its
particular instances, rj and r2, which it comprises. In addition to
such kinds of qualities, there may also be kinds of facts or
unities43. If two or more facts or unities resemble each other
exactly, then they will be comprised by a kind of fact or unity. A
general law, then, is a kind of law - i.e., a unity determined by
relations of exact resemblance between singular laws44. Although a
general law is distinct from the singular laws which it comprises, it
is not independent of these singular laws. Any singular law which is
comprised by a general law I shall call an instance of the general
law. If there is a general law comprising two or more kinds, then
each instance of one kind implies an instance of the other. It is
also clear that if each instance of a kind implies an instance of
another kind, then there is a general law comprising these two kinds.
A general law should be distinguished from what we might call a
general regularity. If each instance of a kind co-exists with an
instance of another kind then that is a general regularity. But
unless each of these instances implies the other we do not have a
general law which comprises them. A general law is a general
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regularity, but it is not just a general regularity - as Armstrong
has argued45.
An important epistemic consequence of our view of general laws is
that, since the general law is a distinct entity from its particular
instances, our knowledge of the general law may be epistemically
prior to our knowledge of the particular instances. That is to say,
our knowledge of the general law need not be inductively inferred
from the knowledge of its instances.

31. The occurrence of laws among the qualities of the existent
allows us to conclude that the existence of some of these qualities
is dependent upon the existence of others. If the existence of some
quality Y is dependent upon the existence of some other quality X,
then we may say that X determines Y. The thesis that every quality of
the existent is dependent upon the existence of some other quality of
the existent I shall call the thesis of Determinism. The thesis that
every quality of the existent is dependent upon every other quality
of the existent I shall call the thesis of Universal Determinism. I
shall now argue that the thesis of Universal Determinism is true.
In order to establish the thesis of Universal Determinism we need
to clarify the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic
determination. If the existence of Y is dependent upon the existence
of X, and Y is implied by the existence of X, then we may say that X
intrinsically determines Y. If the existence of Y is dependent upon
the existence of X, and if X does not imply Y, then we may say that X
extrinsically determines Y. The thesis of Determinism might therefore
be understood to mean either:
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(a) Every quality of the existent is intrinsically determined
by some other quality of the existent; or,
(b) Every quality of the existent is extrinsically determined
by some other quality of the existent.

The thesis of Universal Determinism, on the other hand, might be
understood to mean either:

(c) Every quality of the existent is intrinsically determined
by every other quality of the existent; or,
(d) Every quality of the existent is extrinsically determined
by every other quality of the existent.

At this point we may reject alternative (c). Some existent
qualities, we have argued, are incompatible. And if two qualities are
incompatible neither can be implied by the other. Insofar as they are
existent, this means that neither quality is intrinsically determined
by the other. It is not the case, then, that every quality of the
existent is intrinsically determined by every other quality of the
existent.
Without knowledge of the relative incidence of laws of existence I
do not see that it is possible to eliminate (a). But even though we
cannot, at this stage, eliminate (a), we do not have any reason to
believe that it is true. Knowledge of the relative incidence of laws
of existence is not, I think, attainable by a priori means48. And
without such knowledge we cannot decide either in favour of, or
against, the truth of this principle.
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This leaves us with (b) and (d) as the most plausible versions of
Determinism. I believe that it is possible to demonstrate the truth
of both of these principles. The truth of (b) is, however, implied by
the truth of (d) - which is clearly the stronger principle. A
demonstration of the truth of (d) is therefore sufficient to
establish the truth of (b).

32. In order to establish the truth of (d) the first thing we need
to do is to remind ourselves of the distinction which McTaggart drew
between the "Primary" and the "Repeating" qualities of a
substance47. The Primary Qualities include both original qualities
and qualities which are implied by original relationships. An
original quality is a quality which is directly true of a substance,
and which is not implied by a relationship. An original relationship
is any relationship involving original qualities. Any original
relationship implies a relational quality in each term of the
relation - namely, the quality of being a term in that relationship.
Such qualities are included among the Primary Qualities of the
substance. The repeating qualities of a substance are those qualities
which are intrinsically determined by the Primary Qualities of that
substance.
It is clear that, in order to establish (d) we need only show that
every Primary Quality of the existent is extrinsically determined by
some other Primary Quality of the existent, since each of the
repeating qualities is intrinsically determined by one or more of the
Primary Qualities and cannot, therefore, exist independently of them.
The next step in the argument is to point out, firstly, that every
Primary Quality of the existent is a particular entity; and,
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secondly, that, in accordance with the principle of the Dissimilarity
of the Diverse, substances are differentiated by their natures. From
these premisses we may draw two further conclusions:

(1) No particular substance can have a nature other than that
which it does, in fact, have; and
(2) No particular substance could have had a nature other
than that which it does, in fact, have.

Given these conclusions, the next step in the overall argument is
to remind ourselves of the fact that every quality is ultimately
dependent upon a substance for its existence. This follows from the
categorisation of existence as substance. Now, in view of the fact
that the uniqueness or particularity of any substance is dependent
upon the uniqueness of its nature, it follows that the existence of
any particular substance is determined by the uniqueness of its
nature. A substance with a nature made up of the qualities X,Y and Z
is a different substance than a substance whose nature is made up of
the qualities P,Q and R. But it is also a different substance than a
substance with a nature made up of the qualities X and Y only, or a
substance with a nature made up of the qualities W,X,Y and Z. That is
to say, if any of the qualities which make up the nature of a
particular substance should cease to exist, then that particular
substance ceases to exist. Now, if the particular substance ceases to
exist, then the remaining qualities - which only exist as the
qualities of that particular substance - cease to exist. It is clear,
then, that the existence of every quality of every substance is
dependent upon the existence of every other quality of that
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substance. And this is sufficient to establish the truth of (d) i.e., the truth of Determinism - in respect of any particular
substance.

33. Having established the truth of (d) in respect of any
particular substance we need only introduce two further premisses in
order to establish the truth of (d) as such. The first of these
premisses is that the Universe is a compound substance of which all
other substances are proper parts. The second premiss is that if any
proper part, A, of the Universe, has a quality, X, then the Universe
has the quality of containing a part with the nature of A. If we call
this latter quality X', then, as McTaggart points out4', the fact
that A has X, and the fact that the Universe has X', intrinsically
determine one another. It follows that if X, which, we will assume,
is a Primary Quality of A, did not exist, then X' would not exist,
since the existence of X* is intrinsically determined by the
existence of X. But if X' did not exist, then the Universe would not
exist, and with it would go the remaining qualities comprised by its
nature. The existence of each quality of the existent is therefore
dependent upon the existence of every other quality of the existent.

34. It follows from the truth of the principle of Universal
Determinism that we are not justified in drawing any conclusions
about what might have been the case should any particular substance
have had a different nature than that which it does, in fact, have.
That is to say, contrary-to-fact or counterfactual conditionals
involving particular substances are, strictly speaking, illegitimate.
This does not necessarily mean that other types of conditional
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judgements are illegitimate. A conditional judgement of the form "If
anything is X then it is T', as well as a subjunctive conditional of
the form "If anything were X then it would be T, may both be
understood to be a expressions of a general law comprising X-ness and
Y-ness. A counterfactual conditional, on the other hand, involves an
illegitimate assumption about a particular substance - namely, that
the substance in question might have had a nature other than that
which it does, in fact, have.
This conclusion has recently been argued for on quite different
grounds. Although we may not necessarily accept the premisses of that
author's argument we can, I think, agree with his reply to those who
would simply dismiss such a view outright, on the grounds that it
leads to a "block" Universe.

I believe that Leibniz would have diagnosed his opponents'
disagreement with this as resulting from a failure to think
through the consequences of our most fundamental assumptions
about what it is to be an individual. And the least that can be
said for his own point of view, I think, is that it may have a
salutary effect in warning us against being too casual in
assuming that this or that feature of our world could be
changed while everything else is left the same. One might even
imagine that an increasing awareness of the dangers of such
assumptions, rather than some shift in economic status or some
regrettable effect of the aging process, is what explains why
people tend to become more and more conservative as they grow
older.40
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To this I think we need only add McTaggart's own comment, that if
the absence of contingency in the Universe is an evil, it is an evil
which is inevitable and universal50.

NOTES

1.

McTaggart, The Nature Of Existence, §108.

2. Broad mistakenly considers the description in Section 108 to
constitute a definition of Intrinsic Determination [Examination
Of McTaggart's Philosophy, Volume 1, pp. 196-7]. Much of the
subsequent discussion in that chapter of the Examination is, as
I shall argue below, compromised by this mistake. McTaggart
nowhere offers a definition of Intrinsic Determination. The
description in Section 108 simply provides us with the
denotation of the concept of intrinsic determination. A
definition would have provided us with a partial or complete
analysis of the relation itself [cf., The Nature Of Existence,
§63].
3. Broad, Examination Of McTaggart's Philosophy, Vol.1, pp.193194.
4. See R.L. Saw, Leibniz, pp.116-117.
5. Armstrong talks of them as structural properties. But the
distinction is not, I think, relevant to the points which I
wish to make in the following discussion.
6. D.M. Armstrong, A Combinatorial Theory Of Possibility, pp.7884.
7. Armstrong, A Combinatorial Theory Of Possibility, p.79.
8. Armstrong, A Combinatorial Theory Of Possibility, p.79.
9. McTaggart, The Nature Of Existence, §568.
10. McTaggart, The Nature Of Existence, §568. Cf., Stout, A Manual
Of Psychology, p.60:
The measurement of the qualitative or intensive
attributes of sensation or feeling is attended by
peculiar difficulties, due to the intrinsic nature of
what is measured. The degree of loudness of a sound
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cannot be broken up into fractional parts which can be
marked off from each other. We cannot say by direct
comparison of two sounds that one is half, or a quarter,
or a third, or twice as loud as the other. The two sounds
cannot be superposed so as to make the fainter coincide
with part of the louder, leaving a remainder which can be
regarded as the quantitative difference between them. In
this respect intensive differs from extensive quantity.
The difference between two extensive quantities is itself
an extensive quantity. The difference between two lines,
one a foot long and the other ten inches long, is itself
a line two inches long. But the difference between the
loudness of two sounds is not itself a sound having a
certain assignable loudness.
11. Wholes are a species of unity, but not all unities are wholes.
I should distinguish an aggregate, which is a unity, from a
whole insofar as the entities comprised by an aggregate,
although co-existent, need not belong to the same ontological
category.
12. Armstrong, A Combinatorial Theory Of Possibility, pp.80-81,
13. A magnitude of intensity should be distinguished from an
intensive magnitude. The former is an instance of the latter.
14. It might be suggested that pleasure is identical with a zero
degree of pain, or vice versa. But it is not clear to me that,
in that case, they could be said to share a common magnitude.
In what way, for example, could we distinguish a zero degree of
pleasure from a zero degree of brightness? Cf., W.E. Johnson,
Logic, Part II, Chapter 7, §10:
It is impossible, however, to compare two kinds of
intensive magnitude such as the brightness of a light
sensation with the loudness of a sound sensation; all we
can say is that a colour of zero brightness would be nonexistent, and a sound of zero loudness would be nonexistent. The subtle point then arises whether the notion
of zero-intensity of sound is distinguishable from the
notion of zero-intensity of light. In popular language we
might ask: Is there anything to distinguish absolute
silence from absolute darkness? I think that apart from
an organ of sensation having potentialities as a medium
for receiving sensations we must say that zero
intensities are indistinguishable; it is only through the
capacity of visual and auditory imagery, and indirectly
through the possession of organs for conveying these two
corresponding kinds of sensation, that distinctions
between zeros can have for us any import.
15. D.M. Armstrong, "Are Quantities Relations? A Reply To Bigelow
And Pargetter". If, on the other hand, we accept the view put
forward by Bigelow and Pargetter, that quantities are
relations, then, since, as Russell has pointed out [The
Principles Of Mathematics, §153], relations are not generally
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divisible, most, if not all, magnitudes must be intensive,
rather than extensive.
16. Armstrong, A Combinatorial Theory Of Possibility, p.82.
17. Armstrong, A Combinatorial Theory Of Possibility, p.83.
18. Kant, of course, has argued that all sensible qualities or
representations have intensive magnitude, and that these
intensive magnitudes are essential characteristics of those
qualities. See Critique Of Pure Reason, Anticipations Of
Perception, B207-218.
19. Cf., John Foster, The Case For Idealism, Chapter 6.
20. Armstrong, A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility, Chapter 6,
Section III,
21. Armstrong, "Are Quantities Relations? A Reply To Bigelow And
Pargetter".
22. "A" and "B" may, of course, be names of one and the same
entity.
23. Armstrong, A Combinatorial Theory Of Possibility, p.105.
24. Armstrong, A Combinatorial Theory Of Possibility, p.105.
25. Armstrong, A Combinatorial Theory Of Possibility, p.ix.
26. Armstrong, A Combinatorial Theory Of Possibility, p.85.
27. See Russell, The Principles Of Mathematics, §23.
28. Russell, The Principles Of Mathematics, Chapter 24.
29. The terminology is taken from Joseph, An Introduction To Logic,
Chapter 27, §6.
30. Armstrong, A Combinatorial Theory Of Possibility, p. 103.
31. Examples of "internal" relations which are incompatible with
certain qualities would be even easier to cite.
32. That this definition is in accordance with McTaggart's own
views is, I believe, supported by the following passage from
"An Ontological Idealism" in his Philosophical Studies.
Some characteristics clearly imply others, since it is
sometimes true
that,
if one substance has the
characteristic X, that substance, or another which stands
to it in some definite relation, will have the
characteristic Y.
This
may be
called
Intrinsic
Determination, [p.276]
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I think we are entitled to draw two conclusions from these
statements. The first is that Intrinsic Determination is a
relation of implication. The second is that it relates
characteristics of substances - i.e., existent characteristics.
Hence our definition of intrinsic determination as a relation
of existent implication.
33. Broad, Examination Of McTaggart's Philosophy, Vol.1, p.197.
34. See Note 2 of this chapter.
35. Broad, Examination Of McTaggart's Philosophy, Vol.1, p.198.
36. Broad, Examination Of McTaggart's Philosophy, Vol.1, p.198.
37. Two relations are wholly distinct if they are neither
analysable into, nor analysable in terms of, the other.
38. This description differs slightly from McTaggart's own
description in Section 109 of The Nature Of Existence. But the
difference does not, I think, affect the metaphysical
significance of the principle.
39. The view that our knowledge of such sensible qualities is
epistemically prior to our knowledge of a single substance or
substantive in which they inhere can be found in Locke, for
example. Cf., Ayers, Locke, Vol.1, p. 162:
Just as we can perceive particular identities and
differences without the aid of an explicit idea of
identity or diversity, so, Locke seems to have thought,
we can perceive particular coexistences of qualities
(and, a fortiori, particular qualities on their own)
before forming the explicit idea of a 'substance' to
which the qualities belong.
40. F.H. Bradley, Appearance And Reality, Chapter 2.
41. McTaggart, The Nature Of Existence, §258.
42. McTaggart, The Nature Of Existence, §258.
43. There cannot, however, be kinds of substances. The unity of a
kind is determined by relations of exact resemblance between
two or more entities. But according to the principle of the
Dissimilarity of the Diverse no two substances can resemble
each other exactly.
44. A general law, which is a kind of law, should be distinguished
from a law between kinds. A law between kinds is a singular law
- although it is, itself, implied by a general law.
45, D.M. Armstrong, What Is A Law Of Nature?, Part 1.
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46.

If we understand the Principle of Sufficient Reason to mean
that no quality can exist without a sufficient reason for its
existence, then, insofar as the intrinsic determination of one
quality by another is a sufficient reason for the existence of
the latter, it might be argued that the truth of this principle
is sufficient to establish the truth of (a). Although the
principle has been considered to be self-evident by some
philosophers, it is generally considered to apply to particular
substances rather than to the qualities of those substances.
Insofar as it is applied to the qualities of particular
substances I do not consider the principle to be self-evident.
In any case, the truth or falsity of the principle does not
affect the overall soundness of the following argument,

47. McTaggart, The Nature Of Existence, §89. McTaggart's use of the
adjective "primary" to describe such qualities is, perhaps,
somewhat unfortunate in view of the traditional distinction
between primary and secondary qualities. To avoid confusion I
will use upper and lower case letters to distinguish the two
senses of the term. Thus a Primary Quality is distinguished
from a Repeating Quality, and a primary quality from a
secondary quality.
48. McTaggart, The Nature Of Existence, §137.
49, Benson Mates, The Philosophy Of Leibniz, p.253.
50. McTaggart, The Nature Of Existence, §143.
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C H A R T E R

F I V E

The Contradiction Of Infinite
Divisibi 1 i ty

1. In Chapter 3 we concluded that there are no simple substances -

i.e., that substance is infinitely divisible. Given the assumption

that substance is infinitely divisible, McTaggart has argued that,

except under one condition, this assumption involves a contradicti
The contradiction arises in the following way.
There is, according to McTaggart, a relation of presupposition

between a substance and its parts. In general, this relation holds

between the occurrence of one quality, and the occurrence of one o
more other qualities - i.e., between quality-instances - whether
be true of the same or of different substances. McTaggart's
definition of this relation is as follows.

When the occurrence of the quality X determines intrinsically
the occurrence of either the quality Y or the quality Z, but
does not intrinsically determine whether it shall be Y or Z
which does occur, let us say that X Presupposes the one of the
two, Y or Z, which does actually occur.1

McTaggart gives two examples of this relation. The first is the
case where the occurrence in a substance of the quality of being
human presupposes, in that same substance, the occurrence of the
quality of being male, or the quality of being female - whichever
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the two it in fact has. The second is the case where the occurrence
in a substance of the quality of being a parent presupposes, in some
other substance, the quality of being a son, or the quality of being
a daughter - whichever of the two qualities that other substance in
fact has.
Two points should be noted here. The first is that the relation of
presupposition does not necessarily relate qualities of one and the
same substance. It may, as McTaggart's examples clearly show, relate
qualities of two or more substances. The second point is that
presupposition is not a relation which relates the occurrence of one
quality and the occurrence of any disjunctive quality which is
intrinsically determined by the occurrence of that quality. And it
does not hold between the occurrence of one quality and those
elements of a disjunctive quality, intrinsically determined by that
quality, which do not occur. If the occurrence of X, for example,
intrinsically determines, whether in the same or in a different
substance, the occurrence of the disjunctive quality A-or-B-or-C, and
if the substance is in fact A, then although the occurrence of X
presupposes the occurrence of A, it does not presuppose B or C.

2. McTaggart claims that whatever has a presupposition also has a
Total Ultimate Presupposition. A Total Ultimate Presupposition is
defined in the following way.

I should define the Total Ultimate Presupposition of X as being
the aggregate of all the presuppositions of X after all those
have been removed, the fixing of which is implied in the fixing
of any of those which remain,2
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A presupposition is fixed when, if a quality X intrinsically
determines some determinable quality W, and presupposes some
determinate form of that determinable quality, the particular
determinate form, w, is intrinsically determined by the occurrence of
some further quality R. For example, the fact that a substance has
the quality of triangularity intrinsically determines that it has the
disjunctive quality of being scalene-or-isosceles-or-equilateral; and
the occurrence of the quality of triangularity presupposes the
occurrence of whichever of these qualities the substance in fact has.
But the fact that it is triangular also presupposes that the internal
angles of that figure have a determinate relative magnitude. If we
call the first presupposition a, and the second presupposition j3,
then if a is determined, so is J3. For example, the quality of being
equilateral determines that the internal angles of a triangle be
equal. The presupposition J3 is thereby fixed by the determination of
a. It is clear from this example that this relation between
presuppositions may be reciprocal - the fixing of a involves the
fixing of J3, and vice versa. And if it is the case that the relation
between any two presuppositions is reciprocal, then either, but not
both, may be removed from the total ultimate presupposition of X.

3. McTaggart's next step is to point out that every substance must
have, in virtue of the fact that it is infinitely divisible, (a) an
infinite number of sets of parts; (b) sufficient descriptions of each
member of each of these sets of parts. That is to say, the nature of
every substance requires sufficient descriptions of each member of
each of its infinite number of sets of parts. Now, these sufficient
descriptions can be either supplied by the nature of that substance
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of which they are parts, or presupposed by that nature. But according
to McTaggart, if the descriptions are presupposed by the nature of
the substance we are faced with a contradiction. He therefore
concludes that the nature of the substance must supply these
descriptions; and his theory of Determining Correspondence is an
attempt to explain how these descriptions can be supplied.

4. The obvious question to be asked at this stage is, Why should
the assumption that the nature of a substance presupposes sufficient
descriptions of each member of its infinite number of sets of parts
involve a contradiction?
In order to answer this question we must first of all introduce a
distinction which McTaggart had made in a previous chapter3 between
precedent and sequent sets of parts of a substance. The distinction
is important, and the failure to fully appreciate its nature and
significance has led at least one critic, or so I shall argue in the
next chapter, to misunderstand the precise nature of the problem
which the theory of Determining Correspondence was intended to
solve4. A set of parts of a substance is said to be sequent to some
other set of parts if none of its members falls within more than one
member of the other, while at least one member of the other contains
more than one of its members. The distinction may be illustrated by a
square divided in the following way [Figure 5.1].
The set of parts {A,B} is precedent to the set of parts {A,C,D}
since none of the members of {A,C,D} falls within more than one
member of {A,B}, while one member of {A,B}, viz. B, contains more
than one member of {A,C,D}, viz. C and D.
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Figure 5.1
With this distinction in mind it is then argued that if the nature
of a substance presupposes sufficient descriptions of each member of
its infinite number of sets of parts, then the substance has an
infinite number of presuppositions.

If the nature of A presupposes sufficient descriptions of
the members of any set, M, of its parts, it will presuppose
sufficient descriptions of the members of any set of its parts,
N, which is sequent to M. For if it does not presuppose them,
it must supply them, since it requires them and can only escape
presupposing them by supplying them. But sufficient
descriptions of the members of N will imply sufficient
descriptions of the members of M, since each member of M is
either itself a member of N, or is a whole made up of members
of N, and, as we have seen, sufficient descriptions of the
parts give a sufficient description of the whole. And so, if
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the nature of A presupposes sufficient descriptions of the
members of M, and therefore does not supply them, it cannot
supply sufficient descriptions of the members of N, since, by
supplying the latter, it would supply what they imply - namely
sufficient descriptions of the members of M.
Since A has no simple parts, it will have an infinite number
of sets of parts which are sequent to any given set. And,
therefore, if its nature presupposes sufficient descriptions of
the members of any set of its parts, it will have an infinite
number of presuppositions.5

Now, if the only way in which a sufficient description of a
substance can be given is by giving sufficient descriptions of the
members of a set of its parts then the above conclusion leads to a
contradiction.

The fact that A is a substance presupposes the sufficient
descriptions of the members of a set, M, of its parts. And
these sufficient descriptions of the members of M could only be
given, on our present hypothesis, by giving sufficient
descriptions of the members of sets of their parts. These
members of the sets of parts of M will also form a set of parts
of A - the set N. And, in the same way, sufficient descriptions
of the members of N could only be given by giving sufficient
descriptions of the members of sets of their parts, which
members will form another set of parts of A - the set P. And
this process will continue to infinity.
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Such an infinite series will be vicious. For the sufficient
descriptions of the members of M can only be made sufficient by
means of sufficient descriptions of the members of N, and these
by means of sufficient descriptions of the members of P, and so
on infinitely. Therefore the sufficient descriptions of the
members of M can only be made sufficient by means of the last
stage of an unending series - that is, they cannot be made
sufficient at all. But the existence of A, which presupposes
sufficient descriptions of the members of M, implies that there
are such sufficient descriptions. And therefore the fact that
there can be no such sufficient descriptions implies a
contrad i ct i on.'

With this conclusion the most important stage of McTaggart's
argument is completed. The remaining sections of the chapter deal
primarily with possible objections to this argument. I will now
consider some of these objections.

5. Perhaps the most obvious objection to the argument, as stated,
is that it includes an unjustified assumption - namely, that the only
way in which a sufficient description of a substance can be given is
by means of sufficient descriptions of all the members of a set of
its parts. Once we abandon this assumption then, it might be
suggested, the above-mentioned contradiction can be avoided.
McTaggart did anticipate this objection; and he gives two replies
to it. The first does not profess to be conclusive, and consists in
pointing out the extreme implausibility of the alternative
hypothesis. The alternative hypothesis is that every substance can be
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sufficiently described without sufficiently describing each member of
a set of its parts. This hypothesis, in itself, would not seem to be
implausible, as the following example, provided by McTaggart, shows.

The United Kingdom, for example, might be described as a Great
Power, a monarchy, a nation which possessed two established
churches, and so on, till the description became sufficient,
without introducing sufficient descriptions of any of its
parts.7

The hypothesis becomes implausible, according to McTaggart, when
we consider each member of the infinite number of precedent and
sequent sets of parts of a substance. The hypothesis is that each of
these members has a sufficient description which is supplied
independently of the fact that it occupies the particular position
which it does in the series of sets of parts. The description cannot
be determined by the position of the substance with respect to
sequent terms in the series, since in that case the precedent terms
would not presuppose sufficient descriptions of a sequent term which is contrary to the earlier assumption that they do.
Although this consideration does not refute the hypothesis, I
think that McTaggart is correct in believing that it renders it
implausible. Broad, however, thought otherwise. On pages 368 to 369
of Volume 1 of his Examination he makes two comments which are
relevant to McTaggart's claim. The first is that it is not reasonable
to believe that the hypothesis is implausible unless we can assign to
it some antecedent probability which is less than some assigned
finite number; and it is not obvious, according to Broad, how such a
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probability could be calculated. The second comment is that "We are
moving in such very unfamiliar regions, and the atmosphere is so
highly rarefied, that we may reasonably hesitate to say what is
incredible and what is not,"'
My response to these comments is this. In the first place it
should be noted that McTaggart's argument is not, as Broad seems to
assume in this part of his criticism, an attempt to undermine the
plausibility of the more general claim that sufficient descriptions
of the parts cannot be supplied otherwise than by inclusion or
implication. It is, rather, an attempt to show the implausibility of
the claim that these descriptions can be supplied independently of
the exclusive descriptions of the substances which are supplied by
the fact that the substances occupy the positions which they do in
the infinite series of sequent and precedent sets of parts of some
substance.
Secondly, it seems to me to be unreasonable to claim that, in
order to rule out a proposition as implausible, we must be able to
assign it some antecedent probability which is less than some given
finite number. Broad seems to be suggesting that the notions of
implausibility and improbability are equivalent. But such an equation
is of doubtful validity. The proposition that the world was created
thirty seconds ago is, I should say, highly implausible; and it is
reasonable to believe that it is not true. But I do not see how,
apart from metaphysical considerations which cannot obviously be used
to confer any quantifiable probability upon the falsity of that
proposition (unless, of course, it is demonstrably false), such a
proposition can be said to be improbable - where "improbable" means
"having a probability less than some assigned finite number".
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Thirdly, in reply to the second of Broad's comments, I should say
that although the argument is rather abstract, the type of
considerations which McTaggart has in mind in determining the
implausibility of the proposition can be illustrated by a more
concrete example. Consider a square drawn upon a uniformly white
piece of paper. Let this square be divided, like a chess board, into
sixty-four smaller squares of equal area. Now, attempt to provide a
sufficient description of any one of the squares which does not
include the characteristic of being, for example, the /nth square from
the top in the nth column from the right. In other words, we are
asked to believe that the squares which make up the original square
have each a sufficient, and therefore an exclusive, description which
does not essentially include any serial or ordinal characteristics.
The situation we are considering here is, I suggest, analogous to
that discussed by McTaggart; and the same kind of implausibility
which we would assign to the assumption that sufficient descriptions
of the squares can be provided, which do not essentially include
their ordinal characteristics, is, I would argue, to be ascribed to
the assumption that sufficient descriptions of each member of the
infinite series of sequent and precedent sets of parts of a substance
can be provided which do not essentially involve the ordinal
characteristics of the substance implied by its occupying the
position which it does in that series.

6. The assumption that sufficient descriptions of a substance can
be given otherwise than by means of sufficient descriptions of each
member of a set of its parts is equivalent to the assumption that the
presuppositions by that substance of these descriptions are
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independently fixed*. We have considered McTaggart's initial reply to
this objection, and I have argued that, although it might not be
conclusive, it does succeed in making this assumption seem plausible.
His second reply does, on the other hand, profess to be a
conclusive rebuttal. It is stated, briefly, as follows.

We saw in Section 189 that, if no presupposition in the series
is independently fixed, a contradiction arises. It is therefore
necessary - since they must be fixed somehow - that at least
one of the presuppositions must be independently fixed. But, as
we have seen, it is not necessary for any of the
presuppositions which are precedent to any presupposition to be
independently fixed, since it will be fixed by the fixing of
any sequent presupposition. And every presupposition is
precedent to some presupposition. Therefore it is not necessary
for any presupposition to be independently fixed. And thus we
have a contradiction.1'

Broad has claimed11 that this particular argument involves a
"gross logical fallacy". I will argue later that the argument does
not, in fact, involve any such fallacy. But for the moment it is
sufficient to note that the above-quoted passage is a restatement of
the original argument; and, even if it should, thus stated, involve a
fallacy, this does not imply that the original argument involves such
a fallacy. It is possible that McTaggart's restatement of the
argument is clumsy or ambiguous.
The original argument is as follows. Let us suppose that every
member of a set of parts of a substance can be described sufficiently
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without mentioning sufficient descriptions of the parts which make it
up. Would we then avoid a contradiction? According to McTaggart we
would not. The fact that every member of a set of parts of a
substance can be sufficiently described without mentioning sufficient
descriptions of its parts does not alter the fact that it can also be
described by means of sufficient descriptions of all the members of
any set of its parts - namely, as the whole which is made up of the
set of parts whose members have the descriptions in question. Now,
let us assume that M is a set of parts of a substance A, and that N
is a set of parts which is sequent to M. We have assumed that A
presupposes sufficient descriptions of all the members of all its
sets of parts. So we know that the nature of A presupposes sufficient
descriptions of the members of M and of N. Let us call the
presupposition by the nature of A of sufficient descriptions of the
members of the members of M the presupposition n; and the
presupposition by the nature of A of sufficient descriptions of the
members of N the presupposition v. We also know that if the
presupposition of sufficient descriptions of the members of a set of
parts is fixed, then the presupposition of sufficient descriptions of
the members of any precedent set is thereby fixed; so that if v is
fixed, then n is fixed. If we now consider the total ultimate
presupposition of A it is clear that, since u is fixed by the fixing
of v, n does not form part of the total ultimate presupposition of A.
On the other hand, the presupposition, v, of sufficient descriptions
of the members of N will be fixed by the fixing of the presupposition
JI of sufficient descriptions of the members of a set of parts, P,
which is sequent to AT. So v will not form part of the total ultimate
presupposition of A. It is clear that no presupposition can form part

243
of the total ultimate presupposition of A unless the set of parts to
which it refers has no set of parts which is sequent to it. But since
every set of parts of a substance is precedent to some other set of
parts, the total ultimate presupposition of A will not include n, nor
any presupposition the fixing of which implies the fixing of n. And
this, according to McTaggart, is impossible.

For the total ultimate presupposition was defined as the
aggregate of all the presuppositions, after those had been
removed, the fixing of which was implied by the fixing of any
of those which remained. It is therefore impossible that the
total ultimate presupposition presupposed by A should contain
neither p., nor any presupposition whose fixing implies the
fixing of u.12

I suggest that there is no fallacy involved in this statement of
McTaggart's original argument. If there is any fallacy involved it
must, then, lie either in McTaggart's restatement of the argument in
Section 191, or else in Broad's interpretation of the argument. Let
us return, then, to Broad's criticism of this restatement.
According to Broad, McTaggart's statement of the argument to show
that the assumption that there sufficient descriptions of each member
of each of the infinite number of sets of parts of a substance can be
given otherwise than by means of sufficient descriptions of each
member of a set of its parts involves a contradiction, contains a
logical fallacy. The fallacy arises, according to Broad, through the
confusion of two quite different propositions which are often
expressed in English by similar sentences.
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The two kinds of proposition are: (a) "There must be an S which
is in fact P"; and (j3) "There is in fact an S which must be F'.
These two quite different kinds of propositions are often both
expressed by the ambiguous sentence "Some S must be P". The
contradictory of the second is, of course, the proposition
"There is in fact no S which is necessarily P". This is
perfectly compatible with the assertion of the first, viz.,
"There must be an S which is in fact P" ,13

I will not, for the moment, question whether this is an accurate
restatement of McTaggart's argument. What is more important is to
determine whether the type of inference which Broad has cited is
always invalid. And I don't believe that it is always invalid for the
following reason.
Consider the series of integers between 1 and 10. Of this series
the following statements are true:

(1) There must be an integer which is in fact greater than 5.
(2) There is in fact an integer which must be greater than 5.

Now, according to Broad, the contradictory of (2) is:

(2' ) There is in fact no integer which must be greater than 5.

And this statement, although the contradictory of (2), is quite
compatible, according to Broad's reasoning, with (1). But it seems
clear to me that (2') and (1) are incompatible; and their
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incompatibility is determined by the nature of the series of terms we
are asked to consider. In general, if the characteristics of the
terms in the series are all essential characteristics of those terms,
then the type of inference which Broad has condemned is, in fact,
valid.
Let us now consider how this point is relevant to McTaggart's
argument. According to McTaggart, the following two propositions have
been established by previous argument:

(A) There must be a presupposition which is, in fact,
independently fixed.
(B) There is in fact no presupposition which must be
independently fixed.

McTaggart claims that these two propositions are incompatible. In
general, these types of propositions would not be considered to be
contradictories. They can, however, be shown to be incompatible, in
this case, with the help of two principles. The first is a logical
principle.

(C) If P is incompatible with Q, then P is incompatible with
whatever implies Q.

Proposition (B) is obviously incompatible with its contradictory
(B').

(#) There is in fact some presupposition which must be
independently fixed.
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So, if we can show that (A) implies (B'), we can show that (A) is
incompatible with (B). And we can do this by appealing to the
principle of Extrinsic Determination. Once we accept this principle,
we can infer, from the premiss that there must be a presupposition
which is in fact independently fixed, the conclusion that whichever
presupposition has the characteristic of being independently fixed
has that characteristic essentially. That is to say, we can infer
that there is in fact some presupposition which must have the
characteristic of being independently fixed - which is equivalent to
(B').
On this basis I suggest that McTaggart's argument is, in fact,
valid; and, that propositions (A) and (B), though not formal
contradictories, are in fact incompatible.

7. I have argued that Broad's criticism of McTaggart's restatement
of the argument in Section 191 of The Nature Of Existence is
inconclusive. His criticism is not, however, confined to this
restatement. He does, in fact, offer independent criticisms of the
original argument. There are, however, two obstacles in the way of a
succinct treatment of these criticisms. The first is that Broad has
characteristically chosen to express McTaggart's argument in his own
terms. The second is that Broad's restatement of the argument does
not involve the central concepts of presupposition and requirement which are independently criticised and rejected in an earlier
chapter14. An adequate assessment of the soundness of McTaggart's
arguments must, however, take both strands of Broad's criticism into
consideration. In order to preserve continuity I will begin with his
comments upon the concepts of presupposition and requirement.

247

8. Concerning the relation of presupposition Broad makes a number
of points. The first is that, in his discussion of this relation,
McTaggart has, according to Broad, tended to confuse or conflate two
distinct relations, with the result that he has committed at least
one logical fallacy15.

McTaggart, as I have said, failed to distinguish these two
relations, and used the single name "Presupposition" for both
of them. He also failed to notice that presupposition, in one
of the senses he has in mind, is a triadic relation, relating
two characteristics and a particular.16

According to Broad, McTaggart failed to distinguish the relation
of partial conveyance from the relation of presupposition. The former
is a dyadic or two-termed relation relating two characteristics. The
latter is a triadic or three termed relation relating two
characteristics and a particular or substance. Partial conveyance is
defined in terms of the relation of conveyance, which was defined
previously by Broad in the following way.

I define the statement that 0 "conveys" if to mean that, if
anything has 0, it necessarily follows that that same thing has

A characteristic 0 is said to "partially convey" another
characteristic if if and only if the following four conditions are
satisfied.
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(a) a is a class of mutually exclusive characteristics.
(b) if is a member of a.
(c) If anything has 0, then it is necessary that this same
thing has some member of a,
(d) There is no member of the class a such that, if a thing
has 0, it necessarily has that particular member.1'

Broad's relation of presupposition - which I will distinguish from
McTaggart's by the suffix "h" as in "presupposition8" - is defined in
the following way. The statement "0 presupposes if in the instance %"
means that a substance % is characterised by 0 and if, and 0 partially
conveys V3.
There are, I suggest, two serious problems with Broad's criticism
and interpretation of the relation of presupposition. The first is
that the claim that McTaggart had either confused or conflated the
relations of partial conveyance and presupposition6 is unjustified.
It is quite clear from Sections 183-184 of the text that McTaggart
understood the relation of presupposition to be a relation between
occurrences or instances of characteristics, and not between
characteristics per se. Where this condition is not explicitly
stated, it is always implied. A related point is that although
instances of the relation are generally dyadic, it is possible that
there may be instances which relate more than two terms. For example,
the occurrence of the quality of triangularity in a substance which
is equilateral and, therefore, equiangular presupposes both the
occurrence of the quality of equilateral ity and the occurrence of the
quality of equiangular ity in that substance. The instance of the

249
relation of presupposition in this case is thus triadic or threetermed .
The second problem is that presupposition8 is defined as being a
relation between characteristics of one and the same substance. Both
in his definition of conveyance, and in his definition of
presupposition8, Broad explicitly emphasises this point. But this
qualification is clearly at odds with McTaggart's definition of
presupposition - a relation which may be, but is not necessarily, a
relation between occurrences of characteristics of one and the same
substance or substantive. This point is clearly made by McTaggart in
Section 183.

When the occurrence of the quality X determines intrinsically
the occurrence of either the quality Y or the quality Z
(.whether as belonging to the same subject as X, or to some
other), but does not intrinsically determine whether it shall
be Y or Z which does occur, then X is said to presuppose Y or
Z.20 [My emphasis]

These two problems should lead us to doubt the accuracy and
conclusiveness of Broad's subsequent criticism and restatement of
McTaggart's argument. This doubt may be strengthened if we consider
Broad's attempt, on page 204, to convict McTaggart of committing
another logical fallacy.

He says in §184 that, if X presupposes Y or Z, and Y
presupposes S or T, and Z presupposes U or V, then X will
presuppose S or T or U or V. There are two comments to be made
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on this, (a) We must substitute for "X presupposes Y or Z" that
"Y and Z are a set of partial consequents of X", and similarly
throughout the proposition, (b) Even so the statement is false.
We can infer from the premises that anything that had X would
have 5 or T or U or V. And this is part of what is asserted in
the conclusion. But we cannot infer, from the fact that what
has X need not have Y and that what has Y need not have S, that
what has X need not have S. And this is equally part of the
conclusion. So McTaggart has simply committed a logical fallacy
here.21

We have here an example of something which Broad repeatedly does
in his criticism of McTaggart. Having simply asserted that
McTaggart's actual expression of some argument is ambiguous or
confused, he then restates the argument in his own words. Having done
this he subsequently finds some sort of logical fallacy in the
argument and promptly dismisses it. In this case, as in a number of
others, the problem lies in Broad's interpretation of the argument,
and not in the argument itself. Broad asserts here that, from the
conclusion that X presupposes S or T or U or V, McTaggart has tacitly
inferred that X need not have S; and such an inference, according to
Broad, is unsound.
It may be true that such an inference is tacitly implied in
Broad's interpretation of the argument, but there is no evidence to
suggest that McTaggart did, in fact, make such an inference. Nor is
there any evidence, apart from Broad's interpretation, to suggest
that such an inference is implicit in McTaggart's argument.
McTaggart's actual argument - which is, in fact, merely an attempt to
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draw the reader's attention to some of the implications of the view
that the relation of presupposition is a transitive relation - is, I
suggest, more like this. If X presupposes For Z, and Y presupposes S
or T, and Z presupposes U or V, then X presupposes S or T or U or V whichever of these disjuncts does in fact occur. But to say that X
presupposes S or T or U or V implies that X does not intrinsically
determine 5 or Tor U or V. And this may be what Broad has in mind
when he says that McTaggart has inferred that what has X need not
have S. Broad has asked us to consider the possibility that, although
X presupposes Y, and Y presupposes S, X does not presuppose S, since
it intrinsically determines it - in which case the claim that
presupposition is a transitive relation would be shown to be false.
Although this objection might seem plausible, its plausibility
rests upon the failure to fully appreciate the nature of the relation
of presupposition. There are two important points to bear in mind
when discussing this relation. The first is that presupposition is a
relation between quality-instances. The second is that a qualityinstance can only presuppose what it does not supply; and if a
quaIity-instance directly or indirectly determines some other
quality-instance, it cannot presuppose it, since it supplies it. Let
us now reconsider our example.
Broad has asked us to assume that the occurrence of X
intrinsically determines the occurrence of S. Now, we have assumed
that the occurrence of S intrinsically determines the occurrence of Y
since, ex hypothesi, the occurrence of Y presupposes the occurrence
of S. In other words, the occurrence of X indirectly determines the
occurrence of Y, and if the occurrence of X indirectly determines the
occurrence of Y it cannot presuppose it, since it supplies it.
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Broad's objection is therefore based upon an assumption which, given
the circumstances, cannot possibly be true. Any initial plausibility
it may have is derived from his tendency to consider the relation of
presupposition in abstraction - i.e., independently of any
characteristics which it may have as a constituent of a concrete
fact.
I suggest, then, that Broad has not shown that the relation of
presupposition, as distinct from the relation of presupposition8, is
not a transitive relation. Nor has he uncovered any logical fallacy
in McTaggart's statement of this principle.

9. Having discussed the nature of the relation of presupposition,
Broad turns his attention to the principle of Total Ultimate
Presuppositions - a principle which, we have seen, is crucial to
McTaggart's argument. The principle of Total Ultimate Presuppositions
is understood to be equivalent to the proposition that, if anything
has a presupposition it has a total ultimate presupposition. Broad's
objection to this principle is that it is conceivable that something
should have a presupposition without having a total ultimate
presupposition; so that, even if the principle is in fact true, it is
not a logical truth, or, rather, not a necessary truth. We are
firstly asked to consider what would be involved in a case where the
principle was not true,

Suppose, if possible, that, in a certain instance x, 0 had
presuppositions but had no Total Ultimate Presupposition, This
would mean that there is an unending series of characteristics,
1flt ifls..., such that (i) all of them, and also 0, characterise
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x, (ii) 0 partially conveys each of them, (iii) each conveys
the ones that precede it in the series, and (iv) none of them
conveys any one that follows it in the series. In this case, if
it were possible, 0 would have presuppositions, but no Total
Ultimate Presupposition, in the instance x.22

Broad accepts, and illustrates, the prima facie plausibility of
the principle in some cases. The occurrence of the determinable
quality of being coloured, for example, presupposes a series of more
and more determinate colour qualities in the substance until an
absolutely determinate shade of some specific colour is reached. Let
us assume that the substance is, in fact, an absolutely determinate
shade of scarlet. The occurrence of the quality of being coloured
presupposes the occurrence of the specific quality of being red; and
the occurrence of the quality of being red presupposes the occurrence
of the quality of being scarlet which, in turn, presupposes the
occurrence of some absolutely determinate shade of scarlet. Now,
since the occurrence of this absolutely determinate shade of scarlet
implies the fixing of each of the other presuppositions mentioned, we
may say that it is the total ultimate presupposition of the
occurrence of the determinable quality of being coloured in that
substance. In such cases, according to Broad, the principle of Total
Ultimate Presuppositions is obviously valid. But it is not so
obviously valid, he suggests, in some other cases.
Let us assume that a substance, x, has the property of having a
certain characteristic 0 at some time within a certain period x.
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Now consider the series of characteristics "having 0 for less
than x", "having 0 for not more than x/2", "having 0 for not
more than x/4", and so on without end. Each of them conveys all
its predecessors and none of its successors. Each of them is
partially conveyed by the property of "having 0 at some time
within the period x". So, if all of them could belong to a
particular x, the property of "having 0 at some time within the
period x" would, in the instance x, presuppose all these other
characteristics, and yet would have no Total Ultimate
Presupposition, since the series is plainly endless.23

There are two replies to this objection to McTaggart's principle.
The first is to suggest that it is impossible for any substance to
have a characteristic within a period of time without its having that
characteristic for a finite duration within that period. In this
case, the series of characteristics mentioned by Broad must have some
final term, x/n, equal to the actual duration for which x has 0, such
that for any finite value greater than n the series of
characteristics generated by these values will not be true of x.
Broad did, in fact, anticipate this response and he replies by saying
that, in such a case, the possibility of any continuous change with
respect to a characteristic would be eliminated. Unfortunately, Broad
does not elaborate upon this point, and his notion of continuous
change of a substance with respect to a characteristic remains
unanalysed. I presume that he has in mind the kind of analysis of
continuous change proposed by Bertrand Russell in The Principles Of
Mathematics.
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Change is the difference, in respect of truth or falsehood,
between a proposition concerning an entity and a time T and a
proposition concerning the same entity and another time T ,
provided that the two propositions differ only by the fact that
T occurs in the one where T' occurs in the other. Change is
continuous when the propositions of the above kind form a
continuous series correlated with a continuous series of
moments.24

It is, however, difficult to see how such an analysis, according
to which continuous change involves a one-to-one correlation between
the members of a compact series of propositions and a compact series
of moments of time, can provide us with an analysis of the notion of
continuous change with respect to a characteristic. In fact, some
philosophers have raised doubts as to whether Russell's account can
provide us with a satisfactory analysis of change in any sense.
Fortunately, it is not necessary to enter into a discussion about the
nature of continuous change to show that Broad's objection is
unsatisfactory, since it can be dismissed on quite different grounds.
Let us assume, with Broad, that it is possible for a substance to
have a characteristic at some time within a certain period of time,
without this fact implying that the substance must have the
characteristic for a finite duration within this period. How would
this affect the principle of Total Ultimate Presuppositions? I
suggest that it would not affect the validity of this principle at
all, since the occurrence of the characteristic of "having 0 at some
time within the period x" would, in that case, imply the occurrence
of the series of characteristics "having 0 for not more than x/2",
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"having 0 for not more than x/4", and so on without end. And since it
supplies these characteristics by implication it cannot presuppose
them. Such an example does not, then, provide us with a counterexample to the principle of Total Ultimate Presuppositions. The fact
that Broad did believe it to be a counter-example to this principle
suggests that, once again, he has failed to fully appreciate the
nature of the relation of presupposition.

10. Broad provides one further example of a case where something
has a presupposition, without, apparently, having a total ultimate
presupposition. It is not intended to be a counter-example to
McTaggart's principle, since it rests upon an assumption which, Broad
admits, may, in fact, be false. We are asked to consider the
possibility of a red band, of a determinate length, which varies
continuously in shade from one end to the other.

For let the band be of length x, and let s be a perfectly
determinate shade of red which occurs somewhere within this
band. Then the band will have a series of properties of the
following kind, viz., "having the shade s throughout a length
less than x", "having the shade s throughout a length not
greater then x/2", "having the shade s throughout a length not
greater than x/4", and so on."25

Again there are two replies to this objection. The first relies
upon the evident truth of the principle that nothing can be coloured
without that colour occupying a finite area of that thing. If this
principle is accepted - and it is almost universally accepted - then
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the fact that the band has the colour s implies that it has s
throughout a finite length. Let us assume that this length is equal
to x/10. Then the series of characteristics "having the shade s
throughout a length not greater than x/n" ceases to be true of the
band for all values of n greater than 10. The series, in this case,
is not endless, and the property of having the shade s, in this case,
will not have an infinite number of presuppositions. It can,
therefore, in principle be said to have a total ultimate
presupposition.
Even if we do not accept the principle that nothing can be
coloured without that colour occupying a finite area of that thing,
there is still another reason for rejecting Broad's example. If we
assume that it is possible for the band to have s at some point
within its length, without s occupying some finite part of that
length, then it is clear that the property of having s somewhere
within x implies the series of properties in question. And if it
implies these characteristics it cannot presuppose them. The
occurrence of the property of having s somewhere within x does not,
therefore, have an endless series of presuppositions without having a
total ultimate presupposition. This reply is analogous to that which
we gave to Broad's previous putative counterexample, and it points to
the same failure to fully appreciate the nature of the relation of
presuppos i t i on.

11. In the second part of Chapter 12 of the Examination Broad
briefly discusses the concept of Requirement; and, with one
qualification, he seems to be prepared to accept its validity. But
before we consider this proposed qualification two points should be
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made. The first is that mention of Requirement initially occurs in
Section 184 of The Nature Of Existence. No attempt is made there, or
elsewhere, to define this concept. In view of McTaggart's
conscientiousness in regard to the provision of definitions of
concepts which he is using in a technical sense, and in view of the
fact that it first occurs as an element in the definition of the
technical concept of Presupposition, we may conclude either that he
believed that the concept of Requirement is indefinable; that he
believed that its meaning was generally understood; or both that it
was indefinable and that its meaning was generally understood. In any
case I think we ought to be cautious about Broad's apparent attempt
to bestow upon it the status of a technical term in need of
explanation.
The second point is that nothing which Broad says about
Requirement materially affects the validity of the concept of
Presupposition or of the arguments which McTaggart uses to show that
the nature of a substance cannot presuppose sufficient descriptions
of each member of an infinite series of precedent and sequent sets of
its parts. I have included a discussion of Broad's comments on this
concept more for the sake of completeness than because of any belief
that what he has to say may undermine the soundness of McTaggart's
position.
McTaggart introduces the concept of Requirement in the context of
his discussion of the relation of presupposition.

The nature of presupposition may be expressed not unfairly
by saying that X presupposes whatever it requires but does not
supply- X requires Y-or-Z, for if it occurs, something must
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occur which is Y or Z. But it does not presuppose F-or-Z, for
it supplies it, since it intrinsically determines it, and so,
if we know that X occurs, we know that F-or-Z occurs. But in
addition to this, it either requires F or requires Z, and this
it does not supply. For the fact that X occurs does not
determine whether it is F or Z which occurs.26

As I pointed out above, the concept of Requirement remains
undefined by McTaggart. Now, although Broad does not attempt to
define the concept, he does attempt to explain it by asking us to
consider an example. There is, however, one important point which we
need to keep in mind when considering this example. This is that,
according to McTaggart, if an entity X implies the disjunctive
quality Y-oi—Z, and presupposes either For Z, then, since something
must have the disjunctive quality Y-or-Z, and since something must
have F, or something must have Z, X therefore requires Y-or-Z, as
well as either F or Z - depending upon which of these two does, in
fact, occur. The example we are asked to consider is as follows.

Suppose that a certain particular has the property of being a
conic section. Then this conveys the disjunctive property of
being either a circle or an ellipse or an hyperbola or a
parabola or a pair of intersecting straight lines. It may be
said then that the characteristic of being a conic section
"supplies" this disjunctive property. Now suppose that the
particular in question is in fact a circle. Since the property
of being a conic section only partially conveys that of being a
circle, we say that it "presupposes" circularity in this
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instance. Now, it seems to me, what the property of being a
conic section has here failed to "supply" is the differentia
between the generic characteristic of being a conic section and
the specific characteristic of being a circle. This differentia
is the characteristic of being a section perpendicular to the
axis of the cone. Thus, it seems to me, the correct statement
would be, not that being a conic section in this instance
requires being circular, but that in this instance it requires
being perpendicular to the axis of the cone. It supplies the
property of being a conic section in some direction or other;
it fails to supply the determinate direction; and yet in any
particular instance the direction must be determinate. Thus
what it requires in any particular instance is surely the
determinate direction of the section. So I should say that
being a conic section supplies being either a circle or an
ellipse or an hyperbola or a parabola or two intersecting
straight lines, that in this instance it presupposes being
circular, and that in this instance it requires being a section
perpendicular to the axis of the cone.
On this interpretation the notion of requirement would cease
to apply where there is no question of a differentia, as, for
example, in the case of the determinable "being coloured" and
the determinate "being red". Suppose that a certain particular
is extended. I should say that this supplies being red or blue
or green or yellow or white or black. Suppose that this
particular is in fact red. Then I should say that being
extended in this instance presupposes being red. But there is
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nothing of which I could say that it was required in this
instance by being extended.27

It is difficult, when considering these comments, not to conclude
that Broad has simply misunderstood what is involved in the concepts
of Presupposition, Requirement, and Supply. I can see no reason why
this occurrence of the property of being a conic section should not
require an occurrence of the disjunctive quality of "being-either-acircle-or-an-el1ipse-or-an-hyperbola-or-a-parabola-or-two
intersecting straight lines", an occurrence of the quality of "being
a section perpendicular to the axis of the cone", and an occurrence
of the property of "being a circle". It requires each of these
characteristics; it supplies the first by implication, and it
presupposes the last two. The point is that although an occurrence of
some characteristic cannot both presuppose and supply an occurrence
of some other characteristic or set of characteristics, this does not
mean that it cannot require both what it supplies and what it
presupposes. The failure to appreciate this point has, I believe,
rendered Broad's comments largely irrelevant to McTaggart's actual
views. This belief is supported by his remarks in the second
paragraph of the above quotation. Let us suppose that a substance, x,
is extended - i.e., that it has an instance of the quality of
extension. Now, an occurrence of this quality in x does not imply an
occurrence of the determinable quality of being coloured. Nor does it
imply an occurrence of the disjunctive quality red-or-blue-or-greenor-yellow-or-black-or-white. And even if x is, in fact, red, it does
not imply an occurrence of being red. In this instance, then, the
quality of being extended does not require any of these other
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qualities. But I do not see how this can be interpreted as a
criticism of McTaggart's views. McTaggart does not argue that an
occurrence of every characteristic requires the occurrence of some
other characteristic or characteristics. He is committed to the view
that an occurrence of the quality of extension in x extrinsical ly
determines every other quality of x, including the quality of
redness. But the concepts of Requirement and Extrinsic Determination
are not equivalent. An occurrence of the determinable quality of
being coloured, on the other hand, does imply an occurrence of the
quality of being extended. And it does imply an occurrence of the
disjunctive quality of being red-or-blue-or-green-or-yellow-or-blackor-white. But it does not imply an occurrence of the quality of being
red, even if x is, in fact, red - it presupposes it. In other words,
the occurrence of being coloured in x requires an occurrence of the
quality of being extended, an occurrence of the disjunctive quality
of being red-or-blue-or-green-or-yellow-or-black-or-white, and an
occurrence of being red. It supplies the first two by implication,
and presupposes the last.
In general, then, we may conclude that the concepts of
Presupposition, Requirement and Supply apply to quality-instances,
rather than to qualities per se.

12. We have considered McTaggart's arguments to show that the
nature of a substance cannot, without involving a contradiction,
presuppose sufficient descriptions of each member of an infinite
series of precedent and sequent sets of its parts. But it nonetheless
requires these descriptions; and, as we have seen, if it does not
presuppose them it must supply them. Now there are, according to
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McTaggart, only two ways in which the nature of a substance can
supply sufficient descriptions of the members of a set of its parts it can include them, or it can imply them. To establish that the
nature of a substance must imply these descriptions he argues that it
cannot include, without also implying, these descriptions; and he
offers two arguments to show that it cannot simply include these
descriptions.
The first argument consists in an appeal to the implausibility of
the assumption that there could be an infinite number of ultimate
concurrences between the exclusive descriptions of the substances
which are implied by their occupying the positions which they do in
the infinite series of sets of parts, and the additional qualities
which are required by those substances if they are to have sufficient
descriptions which do not include, and which are not implied by,
their ordinal characteristics. This is essentially the same argument
he used in Section 190 when discussing the assumption that the
infinite number of sufficient descriptions of the members of the sets
of parts of a substance are presupposed by the nature of that
substance. Although not conclusive, the argument does succeed, as I
suggested in Section 7, in making the assumption seem plausible.
The second argument does profess to be conclusive. McTaggart
begins by assuming that the nature of a substance can include
sufficient descriptions of all its parts. He then argues that unless
it also implies them a contradiction arises. The reason why a
contradiction arises has to do with the concept of a Minimum Adequate
Description. A description may, in general, be adequate or more than
adequate, for some given purpose. For example, the description "The
only Australian state which is surrounded by water" is adequate for
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the purpose of providing an exclusive description of Tasmania. A
minimum adequate description is a description which is adequate for a
given purpose, but no more than adequate for that purpose - i.e., it
does not contain any characteristics which are superfluous for the
purpose in question. The description "The only Australian state
surrounded by water, and the only Australian state which lies to the
south of Victoria" is more than adequate for the purpose of
exclusively describing Tasmania; and we can obtain a minimum adequate
description for that purpose by omitting either of the conjuncts
which make up that description.

13. The next step in the argument is to point out that, for every
description which is adequate for a given purpose, there must be at
least one minimum adequate description for that purpose. The latter
will either be identical with the former, or else it will differ from
it by the omission of those elements which are superfluous for the
given purpose.
We are then asked to consider what could serve as a minimum
adequate description for the purpose of providing sufficient
descriptions of each member of the infinite number of precedent and
sequent sets of parts of a substance. McTaggart argues that it cannot
consist of sufficient descriptions of the members of any set of parts
which is precedent to some other set of parts, since sufficient
descriptions of the latter will imply sufficient descriptions of the
former. Hence, sufficient descriptions of the precedent set of parts
are superfluous for the given purpose and therefore cannot form part
of the minimum adequate description for that purpose. However, since
we know that every set of parts is precedent to some other set,
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sufficient descriptions of the former will always be superfluous for
the purpose, and cannot, for this reason, be included in the minimum
adequate description. And this implies that there cannot be a minimum
adequate description for the purpose of providing sufficient
descriptions of each member of the infinite number of sets of parts
of a substance. But according to the assumption that the nature of a
substance can include, without implying, these sufficient
descriptions, there must be a description which is adequate for the
purpose of providing such descriptions; hence there must be a minimum
adequate description for this purpose.

And thus there is a contradiction. There must be a minimum
adequate description for the description in question, and yet
there cannot be one. There is only one way in which this can be
avoided. A chain of implications must run downwards from
precedent sets to sequent sets, such that sufficient
descriptions of the members of the precedent set imply
sufficient descriptions of the members of the sequent sets. In
this case the inclusion of the description of the precedent set
will render inclusion of the descriptions of the sequent sets
unnecessary, since they can be deduced from it. And thus the
minimum description of A which is adequate for providing
sufficient descriptions of all its parts will be the
description of the parts of the precedent set, from which the
chain of implications starts.
Of the two ways in which the nature of A could supply the
sufficient descriptions of its parts, we have now seen that
inclusion without implication would involve a contradiction. We
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have therefore no hope left but in implication. We must find a
description of A which, while it may include sufficient
descriptions of the members of one or more sets of its parts,
implies sufficient descriptions of the members of the infinite
number of sets of parts which are sequent to the last of
these.23

The theory of the Determining Correspondence of Substance is an
attempt to provide a description of A which will satisfy this last
condition.
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CHARTER SIX

Determining Cor-r-esponcienee

1. In the previous chapter we considered McTaggart's attempt to
prove that, except under one condition, the assumption that all
substances are infinitely divisible leads to a contradiction. The
arguments used to establish this conclusion are, we concluded,
fundamentally sound. In order to avoid a contradiction we must,
therefore, agree with McTaggart that the stipulated condition is
satisfied, and that there is a description of every substance which
implies sufficient descriptions of each member of an infinite series
of sequent sets of its parts.
In this chapter we will consider McTaggart's proposed solution to
the problem of finding such a description - the theory of the
Determining Correspondence of Substance. I will begin by stating what
the theory in question is, and explain how it avoids the
contradiction of infinite divisibility. I will then consider the
criticisms of this theory which have been put forward by various
philosophers, and argue that they are basically unsound.

2. Perhaps the best approach to an understanding of McTaggart's
solution to the contradiction of infinite divisibility is to begin
with his summary statement at the end of Chapter 24 of The Nature Of
Existence.

269
To sum up the results of this chapter - the absence of
simple substances does not involve a contradiction if the
universe has a set of parts which answer to our definition of
primary parts. (These primary parts may form one primary whole,
or may be divided into any number of primary wholes.) The
theory that the universe has such a set of parts I shall call
the theory of the determining correspondence of substance.1

Clearly, the central concepts involved in the solution are those
of a Primary Part and a Primary Whole. Once we have grasped the ful 1
significance of these concepts we will, I believe, have understood
the essential nature of the proposed solution. What, then, is a
Primary Part of a substance? McTaggart defines a Primary Part in the
following way.

When a set of parts of a substance is such that none of its
members are determined by determining correspondence, and that,
from sufficient descriptions of all its members, there follow,
by determining correspondence, sufficient descriptions of the
members of an infinite series of sequent sets, then the members
of that set are called Primary Parts.2

We have discussed most of the concepts involved in this definition
in previous chapters. The concepts of a Set of Parts, of a Sufficient
Description, and of a sequent set of parts are, I trust, clearly
understood. Unfortunately, unless we understand what determining
correspondence is, the definition is of little benefit in helping us
to understand what a Primary Part is.
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3. If we turn, then, to McTaggart's initial discussion of
determining correspondence in Section 197 of The Nature Of Existence,
we find it stated there that determining correspondence has three
typical features. Let us assume that a substance, A, has a set of
parts {B,C}3. Then, according to McTaggart, the parts of A will form
a determining correspondence system if the following three conditions
are satisfied.

(1) Each of B and C has a set of parts corresponding to each
set of parts of A.
(2) The correspondence between the parts is of the same sort
throughout the system; it involves a one-to-one relation
between the members of the various sets of parts; and is
such that a certain sufficient description of C, which
includes the fact that it is in this relation to some
part of B, will determine a sufficient description of the
part of B in question.
(3) The correspondence is such that when one determinant is a
part of another determinant, then any part determined by
the first part will be part of a part determined by the
second.

Such a system is called a "determining correspondence" system
since certain sufficient descriptions of B and C will intrinsically
determine sufficient descriptions of each member of an infinite
series of sets of parts of A4. Given that such a system of
correspondence holds among the parts of A, then B and C, in virtue of
their unique position in the series of sequent sets of parts of A,
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are said to be Primary Parts of A; and A itself, being a whole made
up of a set of Primary Parts, is said to be a Primary Whole.
Although the above set of conditions is sufficient for a
determining correspondence system, it does not constitute a
definition of determining correspondence since, as it turns out, it
is more than sufficient for such a system. The definition of
determining correspondence is given in Section 202 of The Nature Of
Existence. For the moment, however, we will focus our attention upon
these initial three conditions.

4. The first condition is sufficient to generate an infinite
series of sets of parts of A, since B will have a set of parts
comprising a part which corresponds to C (which part, in accordance
with McTaggart's system of notation, we shall call "B!C" - i.e.,
"that part of B which corresponds to C"), and a part which
corresponds to B itself (which part we shall call "BIB"). C, in turn,
will have a set of parts comprising a part, C!B, which corresponds to
B, and a part, C!C, which corresponds to C itself. Now, since the
parts BIB, BIC, CIC and CIB together make up a set of parts of A
(which we will call a set of Secondary Parts of the First Grades), B
and C will each have a further set of parts, the members of which
will correspond to the members of this last set of parts of A. Thus
we will have, in B, a part BIBIB which corresponds to BIB, a part
BIBIC which corresponds to BIC, a part BIC1C which corresponds to
CIC, and a part BIC1B which corresponds to CIB; and these parts
together will make up a set of parts of B. Similarly, we will have,
in C, a part CIC1C which corresponds to CIC, a part CICIB which
corresponds to CIB, a part CIBIB which corresponds to BIB, and a part
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CIBIC which corresponds to BIC; and these parts together wi 11 form

a

set of parts of C. Again, these latter two sets of parts of B and C
will, when taken together, form a set of parts of A - which set we
shall call a set of Secondary Parts of the Second Grade. B and C will
each have a further set of parts corresponding to this last set of
parts of A; and so on to infinity.
It is clear, then, that, by applying the principle embodied in
condition (1), an infinite series of sets of parts of A is generated.
But it is not clear that an infinite series of sequent sets of parts
is thus generated. And it is an infinite series of sequent sets of
parts of A that is required if the theory of Determining
Correspondence is to solve the contradiction of infinite
divisibility. It is true that the set of Secondary Parts of the First
Grade, {B!B,B!C,C!B,C!C}, is sequent to the set of Primary Parts
{B,C}, since, in accordance with the definition of sequent sets of
parts given in Section 181 of The Nature Of Existence, no part in the
former set contains more than one part in the latter, while at least
one part in the latter set contains more than one part in the former.
But the same relation does not obviously hold between the set of
Secondary Parts of the Second Grade and the set of Secondary Parts of
the First Grade. It would seem to be possible, for example, that
B1BIC should fall within both BIB and BIC - hence that the set of
parts of A comprising the Secondary Parts of the Second Grade should
be neither precedent nor sequent to the set of parts comprising the
Secondary Parts of the First Grade. Furthermore, in Section 198 of
The Nature Of Existence, McTaggart describes the sets of parts
generated by the principle of correspondence as being "higher" or
"lower" than each other, rather than as being precedent or sequent to
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each other; and this is the only place where he does use the former
pair of terms to describe the order among the sets of parts. Now we
may speak of the set of Secondary Parts of the First Grade as being
"higher" than the set of Secondary Parts of the Second Grade in the
sense that there are more parts of A contained in the latter set than
are contained in the former set. But, as we have seen, this does not
imply that the latter set is sequent to the former set.

5. Fortunately, the soundness of the principle is saved by the
introduction of the third condition. This condition ensures that each
"lower" set of parts generated by the principle of correspondence is
sequent to the next "highest"; and it does this in the following way.
Let us consider, once again, the two sets of parts of A comprising
the Secondary Parts of the First Grade and the Secondary Parts of the
Second Grade. Consider the parts BIB and BIBIC - the first belonging
to the former set of parts, and the second belonging to the latter
set of parts. In order for the latter set of parts to be sequent to
the former we must show that BIBIC (or any other member of that set)
does not fall within more than one part in the former set. And we can
establish this once we have accepted the third condition. For, if we
accept this condition, it follows that, since BIC, which is the
determinant of BIBIC, is a part of B, then any part determined by
BIC, e.g. BIBIC, is a part of a part determined by B - i.e. BIB. Thus
BIBIC must be a part of BIB. It cannot be a part of BIC, since BIC is
determined by C. By applying this condition to the other members of
the set of Secondary Parts of the Second Grade we can show that no
part in that set can fall within more than one part in the set of
Secondary Parts of the First Grade. We also know that at least one

274
part in the latter set, e.g. BIB, contains more than one part in the
former, viz. BIBIB and BIBIC. So, we may conclude that if the third
condition holds, the principle of correspondence will generate an
infinite series of sequent sets of parts within A.
The third condition is also essential, as McTaggart points out in
Section 199, to ensure that every part of A is determined in
accordance with the principle of correspondence. It does this in the
following way. Let us assume, for example, that BIC is a part of B,
and that BIBIC is determined by BIC. Let us also assume that,
contrary to the third condition, BIBIC is not a part of a part
determined by B. It must, then, be a part of the only other Secondary
Part of the First Grade which is a part of B - i.e., BIC. But in that
case, as McTaggart points out in Section 199, it would be possible
that the Secondary Parts of the Second Grade BIBIC, BICIC, BICIB,
CIC1C, CIC IB and CIB1C should fall within the three Secondary Parts
of the First Grade BIC, CIC and CIB; while BIBIB and BIB should be
one and the same part of B*. The principle would, in that case, fail
to determine an infinite number of parts within BIB [BIBIB]. Hence it
would fail to provide us with a satisfactory solution to the
contradiction of infinite divisibility.

6. The first and third conditions are thus sufficient to generate
an infinite series of sequent sets of parts within a substance. But
if we are to provide a satisfactory solution to the contradiction of
infinite divisibility we must be able to show that sufficient
descriptions of each member of each of these sets of parts are
implied by sufficient descriptions of the members of a certain set of
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its parts, viz. the set of Primary Parts. This is why the second
condition is essential to McTaggart's theory.
The second condition has two parts. The first states that the
correspondence between the members of the various parts of A must be
of the same sort throughout, and that the relations between these
members are "one-to-one" relations. The second states that the
correspondence must be such that a certain sufficient description of
a part, say B, of a substance (which description includes the fact
that B has this correspondence relation to some part of a substance,
say C [C may, of course, be identical with B], determines a
sufficient description of the part of C, i.e. CIB, in question. I
will consider each part of this condition in turn.

7. The first part appears to be straightforward. I have assumed
that by a "one-to-one" relation McTaggart means what Russell meant by
a "one-one" relation. A one-one relation was defined by Russell in
the following way.

A relation is said to be "one-one" when, if x has the
relation in question to y, no other term x' has the same
relation to y, and x does not have the same relation to any
other term y' other than y. When only the first of these two
conditions is fulfilled, the relation is called "one-many";
when only the second is fulfilled, it is called "many-one".7

Given that B and C make up a set of Primary Parts of A, then, in
accordance with this condition, the correspondence between the
members of this set of parts and the members of the set of Secondary
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Parts of the First Grade, i.e. {B!B,B!C,C!B,C!C}, is such that there
can be only one part of B, BIB, which corresponds to B; one part of
B, BIC, which corresponds to C; one part of C, CIC, which corresponds
to C, and one part of C, CIB, which corresponds to B. This condition
is essential if we are to avoid the possibility that there should be,
for example, two or more parts of B which correspond to C. In that
case, the relation of correspondence between C and the parts of B
would be one-many (assuming that C is the determinant term in the
relationship); and this, in turn, would allow for the possibility
that there should be two or more parts describable as "BIC - i.e.,
as "the part of B which corresponds to C". These parts could not,
therefore, have sufficient descriptions determined by the principle
of correspondence alone. In this case the theory of Determining
Correspondence would not necessarily provide us with a principle
which implied sufficient descriptions of each member of each set of
an infinite series of sequent sets of parts of the substance A.

8. The second part is, perhaps, less straightforward. But it is
essential that we understand it clearly if we are to understand how
the correspondence system determines sufficient descriptions of the
members of the sets of parts. The condition is that a certain
sufficient description, 0, of a part, C, which description includes
the fact that C is in this relation to some part of a substance B
(which may be identical with C), with a sufficient description, if,
will determine a sufficient description of the part of B in question,
viz. BIC. We may understand the sufficient description of C to be a
compound characteristic comprising the general qualities U,V and W -
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where W is the relational quality of being the determinant of the
one-to-one correspondence relation, R.
There are two important points to note about this condition. The
first is that both the referent and the relatum of the relation
mentioned in the relational quality, W, must have sufficient
descriptions which are fixed independently of their position in the
determining correspondence system; otherwise we will be faced with a
vicious circle in which the members of sequent sets of parts will be
sufficiently described by means of sufficient descriptions of the
members of the set of Primary Parts which, in turn, can only be
sufficiently described by means of the members of the sequent sets of
parts.
The second point is that the correspondence relation between any
two parts of a substance is understood to be a particular instance or
occurrence of the general kind of relation. The failure to appreciate
this fact has led Broad, for example, to make the following
unjustified criticism.

R itself is not (as McTaggart mistakenly says) assumed to be a
one-one relation. What is assumed is the following series of
propositions. (1) R, with its co-domain confined to a [a set of
parts of A], is one-one, (2) R with its co-domain confined to
R"a [the parts of the members of a] is one-one, (3) R with its
co-domain confined to R"R"a [the parts of the part of the
members of a] is one-one, and ... so on.
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Once we accept that the correspondence relations in question are
particular instances of the general kind, the supposed inaccuracy is
removed from McTaggart's statement.
Now, given that the determinant or referent, C, has the sufficient
description, 0, which includes the relational quality W, it follows,
according to the second condition, that the determinate term or
relatum, BIC, has a sufficient description in virtue of the fact that
it is thus related to C. The correspondence relation thus determines
a sufficient description, 9, of the part in question, BIC. Similarly,
given that BIC has a sufficient description determined in this way,
and given that the correspondence relation holds between BIC and any
determinate of BIC, we may conclude that BIBIC, for example, will
also have a sufficient description in virtue of the fact that it is
the relatum of a particular instance of the determining
correspondence relation of which BIC is the referent.

9. There is, however, a certain ambiguity in McTaggart's statement
of this condition. This was noted by Broad, and concerns the precise
nature of the sufficient description 9, determined in BIC. As Broad
points out, it is not clear whether 0 comprises any qualities apart
from the relational quality of being the part of B which is the
relatum of the determining correspondence relation which relates B
and C.

Does McTaggart mean that there is always some sufficient
description of xly which does not involve the fact that it is
the R-correlate of y? If so, he ought to have said so. His
examples in Chapter XXVI do not accord with this view of his
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meaning. His view seems to be there that, if C has a sufficient
description, BIC (i.e., the part of B which perceives C) is
sufficiently described as the part of B which perceives the
substance which has this sufficient description. If this be all
the description of BIC that is in view, assumption (vi) becomes
trivial, so far as I can see. And it is certainly not meant to
be trivial.9 [Assumption (vi) is, in Broad's words (op.cit.
p.329), "If some part of x has the relation R to y then there
is a sufficient description of y, which includes this fact
about y, and implies a sufficient description of the part of x
in question."]

Broad is, I think, justified in drawing attention to this
ambiguity in McTaggart's initial statement of the condition. But it
is one thing to claim that there is always some sufficient
description of BIC which involves the fact that BIC is the Rcorrelate of C. It is another thing to claim that the sufficient
description involved only amounts to "the part of B which perceives
[i.e. which corresponds to] a substance C" - where B and C are
understood to have the sufficient descriptions if and 0 respectively;
so that the description of BIC amounts to "the part of a substance
with the sufficient description if, which corresponds to a substance
with the sufficient description 0". Yet Broad does not appear to have
clearly distinguished these two claims. Obviously, the last
description will be a sufficient description of BIC given that each
of the three stipulated determining correspondence conditions holds.
But it does not follow that this is the only sufficient description

which is determined by the fact that BIC is the i?-correlate of C. The
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nature of the sufficient description of BIC determined by the fact

that it is the J?-correlate of C will depend upon the specific kind or
determinate form of the determinable determining correspondence
relation16 which exists between the parts of A - i.e. between B and
C and their respective parts. It is an empirical question, as
McTaggart points out in Chapter 26 of The Nature Of Existence, what
kind of determining correspondence does exist between the parts of
the Universe; and it is impossible to decide, a priori, the precise
extent to which the nature of any determinate part of the Universe is
determined by determining correspondence.

We have seen that from a sufficient description of C[B], which
includes the fact that C is in the relation X to some part of
B, there follows a sufficient description of BIC. But can we go
further, and say that there is implied in this sufficient
description of C[B], not only a sufficient description of BIC,
but the whole nature of BIC? Or, on the other hand, is it
possible that BIC should have qualities which were not in any
way implied in this sufficient description of C[B]?n

The question now naturally arises whether we are able to
discover what relation of determining correspondence actually
does occur in the universe. If we could show a priori that
there was only one relation which was a relation of determining
correspondence, or only one whose occurrence was compatible
with the other results which we have reached as to the nature
of the existent, we should know that that relation does occur
in the universe, and that it is the only relation of
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determining correspondence which does occur. But I do not think
that it is possible to show this a priori. When, in Book V, we
introduce considerations of an empirical nature, it will, I
think, be possible to give good reasons for believing that
there is a certain relation of determining correspondence which
occurs in the universe, and which is the only one which does
occur. But, till then, the point must remain undetermined.12

In reply to Broad's criticism we may say, then, that assumption
(vi), at least in the form originally expressed by McTaggart, does
ensure that there is a sufficient description of any determinate term
in a determining correspondence system, that this description is
implied by the fact that it is a determinate term in that system, and
that every such term will have a sufficient description of the form
"the part of the only substance which is 0 which corresponds to the
only substance which is if" - where 0 and if are understood to be
sufficient descriptions of substances13. But this does not preclude
the possibility that every such term will have a more extensive
sufficient description determined by the fact that it is a term in
the determining correspondence system. Nor does it preclude the
possibility that the entire nature of the term is determined by this
fact14. Assumption (vi) might appear trivial in the sense that the
kind of sufficient description mentioned above is implied by this
assumption. But it is not trivial if it is a necessary condition in
order that a determining correspondence system should avoid the
contradiction of infinite divisibility discussed in the previous
chapter. And it is not trivial if the specific kind of determining
correspondence relation which does relate the parts of the Universe
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is such that the entire nature, or even a significant part of the
nature, of any determinate term forms a part, or even the whole, of
the sufficient description of that term which is determined by the
fact that it is a determinate term in that system. We might add that
the extent to which the nature of any determinate term is determined
by the fact that it is a determinate term in a determining
correspondence system determines, in turn, the closeness of the unity
among the parts of the Universe - a theme which we will take up in
the next chapter.

10. Having considered those conditions which are sufficient for a
determining correspondence system we are now in a position to
understand McTaggart's definitions of the important terms in his
theory. These definitions are to be found in Section 202 of Tfce
Nature Of Existence, and are as follows.
A Primary Whole is (1) a substance such that it is not necessary,
in order to describe sufficiently any of its parts, to introduce any
determining correspondence with anything except another of its parts;
(2) a substance such that it is not necessary to introduce
determining correspondence with any of its parts to describe
sufficiently any substance outside it; and (3) a substance such that
it has no part of which the previous clauses, (1) and (2) are both
true.
A Primary Part is defined in the following way.

When a set of parts of a substance is such that none of its
members are determined by determining correspondence, and that,
from sufficient descriptions of all its members, there follow,
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by determining correspondence, sufficient descriptions of the
members of an infinite series of sequent sets, then the members
of that set are called Primary Parts.15

Any member of a set of parts which is sequent to the set of
Primary Parts of a substance is a Secondary Part of that substance.

If it is directly determined by determining correspondence with
a primary part, it is called a secondary part of the First
Grade. If it is directly determined by determining
correspondence with a secondary part of the first grade, it is
called a secondary part of the Second Grade, and so on.18

11. McTaggart's proposed solution to the contradiction of infinite
divisibility consists, then, in the claim that the Universe is either
a Primary Whole, or a group of Primary Wholes - i.e., that it has a
set of parts sufficient descriptions of the members of which imply
sufficient descriptions of the members of an infinite series of sets
of parts which are sequent to the set of Primary Parts.
We have seen that this condition can be satisfied if the Universe
is a determining correspondence system; and we have considered three
conditions which, according to McTaggart, are sufficient to generate
such a system. But these initial three conditions are, in fact, more
than sufficient to generate a determining correspondence system; and,
in Section 201 of The Nature Of Existence, McTaggart revises these
conditions in three ways.
Firstly, he points out that it is not necessary that every Primary
Part should have a set of parts corresponding to every set of parts
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of a Primary Whole. It is sufficient if each Primary Part has what
McTaggart calls a Differentiating Group consisting of two or more
Primary Parts of a Primary Whole. Let us assume, for example, that a
Primary Whole, A, has three Primary Parts, B,C, and D. A determining
correspondence system can be generated among the parts of A if the
following conditions hold: (i) B has a set of parts corresponding to
B and C, and to the parts of the members of a set of parts of B and
C; (ii) C has a set of parts corresponding to C and D and their
parts; (iii) D has a set of parts corresponding to D and B and their
parts. Nor is it essential that a Primary Part should belong to its
own differentiating group. B, for example, might only have parts
corresponding to the members of the sets of parts of C and D. The set
of Secondary Parts of the First Grade in B would, in that case,
comprise BIC and BID, and there would be no part, BIB, in that set of
parts.
Secondly, it is not necessary that every Primary Part should be a
determinant of parts within other Primary Parts of a Primary Whole.
For example, B and C, in our group of Primary Parts, may each have
parts corresponding to each other, but not with D; while D may have
parts corresponding to the parts of B and C, but no parts
corresponding to D itself. In this case A would have, as a set of
Secondary Parts of the First Grade, the set
(BIB,BIC,CIC,CIB,DIB,D1C}, and D as such would not figure as a
determinant of any of these parts, or of the members of any sequent
set of parts of A.
Thirdly, it is possible that, in place of a differentiating group
consisting of two or more Primary Parts, some Primary Parts may have
their parts determined by correspondence to only one other Primary
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Part. D, for example, might have its parts determined by B and the
members of its set of parts alone. But in that case, D could not have
a set of Secondary Parts of the First Grade. DIB, for example, would
be the only member of such a set, and it would, in that case, be
identical with D itself. But it would have a set of Secondary Parts
of the Second Grade corresponding to the members of the set of
Secondary Parts of the First Grade in B. Assuming that the
differentiating group of B is B and C, we would then have the set of
Secondary Parts of the Second Grade in D comprising DIBIB, DIB1C,
DICIC, and DICIB - which would be the 'highest' set of parts of D11.

12. Having stated the 'relaxed' conditions for a determining
correspondence system, we may now consider McTaggart's definition of
a determining correspondence system. This definition is to be found
in Section 202 of The Nature Of Existence.

A relation between a substance C and the part of a substance B
is a relation of determining correspondence if a certain
sufficient description of C, which includes the fact that it is
in that relation to some part of B, (1) intrinsically
determines a sufficient description of the part of B in
question, BIC, and (2) intrinsically determines sufficient
descriptions of each member of a set of parts of BIC, and of
each member of a set of each of such members, and so on to
infinity.13

He then adds that, if the second part of the definition is to be
satisfied, the following three conditions must apply.
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(3) The sufficient description of C must include the fact
that each member of a set of C's parts has some substance
to which it stands in a relation of determining
correspondence, as the part of B does to C itself.
(4) Either B and C form a reciprocally determining group, or
a part of a reciprocally determining group; or else, each
is determined, either directly or indirectly, by a
determining correspondence relation to substances which
are members of a reciprocally determining group.
(5) When one determinant is part of another determinant, then
any part determined by the first is a part of a part
determined by the second.

Condition (5) is, of course, the third condition given in the
initial account of conditions sufficient for a determining
correspondence system. And we have seen that it is required to ensure
that each member of a set of parts of a substance is itself
determined in accordance with the principle of Determining
Correspondence.
Conditions (3) and (4), again, are required to ensure that the
second condition contained in the definition is satisfied; and,
although they do not form part of the definition of a determining
correspondence relation they are, together with condition (5),
necessary if the theory of Determining Correspondence is to avoid the
contradiction of infinite divisibility.

13. I have outlined what I consider to be the essential features
of McTaggart's theory of Determining Correspondence. I will now
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consider some criticisms which have been raised against the theory.
With the exception of a brief, and quite misleading, discussion of
the theory in Geach's Truth, Love And Immortality1*, critical
discussion has been confined primarily to the work of Broad and John
Wisdom20. Broad's discussions can be found, initially, in his
Critical Notice of Volume 1 of The Nature Of Existence, and
subsequently in his Examination. Wisdom's discussion is to be found
in an article which appeared in Mind in 1928, with the title
"McTaggart's Determining Correspondence Of Substance: A Refutation".
The comments of both these critics are comprehensive and informative,
and I shal1 consider each in turn.

14. In his Critical Notice of The Nature Of Existence, Broad's
criticism of the theory of Determining Correspondence essentially
consists in the suggestion that the contradiction of infinite
divisibility might be solved in a way which does not appeal to the
principle of Determining Correspondence21. The suggestion is this.

It has struck me (I am probably wrong) that all his
requirements would be equally well fulfilled if every substance
were (or were correlated with) an ordinary extensive magnitude
like a straight line. Take a straight line AB. Bisect it; it
consists of the set of parts AX, XB. Bisect these in turn; they
consist respectively of the sets AY, YX, and XZ, ZB. The four
are a new set of parts of AB. This process of bisection can be
continued ad infinitum. Moreover, any part in this infinite
series of sets of parts has a simple sufficient description. It
can be described as, e.g. , the mth member of the nth successive
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bisection of AB. If then there exists any sufficient
description 0 of AB it would seem that every part in this
infinite series could be sufficiently described as, e.g. , the
/nth member of the nth successive bisection of the substance
with the property 0. Is anything more than this needed, and if
so, why precisely?12

We might illustrate this example in the following way [Figure
6.1].

A Y 3C Z B
I

1

I

I

I

Figure 6.1
Now there are a number of reasons for doubting that such an
example can avoid the contradiction of infinite divisibility, and we
will consider some of these when we consider Broad's refinement of
the example in his Examination. The most obvious reply, however, is
that it does not give us sufficient descriptions of the members of
any of the sets of parts, much less imply them. Let us consider, for
example, the set of parts formed by the initial bisection of the
line. Broad has named these parts "AX" and "XB". But unless "A","X",
and "B" are considered to be logically proper names of points on the
line there is no way of distinguishing AX from XB. Each can rightly
be described as the second (or the first) member of the first
bisection of the substance which has the sufficient description 0.
Hence the descriptions in question generated by the process of
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bisection are neither exclusive nor sufficient descriptions of the
parts of the line. And if "A", "X" and "B" are logically proper
names, then, insofar as they do enter into the resultant descriptions
of the members of any set of parts of the line, the descriptions will
not be sufficient - although they might be exclusive - since they
introduce undescribed substances. This is, I believe, a conclusive
objection to Broad's example. There are other objections, based upon
McTaggart's views, as found in Chapter 34 of The Nature Of Existence,
on the nature of space and spatial discrimination. But for present
purposes the above objection is an adequate reply to Broad.
We may note, at this stage, that Broad's suggestion for avoiding
the contradiction of infinite divisibility is more or less endorsed
by Wisdom as the "Serial Method". Wisdom does attempt to anticipate
the kind of reply which I have made to Broad23 by suggesting that a
serial order among the parts of AB can generate sufficient
descriptions of those parts providing that a relation such as from
the left is included in the descriptions. In other words, we must
introduce some transitive asymmetrical relation between the members
of any particular set of parts of AB if the Serial Method is to
provide us with sufficient descriptions of those members.
Unfortunately, it is clear that there is no such intrinsic relation
between the parts of a spatially ordered whole such as AB. Any such
serial order must be extrinsic to, or imposed upon, these parts and
the whole, AB, which they make up. And this implies that sufficient
descriptions of the members of the various sets of parts of the line
can only be given either by introducing some relation to a substance
distinct from the line itself, or by introducing non-spatial
characteristics of the line into those descriptions. It only makes
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sense, for example, to speak of "left" and "right" in relation to
some observer of the line; and even then the resultant descriptions
would not necessarily be exclusive, since every member of a set of
parts of AB could be described as being both "to the left of" and "to
the right of" one and the same part of the line - depending upon the
point of view of the observer. And if the descriptions are not
exclusive, they cannot be sufficient. Furthermore, if it is necessary
to include the fact that AB is observed by - i.e., is related to some substance other than AB itself in order to determine sufficient
descriptions of the members of the sets of parts of AB, then AB
cannot be a Primary Whole. Nor is it clear that the sufficient
description 0 would, in case the serial order is extrinsic to the
parts of AB, imply sufficient descriptions of the members of an
infinite series of sequent sets of parts of AB. And if 0 does not
imply such descriptions, then the example in question will not
provide us with a solution to the contradiction of infinite
divisibility.

15. I think that Broad did eventually realise the inadequacy of
the above proposal as a solution to the contradiction of infinite
divisibility; for, in his subsequent treatment of the subject in
Chapter 21 of his Examination he attempts to overcome the type of
objection which I have raised by revising his example so as to
include non-spatial characteristics in the sufficient descriptions of
the spatial whole AB.
In the revised example we are asked to consider, once again, a
finite straight line, P, between two points in space, A and B. Again,
this line has a sufficient description, 0, which does not involve any
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reference to any of the parts of P. 0 might be, to use Broad's
example, "the longest line in the only country which is ruled by a
government of class-conscious proletarians". The line is also, once
again, initially divided into two parts, AX and XB. But this time
these two parts are to have non-spatial qualities which differentiate
them. AX is red, and XB is blue. AX may be called "Pj", and is
sufficiently described as "the longest blue part of the line which is
the only instance of 0". XB may be called "Pf", and is sufficiently
described as "the longest blue part of the line which is the only

instance of 0". Pj and Pz form a set of parts of P which we shall call
P1. Now, let us halve both Px and Pt to obtain another set of parts of
P, P2, comprising AU,UX,XV and VB. These parts we shall call "Pn",
"P12". "Pn". and "Pu" respectively. P2 is thus sequent to P1; and, by
continuing this process of division we can obtain an infinite number
of sequent sets of parts of P. These sets of parts, ordered in terms
of the relations of precedence and sequence, may be said to form a
Fundamental Hierarchy24 in P, and may be illustrated by the
following diagram [Figure 6.2].

Broad makes two claims for this example.

My illustration, if valid at all, is important as a refutation
of two essential doctrines in McTaggart's philosophy, (i) In my
example the problem is solved in a way which is different from
that which McTaggart alleges to be the only way of fulfilling
the conditions. For, as I shall explain later, the hierarchy
which we obtain by my method is not a determining
correspondence hierarchy in McTaggart's sense, (ii) My method
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Neither of these claims, I shall now argue, is justified.

16. Let us consider, firstly, the claim that the above example
provides a solution to the contradiction of infinite divisibility. To
avoid this contradiction it is essential that sufficient descriptions
of the members of a set of P's parts should imply sufficient
descriptions of each member of an infinite series of sequent sets of
parts of P. According to Broad, this condition is fulfilled in the
following way.

Take Pn- This can be exclusively described as the half of P{
which is co-terminous with both Pt and Pt. On substituting in
this the sufficient descriptions of Pi and Pz we shall get a
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sufficient description of P„. P12 will be sufficiently
describable as "that half of the longest red part of the line
which is the only instance of 0 which is co-terminous both with
the longest blue part of this line and with the longest red
part of it". Pn can be exclusively described as the half of P
which is co-terminous with P, but not with P2. This exclusive
description can be made into a sufficient description by the
same means as before. In the same way, mutatis mutandis, Pn and
Plt, the remaining members of P2, could be sufficiently
described in terms of the sufficient descriptions of P: and P2.
Now consider a member of P3, e.g., P112. This can be exclusively
described as that half of Pu which is co-terminous with both
Pn and Pn. Since Pn and Pn have already been sufficiently
described in terms of the sufficient descriptions of Pi and P2,
we can get a sufficient description of Pnl by substituting
these sufficient descriptions of Pn and Pn in the above
exclusive description. And so PU2 will be sufficiently
described in terms of the sufficient descriptions of P and P2.
It is quite clear that in this way any member of any term in
the series could be sufficiently described; that the
descriptions would involve six and only six characteristics,
viz., 0, red, blue, longest, half of, and co-terminous with;
and that the derivation follows a general rule. Thus the series
illustrated in the diagram would be a Fundamental Hierarchy for
the line P. So the first condition is fulfilled in this way.26

17. There are a number of reasons why this example fails to
satisfy McTaggart's condition of implication. The first is that Broad
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has not, I think, distinguished two senses in which a description, 0,
might be said to imply sufficient descriptions of each member of each
set of parts of a substance. In the first sense, which we might call
the analytic sense, 0 might be said to imply such descriptions only
insofar as it implicitly or explicitly includes such descriptions.
For example, "0" might be the name of a compound characteristic
comprising the characteristics A,B and C - where A,B and C are
sufficient descriptions. And if we assume that A,B and C are
sufficient descriptions of the members of a set of parts of a
substance with the sufficient description, 0, then 0 might be said to
imply these descriptions in much the same way that the description of
a substance as "chequered" implies that at least two of its parts
have contrasting colour descriptions.
In the second sense, which we might call the synthetic sense, a
description, 0, of a substance might be said to imply sufficient
descriptions of each part of that substance only insofar as it does
not include these descriptions among its parts or elements. It is in
this sense that the characteristic of being coloured implies the
characteristic of being spatially extended.
Now, I would maintain that, in Broad's example, the description of
AX and XB as "the longest red part of the line which is the only
instance of 0", and as "the longest blue part of the line which is
the only instance of 0", respectively, imply sufficient descriptions
of the members of each of the sets of parts of AB in the analytic
sense only - i.e., in the sense that they implicitly include such
descriptions among their parts or elements. I would also maintain
that we are able to derive such descriptions in accordance with a
general rule only because the sufficient descriptions of the members
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of any set of parts imply sufficient descriptions of the members of
any precedent set of parts. In other words, the initial descriptions
of AX and XB imply that there are sufficient descriptions of the
members of each of their sets of parts without directly implying the
determinate nature of any particular part. That is to say, the
initial descriptions presuppose sufficient descriptions of the
members of any sequent sets of parts. But in the case of an
infinitely divisible substance, such as the line AB, the fact that
the nature of that substance presupposes sufficient descriptions of
the members of any set of its parts leads to a contradiction, as
McTaggart has pointed out in Sections 189-191 of The Nature Of
Existence.

18. I would further suggest that Broad's proposed solution was
more or less anticipated by McTaggart. In Section 356 of The Nature
Of Existence we find the following points being made.

... it is clear that the spatial qualities of the members of a
set of parts imply the spatial qualities of the whole of which
they are a set of parts. If we know the shape and size of each
one of a set of parts of A, and their position relatively to
each other, we know the size and shape of A On the other
hand, the size, shape, and position of the whole implies that
it has parts which have size, shape, and position - for
otherwise it could not be divided into parts in respect of its
spatial dimensions. And if it does not also imply what the
size, shape, and position of these parts are, it presupposes
them. We shall thus have an infinite series of terms, in which
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the subsequent terms imply the precedent, while the precedent
presuppose the subsequent. And, as was shown in Section 191,
such a series will involve a contradiction, since every term in
it will have a presupposition, and yet will have no total
ultimate presupposition.

The conclusion to be drawn, then, is that unless the parts of a
spatial whole are differentiated by characteristics which are other
than spatial, then the nature of that whole presupposes sufficient
descriptions of these parts - and this, as we have seen, leads to a
contradiction. So, unless each of the parts of AB are differentiated
by non-spatial characteristics, AB will presuppose, rather than
imply, such descriptions. But as we have assumed that only two parts
of AB, viz. AX and XB, are differentiated by non-spatial
characteristics, we must conclude that AB does presuppose sufficient
descriptions of the members of each of its sets of parts which are
sequent to the set {AX,XB}. And since it presupposes these
descriptions, it cannot imply them. Hence, Broad's example fails to
satisfy McTaggart's condition of implication.

19. There is a further problem with Broad's example. The example
involves the assumption that the substance P (i.e., the line AB) is
spatially extended, that it has a spatial dimension. Now it is
essential, if a series of sufficient descriptions of all its parts is
to be generated, that it have only one dimension - i.e., it must have
length but no breadth. If it has breadth as well as length, then any
member of the hierarchy of sets of parts of P will be divisible
through each of two different dimensions; and, while Broad's example
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might provide sufficient descriptions of the parts of P which make up
one dimension, viz. length, it will not provide sufficient
descriptions of those parts of P which make up another dimension,
viz. breadth. Unfortunately, the fact that p and P2 are coloured, and
the fact that these colours enter into their sufficient descriptions,
as well as into the sufficient descriptions of the members of all
sequent sets of parts of P - e.g. P1, P2, and P3 - implies that P must
have both length and breadth. Colour, as Broad himself points out
elsewhere27, is an extensible quality; and any substance which has
such an extensible quality must occupy at least two dimensions - i.e.
it must have an area. However, since Broad's method provides
sufficient descriptions of the parts of P throughout only one
dimension, it fails to provide sufficient descriptions of all the
parts of P. It therefore fails to provide us with an example which
satisfies McTaggart's condition of implication.
It might be suggested that, even though P has an infinite number
of parts in one dimension, the fact that these parts have an area
does not imply that they are not sufficiently describable unless they
are divisible throughout that other dimension. Now, this suggestion
might seem plausible if that other dimension of P were other than a
spatial dimension. But this is not the case with P, since the second
dimension which it occupies is a spatial dimension; and if it is
infinitely divisible throughout one spatial dimension, it must be
infinitely divisible throughout the other.
Finally, it might be suggested that any coloured substance must be
made up, not of infinitely divisible coloured areas, but of finite,
indivisible, coloured areas. But this suggestion is contrary to the
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initial hypothesis that P is infinitely divisible, and that it has an
infinite number of parts.

20. Insofar as Broad's example fails to provide us with a means of
determining sufficient descriptions of the members of an infinite
number of sequent sets of parts of a spatially extended substance
such as P, it also fails to provide us with a solution to the
contradiction of infinite divisibility in the case of a material
substance - since it is generally acknowledged that a substance which
lacked size and shape, i.e. which lacked at least two spatial
dimensions, could not be a material substance.

21. In addition to the above general objection to Broad's example,
we may suggest another; this time one which is based upon a
suggestion of McTaggart's own. I do not wish to place too much weight
upon this objection, since it is based upon what is perhaps a rather
contentious view of spatial discrimination; and I do not think that
it is either possible, or necessary, to defend this view at this
stage. It does, however, give us an indication of how McTaggart
himself might have replied to the kind of example proposed by Broad.
In Section 360 of The Nature Of Existence McTaggart makes the
following claim concerning the discrimination of spatial, hence of
material, substances.

I submit that it belongs to the nature of space that nothing
spatial can be discriminated from anything else, in respect of
its spatial qualities, except by means of descriptions of its
parts. A description of the whole which does not describe it by
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means of descriptions of its parts will not discriminate it
from other spaces.

If we accept this principle - and McTaggart does attempt to defend
it - then it is, I think, obvious why there cannot be a solution to
the contradiction of infinite divisibility in the case of a spatially
extended substance. The reason is this. Consider, once again, the
line AB, which we shall call "P". Since P is a substance its nature
requires, in the sense explained in the previous chapter, sufficient
descriptions of each member of each of its sets of parts. Now, if it
requires these descriptions it must either supply them - i.e., either
include or imply them - or else it must presuppose them. But since we
have assumed that any spatial whole can only be discriminated - i.e.
be sufficiently described - by means of sufficient descriptions of
the members of a set of its parts, it follows that the nature of any
spatial whole must presuppose sufficient descriptions of each member
of an infinite series of sets of its parts. However, since there is
no final set of parts - i.e. no set of parts of P which has no
sequent set of parts - the nature of P will have a presupposition
without having a total ultimate presupposition. We are then faced
with the same contradiction concerning the total ultimate
presupposition of a substance which McTaggart pointed out in Section
191, and which we discussed, and defended, in our previous chapter.

22. Apart from some minor revisions in the actual statement of the
theory Broad does not offer any further criticisms of the principle
of Determining Correspondence, and the remainder of Chapter 21 of his
Examination is devoted to a restatement and explanation of the
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theory. I have no serious objections to what is to be found in that
chapter of Broad's work, apart from the proposed "Geometrical"
alternative solution to the contradiction of infinite divisibility
which we have just discussed. Given that the contradiction of
infinite divisibility is a genuine contradiction - and I have argued
in the previous chapter that it is a genuine contradiction - and
given the assumptions upon which the theory is based, Broad is
prepared to accept that the theory of Determining Correspondence is a
genuine solution to that contradiction. In this respect I agree with
him.

23. It is a different matter, however, when we consider John
Wisdom's paper on the theory of Determining Correspondence. Like
Broad's Examination, it was published after McTaggart's death. It
received no response at that time, and has not been discussed since.
It is not mentioned in Geach's book, and it receives only a passing
mention in Broad's work2'. In fact, Broad refers to the article only
to say that he has ignored it when writing his own work. Like much of
Wisdom's work, the paper is concise. Such concision should not,
however, be equated with accuracy; and in a number of important
respects Wisdom has, I shall argue, either misrepresented or
misunderstood crucial stages in McTaggart's argument, with the result
that his criticisms are, for the most part, irrelevant to McTaggart's
actual theory.
Wisdom's paper may be divided into three sections - each
distinguished by the manner in which it attempts to come to terms
with McTaggart's theory. The first section (pp.414-420) is mainly
exegetical. The remaining two sections are devoted to criticisms of
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the theory and of the assumptions upon which it is based. These
criticisms may be classified as either "constructive" or
"destructive". The constructive criticisms, which occupy pages 420423, amount to three alternative solutions to the contradiction of
infinite divisibility. The destructive criticisms, which occupy the
remaining pages of the article, profess to show that the arguments
which McTaggart uses to establish his theory are either invalid, or
unsound because based upon false premisses. In the following
discussion I shall essentially be concerned with the first two
sections of Wisdom's paper. The issues raised in the third section
have, I believe, been adequately covered in previous chapters.

24. The theory of the Determining Correspondence of Substance is
summarised by Wisdom, following McTaggart, in the statement that the
Universe is a Primary Whole or a set of Primary Wholes2'. He then
elaborates.

The conception of a Primary whole involves in its analysis the
conception of a sub-set of one Set of Parts of a substance A,
being what we will call 'representative' of another Set of
Parts of A. Draw a square. Divide it by a line-
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The two resultant parts of the square are a Set of Parts of the
square: for they together make it up and have no common part as Dr Broad neatly says "they just fit together to make it up".
Call this set of parts of the square a. Draw two line across
the first line. Then the square is divided into six bits. Call
this set of the parts of the square J3. The set fi has many subsets, among which are the following: J3', the two top bits, J3',
the two middle bits, &, the two bottom bits. Each of these
sub-sets is 'representative' of a. For any one of them it is
true both (1) that each of its members is a part of a different
member of a, and (2) that each member of a has a part which is
a member of the sub-set.... A sub-set, o, of a set of parts,
S2, is 'representative' of a set of parts, Sls if and only if
both (i) each member of o is a part of a different member of
Si, and (ii) each member of St has a part which is a member of
o.n

The concept of a Primary Whole is then defined by Wisdom in the
following way.

A is a substance. Let A have a set of parts B,C, and below BC
an endless series of sets of parts one below the other. Suppose
that in any lower set of parts there are just so many sub-sets
representative of B and C as there are members of the set above
it. Let there be some relation R such that for each member of a
higher set of parts there is just one sub-set representative of
B,C, in the set of parts below it, to each member of which sub-
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set it has R and to no other parts of B,C Let B and C each
have a sufficient description. Then A is a Primary Whole.31

There is no doubt that McTaggart's theory can be summarized in the
statement that the Universe has a set of Primary Parts - i.e., that
it is either a Primary Whole or a group of Primary Wholes. A
statement to that effect can be found in Section 206 of The Nature Of
Existence; and we ourselves have summarized the theory in this way.
But it is not clear that what Wisdom means by such a statement is the
same as what McTaggart means by such a statement. And if we look
closely at McTaggart's own views, it will, I think, become evident
that what Wisdom understands to be the theory of Determining
Correspondence is not quite the same as the theory which McTaggart
actually held.

25. Let us begin by comparing some of the definitions which Wisdom
provides, in the last of the above-quoted passages, with McTaggart's
own definitions. In Note 2 on page 415 of his article Wisdom explains
what he means by saying that one set of parts of a substance is
"above" or "below" another set.

Say that S2 is below S, if, and only if, any member of S2 is
part of one member of Si and no part of a member of S, is
neither a member of S2 nor a part of a member of S2. In other
words - if every member of a set of parts be split up in some
(the same or different) way the resultant group is a second set
of parts below the first. St is immediately below St if there is
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no third set of parts below S, and above S2. McTaggart uses
'below' differently, see N.of E, p.191.32

Although Wisdom acknowledges that his definition of 'below'
differs from McTaggart's33, he nevertheless seems to think that the
preposition 'below', when applied to a set of parts of a substance,
is equivalent to the preposition 'sequent' when used in the same
context by McTaggart. But this is not the case. According to
McTaggart, a set of parts S2 is sequent to another set Si if no member
of Si falls within more than one member of Slt while at least one
member of Si contains more than one member of S2. The relevant
difference is that it is possible, according to McTaggart, for a part
of a substance to be a member of two different sets of parts of that
substance, even though one set is sequent to the other. Now,
according to Wisdom's definition of "below", it is impossible for a
member of the set of parts Si, which is below the set of parts Slt to

be a member of Si - since S2 is the result of every member of Si being
divided in some way. Furthermore, it follows from Wisdom's definition
of "below" that there can be only one set of parts which is
immediately below another set. A set of parts, S2, is said to be
immediately below a set of parts Sj if there is no third set of parts
below Si and above S2. But according to McTaggart's definitions of
"sequent" and "precedent", between any two sets of parts of a
substance - one of which is sequent to the other - there will always
be another set of parts which falls between them. The difference
between the series of precedent and sequent sets of parts of a
substance, and the series ordered by the relations above and below
is, then, that the former is a compact or dense series, and the
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latter is a discrete series. And this, as we shall presently see, is
an important difference.

26. In Note 3, on page 415 of his article, Wisdom gives his
interpretation of the concept of a sufficient description. A
sufficient description, according to Wisdom, is "any predicate which
happens to belong to only one thing and has no constituent which is a
substance.

Thus "has R to a red thing" would at present be a sufficient
description if at present there were only one red thing.

There are, however, two problems with this interpretation. The
first is that, according to McTaggart34, a description consists of
characteristics - i.e., qualities and/or relations - as distinct from
mere predicates. The view that a description consists of predicates
may suggest that a description is, in some sense, a creature of
language; and it is important, especially in view of D.M. Armstrong's
recent attempt35 to defend a distinction between predicates and
properties or characteristics, to emphasise this point.
The second problem is that McTaggart defines a sufficient
description36 of a substance as an exclusive description - i.e., a
description which applies to one and only one substance, is such that
the substance is absolutely identified by that description, and which
introduces no undescribed substances. Now, the example of a
sufficient description given by Wisdom is doubly unsatisfactory.
Firstly, it fails to satisfy Wisdom's own definition - since it has a
constituent, viz, "red thing", which is, presumably a substance -
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although it does not thereby fail to satisfy McTaggart's definition,
since the substance is not undescribed. But it does fail to satisfy
McTaggart's definition on two other counts. In the first place it is
not an exclusive, hence not a sufficient description if there are, in
fact, two or more entities which have the relation R to a red thing even if there is, in fact, only one red thing. In that case there
would be at least two entities which satisfy the description "has R
to a red thing". The description could not, therefore, be exclusive;
hence it could not be sufficient. Secondly, the description is not
exclusive if there is a red thing which exists at some past or future
moment of time, and which is numerically distinct from the red thing
which exists at present. The point is that the description, as it
stands and without the introduction of a temporal indexica1, will not
identify a substance absolutely if there is a red thing which exists
at some other moment of time.

27. Turning our attention from these preliminary definitions, it
is clear that the most important assertion contained in Wisdom's
restatement of McTaggart's theory is the claim that the theory
involves the concept of one sub-set of parts of a substance being
'representative' of another - specifically, that of a sub-set of a
'lower' or sequent set of parts being representative of the members
of a 'higher' or precedent set.
Now the term "representation" does not occur in McTaggart's own
account of the theory of Determining Correspondence. What, then, does
Wisdom mean by this term? We might possibly elicit his meaning if we
compare his analysis of the concept of a Primary Whole with the
definition given by McTaggart. A Primary Whole is defined by
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McTaggart as being a substance which satisfies the following three
conditions.

(1) In order to describe sufficiently any of its parts it is
not necessary to introduce determining correspondence
with anything except another of its parts.
(2) In order to describe sufficiently any substance outside
it, it is not necessary to introduce determining
correspondence with any of its parts.
(3) It has no part which satisfies both of the above
conditions.

We might summarize this definition by saying that a Primary Whole
is, according to McTaggart, a self-contained determining
correspondence system37. But it is difficult to equate such a
definition with that given by Wisdom. The concept of representation,
which is involved in Wisdom's definition, is not explicitly involved
in McTaggart's. On the other hand, it may be that the concept of
representation is implicitly involved in McTaggart's definition. We
have already outlined the main features of a determining
correspondence system. Let us see, then, if Wisdom's concept of
representation is implicitly involved in such a system. To do this,
it will help if we attempt to give an account of Wisdom's concept of
representation in McTaggart's terminology.
Consider, once again, the substance A, which is a square initially
divided vertically to form a set of parts, a, comprising the parts B
and C. Let us then divide A again by two horizontal lines. We will
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then have another set of parts of A, J3, comprising the parts
D,E,F,G,H,J. A is illustrated below [Figure 6.3].

A

D

E

F

G

H

J

B

C
Figure 6.3

The set of parts, 13, is, in McTaggart's terminology, "sequent" to
the set of parts, a. It is also, in Wisdom's terminology, "lower"
than a. Now, in order for there to be a determining correspondence
system among the parts of A it is essential that there be a set of
Primary Parts, the members of which have sufficient descriptions
fixed independently of that system. Let us assume, then, that B and C
make up a set of Primary Parts of A, and that they have the
sufficient descriptions + and 0 respectively.
It is also essential that there be a series of sets of parts of B,
and a series of sets of parts of C, the members of which correspond
to each set of parts of A. So, there must be a set of parts of B the
members of which stand in a one-one relation with the members of the
set of Primary Parts {B,C}. Similarly, there must be a set of parts
of C, the members of which stand in a one-one relation with the
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members of the set of Primary Parts, The members of the set of parts
of B, and the members of the set of parts of C, which correspond to
the members of the set of Primary Parts must also make up a set of
parts of A. So, we must have a set of parts of B, {BIB,BIC}}, and a
set of parts of C, {CIC,CIB}, which together make up the set of
Secondary Parts of the First Grade of A, if the parts of A are to
form a determining correspondence system.
There is, however, nothing in the above diagram - which is
analogous to that supplied by Wisdom - which allows us to represent
the initial stages of the kind of hierarchy required by McTaggart's
theory. If we are to give an accurate representation of such an
hierarchy, the square A must be divided, initially at least, in the
manner shown below [Figure 6.4],
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C
Figure 6.4

B and C, we will assume, make up the set of Primary Parts of A. D
and F will make up the set of parts of B. And E and G will make up a
set of parts of C. If we are to have a determining correspondence
system among these parts it is essential that {D,F} be equivalent to
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{BIB,BIC}38, and that {E,G} be equivalent to {CIC,CIB}. Clearly,
{D,F} will be a sub-set of parts of A, as will the sets {E,G}, {D,E},
{D,G}, {E,F} - although only {D,F} and {F,G} can be said to be
ordered within the determining correspondence hierarchy. But the
notion of a sub-set of parts is only relevant to McTaggart's theory
insofar as that theory requires that there be a sub-set of parts of A
which is, in turn, a set of parts of the Primary Part C - the members
of which set correspond in the stipulated manner with the members of
the set of Primary Parts of A. How, then, if at all, does Wisdom's
concept of representation enter into such an account of McTaggart's
theory? The answer to this question, I suggest, is that it does not;
and that the concept of representation is, in fact, irrelevant to an
accurate account of the theory of Determining Correspondence.
Let us assume, once again, that A has two sets of parts, {B,C} and
{D,E,F,G}, as illustrated in Figure 6.4. Let {B,C} be called "Si",
and let {D,E,F,G} be called "S,". Now, according to Wisdom's
definition, the subset of S2, {D,E}, which we shall call "o", is
representative of Sj since (i) each member of o is a part of a
different member of S{; and (ii) each member of St has a part which is
a member of o. And if A is to be a Primary Whole, then, according to
Wisdom, the following conditions must be satisfied.

(1) There must be an endless series of sets of parts of A
'below' S,.
(2) In any 'lower' set of parts of A, e.g. S2, there are just
so many sub-sets representative of B and C as there are
members of the set above it, i.e. Si.
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(3) There is a relation, R, such that, for each member of a
higher set of parts, e.g. Ss, there is just one sub-set,
e.g. o, which is representative of St in the set of parts
below it, to each member of which it has R, and to no
other parts of B,C.
(4) B and C each have a sufficient description.

Given that 'below' is understood to mean 'sequent', the first
condition is in accordance with McTaggart's theory.
The fourth condition, again, is in accordance with that theory.
But what of the second and third conditions? Well, we know that there
are two sub-sets of S2 which are representative of Sls viz. {D,E} and
{F,G}. But we also know that there are two more sub-sets of S2 which
are representative of S]9 viz. {E,F} and {D,G}. These latter two sets
are representative of Si since (i) each member of the sub-sets is
part of a different member of St; and (ii) each member of Si has a
part which is a member of each sub-set. So, A cannot be an example of
a Primary Whole, in Wisdom's sense, since it fails to satisfy the
second of his conditions. And yet A could satisfy the preliminary
conditions for a Primary Whole in McTaggart's sense. The relevant
difference lies in the fact that McTaggart stipulates that the parts
which have the relation R (i.e. the converse of the relation R) to B
and C must be members of sets of parts of B and C, rather than
members of sub-sets of a set of parts of A. Initially, this
difference may not seem important. But it does become important when
we consider the relaxed conditions for a determining correspondence
system. According to the relaxed conditions it is not essential that
every Primary Part of a Primary Whole should be a determinant, i.e.
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have the relation R to the members of some other set of parts of A in
a determining correspondence system. According to Wisdom's account,
however, it is essential that every Primary Part should be a
determinant. We might illustrate this difference in the following
way.
Let us assume that, instead of only two Primary Parts, B and C, A
has three Primary Parts, B,C, and D. Now, according to Wisdom, in
order that A should be a Primary Whole it is essential (i) that any
set of parts 'lower' than {B,C,D} have as many sub-sets
representative of {B,C,D} as there are members in the set of parts
immediately above it; (ii) that there be a relation, R, such that for
each of B,C, and D, there is only one sub-set representative of
{B,C,D} in the set of parts immediately below it, to each member of
which it has the relation R, and to no other parts of B,C, or D.
In order for such an hierarchy to exist, there must be three sub-

sets of S| - the set of parts immediately below Si, the set of Primary
Parts - which are representative of {B,C,D}, i.e. which have members
which are parts of B,C, and D. That is, there must be three sub-sets
of St, each of which contains three members, i.e. there must be nine
members of S2. In the first sub-set of S2 we shall have three members,
each of which has the relation R to B. In the second sub-set of S2 we
shall have three members, each of which has the relation R to C. And
in the third sub-set of S2 we shall have three members, each of which
has the relation R to D. I am sure that the kind of hierarchy which
Wisdom has in mind here is the kind which might arise if every
Primary Part of A were a determinant. We should then have a hierarchy
like this [Figure 6.5],
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Figure 6.5
If we follow McTaggart's symbolism, and substitute "!" for "R",
then we shall have the set of Primary Parts of A, Sx, comprising B,C,
and D; and the set of parts immediately below it, S2, comprising BIB,
BIC, BID, CIC, CIB, CID, DID, DIB, and DIC. In accordance with
Wisdom's conditions we shall have three sub-sets of S2, each
representative of Sj. In the first sub-set we shall have a part of B
v v

which has R to B, a part of C which has R to B, and a part of D which
has R to B. In the second sub-set we shall have a part of C which has
V V V

B to C, a part of B which has R to Ct and a part of D which has R to
C. In the third sub-set we shal 1 have a part of D which has R to D, a
part of B which has R to D, and a part of C which has R to D. Let R
be a determining correspondence relation, and we appear to have the
preliminary requirements for a determining correspondence system
among the parts of A.
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The important point is that, for Wisdom, if there are three
Primary Parts which make up a Primary Whole, then there must be 32 or
nine members in the set of parts immediately below the set of Primary
Parts - i.e., in the set of Secondary Parts of the First Grade. And
this is so because every Primary Part must, according to Wisdom's
account, be a determinant in the hierarchy - i.e., every Primary Part
must have R to the members of a sub-set of the set of parts
immediately below the set of Primary Parts, which sub-set is
representative of the set of Primary Parts. But this is not the case
in McTaggart's actual theory in case the "relaxed" conditions for a
determining correspondence system are fulfilled. For McTaggart it is
possible that one of B,C or D should fail to be a determinant, as
long as the other two parts form a reciprocally determining group,
and as long as the members of the sets of parts of the Primary Part
which is not a determinant correspond to, or are determinates of,
these Primary Parts and/or the members of their respective sets of
parts. So that, instead of the kind of hierarchy illustrated above,
we could have one like that illustrated below [Figure 6.6], which
contains only six members in the set of parts immediately below the
set of Primary Parts.
The relevant criticism to make is that there is no way in which
Wisdom's account of a determining correspondence system can allow for
the possibility, illustrated below, that not every Primary Part of a
Primary Whole is a determinant. This is a fundamental error in his
restatement of McTaggart's theory; arising from his attempt to
explain that theory in terms of the concept of representation - a
concept which is not, as I suggested earlier, an essential feature of
McTaggart's actual theory.
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28. The next important step in Wisdom's account of McTaggart's
theory involves the claim that "every Primary Quality is an
Indicator"31. In Wisdom's terminology this amounts to the claim
that, if a substance has the quality, Q, of being a Primary Whole,
then Q will indicate - i.e. imply without including - sufficient
descriptions of each member of the infinite series of sequent sets of
parts of that substance.

We must remember that '0 is an indicator' means 'if 0 applies
to anything, A, then it indicates sufficient descriptions of an
infinite hierarchy of parts of A'. Suppose that Q is a primary
quality. Then "A has Q" is a proposition of the following form
- "There is a set of sets of parts of A, Z, and an item a, in
2, and a relation R, such that (1) taking any item in 2, olt
then there is an item in E, o2, such that (a) each member of Oi
has R to each member of only one (a different) subset within
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02, which subset is representative of a, and to no other parts
of members of a, and (b) each member of o2 has R to some member
of o,; (2) each member of a has one or other of •,, *2 ... *,
(where ti ... if, are sufficient descriptions)."40

Again, in this step, we find the concept of representation playing
an important role. And, once again, it serves to misrepresent
McTaggart's actual views. Let us assume that, only if a substance is
what McTaggart calls a "Primary Whole" can it avoid the contradiction
of infinite divisibility. Let us also agree with Wisdom that the
quality of being a Primary Whole may be called a "Primary Quality"
(even though, as he notes on page 418, McTaggart does not, himself,
talk of Primary Qualities in this sense); and, that only if a
substance has a Primary Quality can it avoid the contradiction of
infinite divisibility. We might also agree that a Primary Quality is
a formal quality, in the sense that "to assert of a thing that it has
a primary quality is to assert of it that it has a quality of a
certain form. "41
Now, according to McTaggart's theory, the fact that a substance
has the Primary Quality, Q, implies that it has a set of parts - viz.
the set of Primary Parts - sufficient descriptions of the members of
which imply sufficient descriptions of the members of each sequent
set of parts of that substance. Where McTaggart differs from Wisdom
is that, for Wisdom, it is the Primary Quality Q, itself, which
implies sufficient descriptions of the members of an infinite series
of sets of parts of that substance. This is obvious from the
following remarks.
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This is the proof that every primary quality is an
indicator.43

It is clear that (i) "Q applies to something" entails without
including "something has q". And we will prove that (ii) q is a
sufficient description.43

The relevant difference between Wisdom's theory and McTaggart's
theory lies in the fact that q is a formal, or, more specifically, an
ordinal characteristic; and that the quality Q, for Wisdom, only
implies that the sufficient description q will apply to some part or
other of the substance A. It does not imply what characteristics in
addition to q the part of A in question will have. Moreover, Q
cannot, by virtue of its merely formal nature, imply any
characteristics of the substance other than q. And in this respect
Wisdom's account again differs from McTaggart's actual theory. As we
have seen, it is impossible, according to McTaggart, for all of the
parts of a Primary Whole to have characteristics other than those
determined by determining correspondence; and it is impossible that
the entire nature of any part of a substance should consist in a
single ordinal characteristic such as q.

29. I have argued that Wisdom's account of the theory of
Determining Correspondence is erroneous in several important respects
- specifically, those concerned with the concept of representation.
But even if it is, in these respects, inaccurate, does it follow that
it fails to provide a satisfactory solution to the contradiction of
infinite divisibility? I will now argue that, even if we ignore these
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inaccuracies, Wisdom's account still fails to provide us with a
satisfactory solution to this contradiction.

30. The crucial section of Wisdom's account is obviously his
attempt to prove that a Primary Quality of a substance is an
indicator, i.e. a quality which implies, without including,
sufficient descriptions of each member of each set of parts of a
substance. I shall quote the relevant passages from his paper in
full.

We must remember that '0 is an indicator' means 'if 0 applies
to anything, A, then it indicates sufficient descriptions of an
infinite hierarchy of parts of A'. Suppose that Q is a primary
quality. Then "A has Q" is a proposition of the following form
- "There is a set of sets of parts of A, E, and an item a, in
E, and a relation R, such that (1) taking any item in E, olt
then there is an item in E, o2, such that (a) each member of Oi
has R to each member of only one (a different) subset within
o2, which subset is representative of a, and to no other parts
of members of a, and (b) each member of o2 has R to some member
of or, (2) each member of a has one or other of •,, f2 ... •,
(where ti ... t, are sufficient descriptions)."
Now if A has such a set of sets of parts as E then there is
an infinite hierarchy of parts of A, viz., E, such that in the
case of any member x within that hierarchy there is a quality
q, which applies to x and is such that (i) "Q applies to
something" entails without including "q applies to something",
and (ii) it is a sufficient description. For let x be any
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member of the set of parts, J3, within E, next below a. The x
has the quality of being (a) R to a thing which has t,-,, and
(b) a part of a thing which has +,_, (•,., and if,., may be the
same). Call this compound quality q. It is clear that (i) "Q
applies to something" entails without including "something has
q". And we will prove that (ii) q is a sufficient description.
It contains no part which is a substance; that is the first
point. It applies to something, viz., x; that is the second
point. It does not apply to more than one thing; that is the
last point. The last point is true for: Suppose y any thing
other than x, then q does not apply to it. For if (1) y is not
a part of a member of a it is not a part of a thing which has
•,./: since if,., is a sufficient description and therefore
applies to nothing which is not the member of a to which it
does apply.
Further, x is a member of one sub-set within # which sub-set
V

is representative of a, and R is a relation which a member of a
higher set of parts Oi in E has only to members of one
representative sub-set within the next lower set of parts o2.
Hence, if (2) y is a part of a member of a and is not a member
of the same representative sub-set within J3 as x is, then y has
not got R to the member of a to which x has R. And therefore y
has not got the quality of "being R to a thing which has if,-„":

for if,-, is a sufficient description of the member of a to which
x has R.
And if (3) y is a member of the same representative sub-set
as x is, it is not a part of the same member of a as x is: by
definition of "representative". And therefore y has not got the
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quality of "being a part of a thing which has if,.,": for +,., is
a sufficient description of the member of a of which x is a
part.44

The most important paragraph here is the first. But it is somewhat
obscure, and so I will try to restate it in a more concrete way. Let
us begin with the assumption that A has a set of sets of parts E. In
Wisdom's terminology this assumption amounts to the assumption that A
has a set of sets of parts which form a hierarchy in which any given
member of E is either directly above or directly below another

member. Consider two members of E, a and J3, where J3 is directly belo
a. Let us take a member, any member, of j3 and call it "x". If A is a
Primary Whole, then according to Wisdom, it will have the quality Q,
i.e. the quality of being a Primary Whole, Now, let us assume that x
has a quality, q, which is implied by the quality Q. Then, according
to Wisdom, q is a sufficient description of x.
He attempts to prove that q is a sufficient description in the
following way. Since AT is a member of J3, and since A is a Primary
Whole, it follows, according to Wisdom, (i) that there is some member
of a of which x is a part; and (ii) that there is some member of a to
which x has the relation R. If we take (i) and (ii) together as being
equivalent to the fact that x has the compound quality, q, made up of
the quality of being a part of a member of a, and the quality of
having the relation R to some member of a, then q, it is maintained,
is a sufficient description of x. Before proceeding further we might
illustrate the position we have reached in the argument by appealing
to an example of a Primary Whole such as that given below [Figure
6.7].
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Figure 6. 7
The Primary Whole, S, has a set of Primary Parts, a, comprising M
and N; and a set of parts, J3, comprising B,C,D, and E, directly
'below' a. Now it is clear, even at this stage, that q is not a
sufficient description of x, if x is identical with B, since q is a
quality which, in the above form, applies to every member of j3. Every
member of J3 has the quality (i) of being a part of a member of a, and
(ii) of having the relation R to some member of a.

31. Wisdom attempts to anticipate this objection by stipulating
that each member of a has one or

the other of

the sufficient

descriptions ifit if}. But this will not help us significantly, since q
will then only amount to being the compound quality of being a part
of a substance which is fi or ift, and of having the relation R to
something which is either +i or t2. And this quality, again, applies
to every member of J3.
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The only way in which q can possibly be a sufficient description
of x is if it is stipulated which member of a it is a part of. But
this is contrary to the initial assumption that x can be any member

of ft; hence that it can be part of any member of a. If x is in fact a
part of the member of a which is •,, then it will have a sufficient
description. And if it is in fact a part of the member of a which is
•2, then it will also have a sufficient description. But neither of
these descriptions can be identical with q since neither of them is
implied by Q, the Primary Quality possessed by the Primary Whole, S.
And unless these descriptions are implied by Q we will not have a
satisfactory solution to the contradiction of infinite divisibility.
Wisdom's attempt to prove that every Primary Quality is an
indicator is, I suggest, fallacious. And it is fallacious in the

following way. He has correctly concluded that, if x is a member of j3

it must have the quality of being a part of a thing which is ifl3 or a
part of a thing which is +2. And this disjunctive quality is implied
by Q. But Q does not imply that x has the quality of being a part of
a member of a which is ti. Nor does it imply that x has the quality
of being a part of the member of a which is +2. But unless it does
imply one or the other of these qualities in x, then x is not
sufficiently described. The fallacy is explicit in the following
passage.

For let x be any member of the set of parts, ft, within E, next
below a. Then x has the quality of being (a) R to a thing which
has •,-,, and (b) a part of a thing which has •,., (if,-M and if,-,
may be the same).
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Clearly, from the fact that x is a member of ft, we cannot infer
that x has the quality of being a part of a thing which has •,.,,
where •,., is a sufficient description of a member of a. The conjunct
(b) should, in fact, be restated thus: (b') part of a thing which has
• i or part of a thing which has •,. Since (b') is a disjunctive
quality it will apply to two members of ft, as will the quality (a).
And since q is, ex hypothesi, a compound quality made up of (a) and
(b''), it cannot be a sufficient description because it is not an
exclusive description. Hence Wisdom's proof that q is a sufficient
description, and that every Primary Quality is an indicator, is
fallacious.
We may conclude, then, that even if we ignore the inaccuracies in
his restatement of McTaggart's theory, Wisdom has not provided us
with a sound alternative solution to the contradiction of infinite
divisibility.

32. In the second section of his paper, Wisdom attempts to show
that the contradiction of infinite divisibility can be solved in a
manner which does not appeal to the principle of Determining
Correspondence. He proposes three alternative solutions to the
contradiction. The first, which he calls the "Serial Method", is
simply a restatement and endorsement of the solution put forward by
Broad; and it is subject to the same criticisms which we raised
against that proposed solution earlier in this chapter.
The second of Wisdom's proposed solutions is called the "Method of
Echoes". The suggestion is this. Let A be a substance which has a set
of parts, a, the members of which have the sufficient descriptions

0X. , .0,. Below a there is a series of sets of parts of A, E, such th
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each member of the series is immediately below the precedent term.
Each set of parts in E has the quality, if. There are two qualities,
Xi and %i, which "echo down" the series,

... this means that if you take any set of parts o,, in the
series and the set of parts o2 immediately below it and take x
any member of Oj, and y and z the two members of o2 which are
parts of x, then y has Xi, and not Xi, and z has Xi and not Xi.
Let us express all this by saying that A has an Echoing
Quality.... Any echoing quality is an indicator. For any member
x of any set of parts in E will have a quality such that (i)
its application is entailed by the fact that something has Q,
the echoing quality which A has; and (ii) it is a sufficient
description.
For let x be any member of the set of parts, ft, next below
a. Then x has the compound quality q of being (a) a part of the
thing which has 0,.,, (b) having Xi (or, if not, XJ)> and (c)
being a member of the set of parts which has if, and is next to
the set of parts (viz., a), described by 01...0,. That q applies
to something is entailed by "A has Q". Further if Q is an
echoing quality q applies to only one thing. For any member of
ft other than x is either also a part of the member of a of
which x is a part or not. If it is it has Xi and not Xi- If it
is not it is not part of what has 0,.,. Similarly, let y be a
member of Y and a part of x. Then y has the compound quality,
q' , of (a) being a part of the thing which has q, and (b)
having Xi (or, if not, x2)> and (c) roughly, being a member of
the second set of parts from a which has +.48
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33. The objection to this as a method of solving the contradiction
of infinite divisibility is, it seems to me, quite obvious. The fact
is that q, the quality of x which is implied by Q, the echoing
quality of A, is not a sufficient description of x. And there are two
reasons why it is not a sufficient description of x. Firstly, q is
applicable to more than one member of ft, the set of parts of A of
which x is a member. And the reason why it is applicable to more than
one member of 13 is that, insofar as it is a quality of x which is
implied by Q, it is a disjunctive quality. Strictly speaking, x has
the quality q' of (a) being a part of a thing which has •,.,; (b')

having Xi or Xi', (c) being a member of the set of parts of A which ha
t, and is next to the set of parts whose members have the
descriptions 01...0I. The important difference is the difference
between (b) and (b'). The fact is that Q implies the disjunctive
quality (b'), but it does not imply which member of the disjunction x
in fact is. Rather, Q presupposes that x is Xi or that it is Xi ~
whichever it, in fact, is. And unless Q implies one or the other of
these two qualities, x will not have a sufficient description implied
by Q. Hence Q cannot be, in Wisdom's sense, an indicator; and if it
is not an indicator, then the Method of Echoes will not provide us
with a solution to the contradiction of infinite divisibility.
The second reason why q is not a sufficient description of x is
that (c) can only be an exclusive description of a set of parts of A
if (i) the series, E, is a discrete, rather than a compact series;
and (ii) every member of E is either directly above, or directly
below, some other member. Now, Wisdom makes both of these
assumptions. There is, however, given the premiss that all substances
are infinitely divisible, no reason to accept either. I have argued
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earlier in this chapter that if "below" is equivalent to "sequent",
then the series of sets of parts of any substance, when ordered in
terms of the relations of precedence and sequence, is a compact
series - i.e., between any two terms in the series there will always
be another term. And if it is a compact series, then there will be no
set of parts of A which can be exclusively described as "next below"
some given set - in which case (c) cannot be either a sufficient or
an exclusive description of a set of parts of A. Hence, q cannot be a
sufficient description of x. Furthermore, even if the series of sets
of parts of A were discrete, it would not follow that, for any two
given sets of parts, one must be below or above the other. Consider
the line AB below [Figure 6.8].
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Figure 6.8
Let us assume that it has a set of parts {AX,XB}, and below that
set two sets of parts {AD,DX,XE,EB} and {AF,FX,XG,GB}. Let us call
the first set "Si", and the two sets below Slf "Si" and "S,"
respectively. Each of these last two sets is directly below Si, since
there is, we will assume, no set of parts of A below S, which has
members which are parts of the members of Sx, and which has fewer
members than either S2 or S3. But neither Si nor S2 is below the
other. The description "the set of parts of A immediately below S/'
will thus apply to both S2 and S3. Hence it cannot be either an
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exclusive or a sufficient description of a member of E, the series of
sets of parts of AB. But unless it is either an exclusive or a
sufficient description of a member of E, q cannot be a sufficient
description of x.
Again, the Method of Echoes fails to provide us with a
satisfactory solution to the contradiction of infinite divisibility.

34. The third of Wisdom's proposed solutions is called the "Method
of Pointers". Wisdom, himself, chooses not to discuss the method in
detail, and does not consider it to be an unconditionally valid
solution to the contradiction. But for the sake of completeness we
will consider it. The proposal is as follows.

Let A have a quality Q, of the form - "has as a part this which
has ti, and this which has +2" and so on to "this which has •,".
Where +...•, each fix a sufficient description and together
describe a hierarchy of parts of A. Let us express all this by
saying that A has a Pointing Quality. (A pointing quality is
not a Pointer as ti...^, are.)47

The objection to this method is quite straightforward. Q supplies
sufficient descriptions of each member of an infinite series of sets
of parts of A only in the sense that it includes, without implying,
each of the pointers •,...•,. And each of these pointers must, if it
is to directly imply a sufficient description, itself be a sufficient
description - in which case the nature of A must either include
without implying, or presuppose, sufficient descriptions of each of
its infinite number of parts. If it includes without implying these
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descriptions, then we will be faced with the contradiction concerning
the concept of a Minimum Adequate Description described by McTaggart
in Sections 193 to 194 of The Nature Of Existence. And if it
presupposes sufficient descriptions of each of its infinite number of
parts then we will be faced with the contradiction concerning the
concept of a Total Ultimate Presupposition, described in Sections 189
to 192 of The Nature Of Existence.

35. We may conclude, then, that none of Wisdom's proposed methods
can provide us with a satisfactory solution to the contradiction of
infinite divisibility. Having argued that the theory of Determining
Correspondence is essentially sound, and a genuine solution to the
contradiction of infinite divisibility, we may now attempt to
determine the kind of unity which a system of determining
correspondence relations implies among the parts of the Universe.
This will be the subject of our next chapter.

NOTES

1. McTaggart, The Nature Of Existence, §206.
2. McTaggart, The Nature Of Existence, §202.
3. There may be any number, finite or infinite, of parts in such a
set.
4. In view of this fact, Geach's comment on page 129 of his Truth,
Love And Immortality, that this terminology "does not remotely
suggest the reality it is supposed to stand for", is rather
unfortunate. Geach's whole discussion of the theory of
Determining Correspondence is seriously misleading; and the
above comment merely reflects the fact that he has not really
understood the true nature of that theory. He mistakenly seems
to equate the theory of Determining Correspondence with the
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principle of Ontological Determinacy - which is a completely
different principle.
5. I am following McTaggart here. See The Nature Of Existence,
§202.
6. They would be the same part of B since each contains the same
content of B - which content is required to make up the set of
Secondary Parts of the First Grade and the set of Secondary
Parts of the Second Grade.
7. Russell, Introduction To Mathematical Philosophy, p. 15.
McTaggart was familiar with this work at the time of writing
The Nature Of Existence. See, for example, Volume 1, p. 132,
Note 1.
8. Broad, Critical Notice of The Nature Of Existence (Vol.1),
p.329.
9. Broad, Critical Notice of The Nature Of Existence (Vol.1),
p.332.
10. That the determining correspondence relation is a determinable
characteristic is stated in Section 418 of The Nature Of
Existence.
11. McTaggart, The Nature Of Existence, §224. The letters in
brackets indicate the original reading of the text. In
agreement with A.E. Taylor ("Doctor McTaggart On The Nature Of
Existence, p.158) I consider this reading to be erroneous.
Where appropriate I have substituted "C" for "B".
12. McTaggart, The Nature Of Existence, §226.
13. Cf., The Nature Of Existence, §410:
This sufficient description of BIC will be "the
perception by the only self which is UVW of the only self
which is XYZ."
14. Cf.,The Nature Of Existence, §224 et foil..
15. McTaggart, The Nature Of Existence, §202.
16. McTaggart, The Nature Of Existence, §202.
17. Cf., The Nature Of Existence, Vol.1, p.214, Note 1.
18. McTaggart, The Nature Of Existence, §202.
19. See Geach, Truth, Love And Immortality, Chapter 9.
20. Aspects of the theory have recently been criticised by N.M.L.
Nathan in "McTaggart's Immaterial ism". I have considered these
criticisms in "McTaggart's Immaterial ism: A Reply To Nathan",
Appendix 1 of this thesis.
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21.

As we shall see, his subsequent criticisms in the Examination
amount to the same suggestion, albeit in a slightly revised
form.

22. Broad, Critical Notice of The Nature Of Existence (Vol.1),
p.332.
23. He acknowledges the basic flaw in Broad's example on page 421
of his article.
24. A Fundamental Hierarchy should be distinguished from
McTaggart's concept of the Fundamental System. The Fundamental
System is the classification of substances into Primary Wholes;
Primary Parts; Secondary Parts of the First Grade; Secondary
Parts of the Second Grade; and so on.
25. Broad, Examination Of McTaggart 's Philosophy, Vol.1, p.375.
26. Broad, Examination Of McTaggart's Philosophy, Vol.1, pp.376377.
27. Broad, Examination Of McTaggart's Philosophy, Vol.2, p.229.
28. Broad, Examination Of McTaggart's Philosophy, Vol.1, pp.liiiliv. See also, Nathan, "McTaggart's Immaterial ism", p.453,
where again Wisdom's article is mentioned only in passing.
29. Wisdom, "McTaggart's Determining Correspondence Of Substance",
p.414.
30. Wisdom, "McTaggart's Determining Correspondence Of Substance",
pp.414-5.
31. Wisdom, "McTaggart's Determining Correspondence Of Substance",
p.415.
32. Wisdom, "McTaggart's Determining Correspondence Of Substance",
p.415, Note 2.
33. McTaggart does not, in fact, use this term to describe the
order among the sets of parts of a substance.
34. McTaggart, The Nature Of Existence, §101.
35. See Armstrong, Universals & Scientific Realism, Vol.1, Chapter
1.
36. McTaggart, The Nature Of Existence, §102.
37. Cf., The Nature Of Existence, §202, p.215n.
38. It is immaterial which of D or F is identical with BIC, and
which is identical with BIB, as long as none is identical with
both. Similar remarks apply to E and G.
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39. Wisdom, "McTaggart's Determining Correspondence Of Substance",
p.418.
40. Wisdom, "McTaggart's Determining Correspondence Of Substance",
p.419.
41. Wisdom, "McTaggart's Determining Correspondence Of Substance",
p. 418.
42. Wisdom, "McTaggart's Determining Correspondence Of Substance",
p.418.
43. Wisdom, "McTaggart's Determining Correspondence Of Substance",
p.419.
44. Wisdom, "McTaggart's Determining Correspondence Of Substance",
pp.419-420.
45. Wisdom, "McTaggart's Determining Correspondence Of Substance",
p.419.
46. Wisdom, "McTaggart's Determining Correspondence Of Substance",
pp.421-422.
47. Wisdom, "McTaggart's Determining Correspondence Of Substance",
p.422.
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C3IAPTER

S E V E N

The Unity Of Thies Uni vesr-se

1. We began this study with the claim that it is a task of the
metaphysician to determine in what sense, if at all, the Universe is
a genuine unity. In view of some of the conclusions which we have
reached in previous chapters we can see that we are unable to give an
unequivocal answer to this question. The Universe is a unity in a
variety of senses - each distinct kind of unity being determined by
the kinds of relations which exist among its parts. In the most
fundamental sense we may say that the Universe is an aggregate of
existents; and an aggregate, we have seen, is a kind of unity - a
unity determined by relations of co-existence among entities. Our
acceptance of the theory of the Determining Correspondence of
Substance allows us to conclude, however, that the Universe is a much
closer unity than a mere aggregate; and, indeed, that it is a much
closer unity than our commonsense beliefs might suggest. In this
final chapter we will attempt to reach some more definite conclusions
about the kind of unity determined by a Determining Correspondence
system; and about some of the more general ontological and
cosmological conclusions which the existence of such a system
implies.

2. In the previous chapter I suggested that there is a
determinable characteristic of closeness which is predicable of
certain kinds of unity. The closeness of a unity comprising two or
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more entities is dependent upon the extent to which the natures of
the entities are intrinsically determined by the fact that they are
constituents in such a unity. If we consider the unity of an
aggregate, for example, it seems clear that the natures of the terms
which make up an aggregate are, to a large extent, determined
independently of the fact that they are constituents of that
aggregate. On the other hand, the nature of a substance within a
determining correspondence system might be more or less completely
determined by the fact that it is a constituent within such a unity depending upon its position within the Fundamental System1. An
aggregate, accordingly, is not a very close unity. A determining
correspondence system, on the other hand, might be considered to be a
very close unity.
The closeness of a unity is thus determined independently of the
truth of the principle of Extrinsic Determination. As we saw in
Chapter Four, the principle of Extrinsic Determination allows us to
conclude that every quality of the existent is determined by every
other quality of the existent. That is to say, it allows us to
conclude that the principle of Universal Determinism is true. But the
truth of Universal Determinism is consistent with the view that the
Universe is not a very close unity, since the characteristics of the
existent need not, according to that principle, be determined by
intrinsic determination.

3. The factor of closeness is illustrated in McTaggart's
distinction, to which we referred in Chapter 2, between a unity of
composition and a unity of manifestation. A whole is considered to be
a unity of composition insofar as it is a compound of its parts; and
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it is considered to be a unity of manifestation insofar as it is
manifest in its parts. The distinction, according to McTaggart2,
involves a difference of emphasis or point of view. In the case of a
unity of composition we are emphasising the diversity of the
constituents. In the case of a unity of manifestation we are

emphasising the unity which comprises them. But if the distinction is
to have any objective validity it must amount to more than just a
difference of emphasis. There must be an ontological basis for the
distinction. And I do not see that McTaggart provides us with a
satisfactory ontological basis. Having explained the concept of
closeness, however, I would suggest that the distinction between a
unity of composition and a unity of manifestation is essentially a
distinction between degrees of closeness. A whole is a unity of
manifestation insofar as the nature of each of its parts is, to some
extent, intrinsically determined by the fact that it is a part of
that whole. And a whole is a unity of composition insofar as the
nature of each of its parts is determined, to some extent,
independently of the fact that it is a part of that whole. Now, we
know that the nature of every part of a whole is intrinsically
determined to some extent by the fact that it is a part of that
whole. Every part of a whole has, for example, the quality of being
part of a whole with an exclusive description 0 - where 0 is an
exclusive description of the whole in question. And this quality of

the part is intrinsically determined by the fact that it is a part of
that whole. Every whole is therefore a unity of manifestation.
Whether or not there are wholes which are not also unities of
composition depends upon whether or not there are wholes wherein the
entire nature of each member of a set of parts is intrinsically

335
determined by the fact that it is a part of that whole. And I think
it is clear that it is impossible for there to be such a whole3. In
this sense, then, every whole is both a unity of composition and a
unity of manifestation.

4. By explaining the distinction between unities of composition
and unities of manifestation in terms of the factor of closeness we
can, I think, escape Broad's charge that McTaggart's concepts of
manifestation and organic unity are "completely trivial"4. Now, the
claim that a concept or principle is trivial might be understood to
mean either (i) that it is unimportant; or (ii) that it is
uninteresting. But it does not entail that the concept has no

application. And we have shown that the concept of manifestation does
apply to every whole. The fact that it applies to every whole might
render the concept uninteresting, but this does not mean that it is
unimportant. Whether or not a concept is interesting depends upon
the interests of the inquirer. Whether or not a concept is important
is, I should think, determined independently of those interests.
Clearly it is not unimportant to conclude that the nature of a part
of a whole is, to some extent, intrinsically determined by the fact
that it is a part of that whole. This conclusion, as we have seen, is
an essential premiss in the argument for the theory of Determining
Correspondence. Such a conclusion might not, however, be of great
interest to the inquirer. What might be of interest is the extent to
which the nature of the part is intrinsically determined by that
fact. But this does not mean that the concept of manifestation, as
such, is unimportant - only that it might be uninteresting.

336
5. Whether or not the concept of an organic unity is trivial
depends upon what we mean by an "organic" unity. McTaggart's concept
of an organic unity is derived from the principles of Extrinsic
Determination and Manifestation. The principle of Extrinsic
Determination allows us to conclude that the nature of every part of
a whole is determined by the nature of every other part of that
whole. The principle of Manifestation allows us to conclude that the
nature of every part of a whole is, to some extent, intrinsically
determined by the fact that it is a part of that whole. The relevance
of these two principles to the concept of an organic unity is
explained in Section 145 of The Nature Of Existence.

The interdependence [between the parts of a whole] is not
more complete than before, but it is more positive. We no
longer say only that, if one of the parts were different, the
whole would be different, and we should have no ground for
supposing that the other parts would remain. We say also that
the parts have a common function to perform - the manifestation
of the whole - and that, while each of them performs it in a
different way, yet none could perform it unless the others were
performing it also. To the idea of mutual indispensabil ity is
now added the more positive idea of mutual co-operation.

An organic unity is a unity of manifestation. In this respect it
is like all other unities. Where an organic unity ostensibly differs
from, say, an aggregate, is in the degree of closeness which it
displays. This fact is not made explicit in the above passage, but it
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is, I think, implicit in McTaggart's subsequent remarks about the
kinds of unity which are generally considered to be "organic".

Now the essential feature of an organic unity is that the
parts manifest the whole - that, since the whole as a unity is
what it is, the parts must be what they are. This, as we have
seen, is really the case with all wholes, and therefore all
wholes are really organic unities. But their organic unity only
becomes obvious when it becomes obvious that a set of parts
only slightly different would be a manifestation of the nature
of a whole which was different in some important
characteristics. This is not the case with the heap of stones the addition or subtraction of a stone, or the interchange of
two of the stones, would make it a different whole, but not
different in any important characteristics. But life and beauty
are held by us to be important characteristics, and slight
changes in the parts may destroy them. And thus it is obvious
with wholes which are living or beautiful that the parts are
manifestations of the nature of the whole, since different
parts would be so obviously inconsistent with the whole being
the same.5

The point which McTaggart seems to be making here is that every
whole is an organic unity insofar as it is a unity of manifestation;
and, that what are commonly acknowledged to be examples of organic
unities, such as beautiful paintings or living creatures, differ from
mere aggregates only because they are ostensibly closer - i.e., only
because the natures of the constituent parts of such ostensibly
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organic unities are intrinsically determined to a much greater and
more obvious extent by the fact that they are constituents of those
unities.
By characterising an organic unity in this way - i.e., in terms of
the concept of manifestation - McTaggart is able to avoid problems
about what kinds of unities are or are not genuinely organic. It
allows him, for example, to classify ostensibly inanimate objects,
such as certain works of art, along with ostensibly animate objects,
such as human beings, as organic unities. On the other hand, by
equating an organic unity with a unity of manifestation, we are
obliged to consider unities, such as a heap of stones, as "organic"
which do not ostensibly have any of the characteristics which are
generally associated with that term. And this is, I think, the real
basis for Broad's criticism that McTaggart's concept of an organic
unity is trivial. If every whole is an organic unity, then the
concept of an organic unity becomes, if not unimportant, then
uninteresting.

6. The question I think we need to ask at this stage is whether

there is some other characteristic which belongs to unities which are
ostensibly organic, and which does not belong to unities, such as
aggregates, which are not ostensibly organic. And the answer to this
question is, I suggest, that unities which are ostensibly organic are
ostensibly ideological unities. Now, the definitive characteristic

of a teleological unity is that its constituents are related as means
to an end. In the case of an organic unity, that end lies within or
is identical with, the existence of the whole8. An organic unity is
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thus, in feint's sense, an instance of intrinsic finality1 or
intrinsic teleology.
The teleological character of an organic unity is, I think,
implicitly acknowledged in McTaggart's claim3 that the parts of an
organic unity have a common function to perform - namely, the
manifestation of the whole. But in the case of some unities which
McTaggart considers to be organic - such as a heap of stones - it is

difficult to consider a teleological interpretation of the concept of
manifestation to be anything other than metaphorical". For this
reason it is, I believe, preferable to distinguish the concepts of
manifestation and organic unity, and to use the latter term to refer
only to unities which are, in fact, teleological.
The question whether the Universe, in addition to being a unity of
manifestation, is also an organic unity, is not, I think, capable of
being answered at this stage. Although our acceptance of the theory

of Determining Correspondence allows us to conclude that the Universe
is a much closer unity than a mere aggregate, we cannot, without

determining the specific kind of determining correspondence relations
which exist among its parts, decide whether or not the Universe, in
addition to being a unity of manifestation, is also an organic unity.
And we cannot determine the specific kind of determining
correspondence relations which exist among the parts of the Universe
independently of empirical considerations.

7. If our acceptance of the theory of Determining Correspondence
does not allow us to conclude, a priori, that the Universe is an
organic unity, does it allow us to draw any further conclusions about
the kind of unity which it displays?
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The Universe, according to the theory of Determining
Correspondence, is either a single Primary Whole, or a group of
Primary Wholes. If the Universe is not a single Primary Whole, then
any given Primary Whole will be a part of the Universe. It will be a

unity within the Universe, rather than providing us with the unity of
the Universe. Any group of Primary Wholes which make up the Universe
we may call a Super-Primary Whole. The concept of a Super-Primary
Whole is illustrated in the following figure [Figure 7.1]. In this
case the Universe, A, has a set of Primary Parts {B,C,D,E}. These
parts are divided among two Primary Wholes which have the sets of

parts {B,C} and {D,E} respectively. Each of the members of these sets
of parts, in turn, has a set of parts determined by determining

correspondence. The members of the latter sets of parts form a set of

Secondary Parts of the First Grade of A. Thus we have two determining
correspondence systems, or two Primary Wholes, within the Universe.
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Figure 7.1
Clearly, if the Universe is a Primary Whole, then it will be a
closer unity than if it is a Super-Primary Whole. But the question
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whether the Universe is a Primary Whole, or a Super-Primary Whole is
not, I think, capable of being decided a priori. In order to avoid
the contradiction of infinite divisibility mentioned in Chapter 5 we
must assume that the Universe has a set of parts, sufficient

descriptions of which intrinsically determine sufficient descriptions
of each member of each of its infinite number of sets of parts. But
the theory of Determining Correspondence does not require that this
set of parts - i.e., the set of Primary Parts - should be comprised
by a single Primary Whole.

8. The fact that we are unable to determine, a priori, whether the
Universe is a Primary Whole or whether it is a Super-Primary Whole,

does not, however, prevent us from drawing conclusions about the kind
of unity which it would have if it is, in fact, a Primary Whole. Some
of these conclusions are discussed by McTaggart in Chapter 31 of The
Nature Of Existence. The most important of these is that, under
certain conditions, we would be entitled to conclude that the
Universe is a self-refleeting unity.
The concept of a self-reflecting unity is derived from the concept
of a self-representative system. A system R represents a system S if
each member of S stands in a one-one relation10 with a member of R.

S is a self-representative system if J? is either identical with, or a
proper part, of S.
The Universe will satisfy the requirements for a selfrepresentative system if: (a) it is a single Primary Whole; (b) every
Primary Part is a determinant; (c) the Differentiating Group of each
Primary Part consists of every Primary Part of the Universe; and (d)
the determining correspondence relations among its parts are of the
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same kind. Let us assume that S is a set of Primary Parts of the
Universe, and that these Primary Parts are comprised by a single
Primary Whole. Let us also assume that R is the set of Secondary
Parts of the First Grade. Then, if each part in S is a determinant,
each part in R will have a set of parts, each member of which stands
in a one-one relation with each part in S. Assuming that the one-one
relations between the members of R and S are determining
correspondence relations of the same kind, then the Universe
satisfies the requirements for a self-representative system. In
accordance with the principle which we introduced in Chapter 2, the
occurrence of these relations between the members of S and R
determines a unity which comprises them. This unity may appropriately
be described as a "self-representative" unity.

9. Although the concept of a self-representative system has its
more recent origins in the mathematical theories of Dedekind and
Cantor, it is not, I would argue, a specifically mathematical
concept11. Leibniz' account of inter-monadic perception, for
example, might be interpreted as a self-representative system. The
definitive characteristic of perception, according to Leibniz, is
not, as was held by Descartes, consciousness; it is, rather, the
representation of a multiplicity in a unity.

14. The passing condition, which involves and represents
multiplicity in the unit [units] or in the simple substance, is
nothing but what is called Perception, which is to be
distinguished from Apperception or Consciousness, as will
afterwards appear.12
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The representation of a multiplicity within a unity is not, of
course, in itself sufficient to constitute a self-representative
system. We must also stipulate that the unit or monad should
represent every member of the system of which it is a part or
constituent. In the case of a Leibnizian monad, the members of the
system of which it is a constituent are the infinite number of monads
or simple substances which make up the Universe. Leibniz' universe of
monads is a se1f-representative system insofar as each monad within
the Universe perceives - i.e., represents within itself - the
contemporary states of every monad within the Universe. The formal
nature of such a self-representative system is admirably set out by
Broad in the following passage.

Leibniz's general theory of representation may be expressed
by the following symbolic scheme. Suppose that there was a set
of n monads MltMt. . . ,M,. Let Mt and Ms be two typical monads of
the set. Let us denote the total state of M, at a certain
moment t by m\, and the total state of Ms at the same moment by
m\. Then in m\ there will be a certain factor mln which
corresponds to the contemporary total state m\ of M. There will
be a certain other feature m\2 which corresponds to the
contemporary total state m\ of M2. And so on for the rest. The
same remarks will apply mutatis mutandis to any other monad
such as Ms. So we can write

l
m , = <f», (m\i ,m\i,. . . .ffl^s,.. . ,m „)

m\

=

$i (m'n,/n's2,... ,m\,,. . . ,mSI)
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with similar equations for each of the n monads. Here the
letters &, £,, etc. astride the bracket in each case represent
the characteristic mode of combination in each monad of the
various factors into a single total state. The whole history of
the Monad M, will be a continuous series of such total states
as m\, producing each other without any influence from outside
in accordance with the law of development which God impressed
on the monad at its creation, and in consequence of the active
force of appetition with which he endowed it.13

Although such a system satisfies the conditions for a selfrepresentative system, it differs from a system of determining
correspondence in a number of respects. The most significant of these
are: (1) the members of Leibniz' system are simple substances; and,
(2) there are no direct inter-monadic relations which determine the
natures of the terms14 of the system. Unfortunately, these two
points of difference are based upon principles which, in the course
of our discussion in previous chapters, we have found reason to
reject. In Chapter 3 we argued that there are no simple substances.
And, in Chapters 5 and 6 we argued that the rejection of simple
substances involves a contradiction, unless we assume that the
content of the Universe forms a determining correspondence system i.e., unless there are direct relations between the parts of the
Universe which intrinsically determine, to some extent, the natures
of those parts.
The absence of any direct inter-monadic relations implies that,

although they may be said to be the elements of a self-representative
system, the monads are not constituents of a self-representative
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unity. The unity of the Universe determined by such a system is thus
no closer than the unity of an aggregate15.

10. If the Universe is a Primary Whole, then it satisfies the
conditions for a self-representative system. But it is a selfrepresentative system in virtue of the fact that it is a system of
determining correspondence. And this fact implies that each of its
Primary Parts has a system of relations between the members of a set
of its parts - the set of Secondary Parts of the First Grade - which

is homologous to a system of relations between the members of the set
of Primary Parts.

For the manner in which these secondary parts are determined by
determining correspondence will depend for each of them upon
three things - the fact that it is a secondary part of B [i.e.,
a Primary Part], and of the first grade, the fact that the
particular relation of determining correspondence is what it
is, and the fact that the primary part which is its determinant
has a certain nature. And the first two of the facts are, on
our present assumption, the same for every secondary part of
the first grade within B. All dissimilarities, therefore,
between the determined sufficient descriptions of these
secondary parts of B must correspond to dissimilarities between
the determinant sufficient descriptions of the primary parts,
and all similarities which exist between some, but not all, of
these sufficient descriptions of the secondary parts must
correspond to similarities between some, but not all, of the
sufficient descriptions of the primary parts. For such
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dissimilarities and exclusive similarities cannot be determined
by the two data which are the same for all the secondary parts
in question, and must therefore be determined by the only datum
which varies for the different secondary parts - that is, the
various primary parts to which they correspond. Since the
system of relations between B's secondary parts of the first
grade will correspond in this way to the system of relations
between the primary parts of the universe, it may be called
homologous to it. Not only will the parts of B correspond to
the parts of the universe, but some of the links which connect
them together will correspond to some of the links which
connect the primary parts together.16

The quality of having a set of parts, each member of which is
homologous to the whole, we may call the quality of self-reflection.

Any system which possesses this quality we may call a self-reflecting

system, and the kind of unity determined by the relations between the
members of such a system a self-reflee ting unity. The difference

between a self-representative unity and a self-reflecting unity might

be summarised by saying that each part of a self-representative unity
represents the whole, and that each part of a self-ref lecting unity
represents the nature of the whole.
In view of this distinction it might be suggested that the system
of Leibnizian monads is more appropriately described as a selfreflecting system, than a self-representative system. There is,
however, an important difference between the system of monads, and
the system of determining correspondence of substance. This consists

in the fact that the natures of the reflectant terms of a determining
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correspondence system are intrinsically determined by the natures of
the terms which they reflect17. And this implies that the system of
determining correspondence is a much closer unity than the system of
monads.

11. The assumption that the Universe is a self-ref lecting system
allows us to draw a further conclusion of importance. If we consider
the members of the set of Primary Parts, not severally or in

isolation, but in their existent relationships, then we will have the

Universe as it is in itself. Similarly, if we consider the members of
the set of Secondary Parts of the First Grade of any Primary Part in
their existent relationships, then we will have that Primary Part as
it is in itself. Now, insofar as the system of relations among the
members of the set of Secondary Parts is homologous to the system of
relations among the members of the set of Primary Parts, we may say
that each Primary Part reflects the Universe as a whole; and that,
insofar as the relations are determining correspondence relations,
each Primary Part reflects the nature of the Universe as a whole.
We may conclude, then, that the Universe is a self-ref lecting
unity if the conditions (a) to (d), as set out in Section 8 of this
chapter, are satisfied. But as McTaggart has argued in Chapter 31 of
The Nature Of Existence, the fact that the Universe is a determining
correspondence system is consistent with the denial of each and all
of these conditions. Are there, then, any considerations, other than
those of a strictly empirical kind, which, if taken into account,
might give us reason to believe that the Universe is, in fact, a
self-reflecting unity?
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12. In the Introduction I argued that neither cosmological nor
ontological knowledge can be reached by inductive reasoning. The
presumption, then, was that genuine metaphysical knowledge is
possible.
At this point, if, having reached certain conclusions about the
nature of the Universe, we found that the truth of these conclusions
is incompatible with the possibility of genuine metaphysical
knowledge, we would be faced with a dilemma: either genuine
metaphysical knowledge is not possible; or else the arguments which
we have used to reach these conclusions are unsound. Now, the
conclusion that genuine metaphysical knowledge is impossible is
incompatible with the assumption that the arguments which we have
used to reach that conclusion are sound, since some of the premisses
of those arguments profess to be instances of genuine metaphysical
knowledge. In general, we may say that any attempt to prove that

genuine metaphysical knowledge is not possible cannot, as Bradley has
argued13, be based upon assumptions about the nature of reality.
The conclusions which we have reached, insofar as the arguments
upon which they are based are sound, cannot, therefore, be
incompatible with the possibility of genuine metaphysical knowledge.
And if we take this fact into consideration, we can, I think,
conclude that the conditions (a) to (d) listed in Section 8 of this
chapter are satisfied, and that the Universe is, in fact, a selfreflecting unity. Any other conclusion, I would argue, is
incompatible with the possibility of genuine metaphysical knowledge
within a system of determining correspondence.
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13. The claim that genuine metaphysical knowledge is possible
might be understood to mean either (i) genuine ontological knowledge
is possible; (ii) genuine cosmological knowledge is possible; or,
(iii) both genuine ontological knowledge and genuine cosmological
knowledge are possible. Clearly, if we can establish the conditions
for both (i) and (ii), we will have established the conditions for
(iii).

14. Let us consider, firstly, the conditions which are necessary
for the possibility of ontological knowledge within a system of
determining correspondence. Ontological knowledge is knowledge of a

kind of characteristic, or of certain kinds of characteristics, which
belong to all existents. In order for such knowledge to be possible
it is essential that cognitive relations should exist between one
existent and all existents. If we assume that the determining
correspondence relations between the parts of the Universe within a
Primary Whole are cognitive relations, then ontological knowledge is
possible within a system of determining correspondence. But it is
only possible if the Universe is a single Primary Whole, and not a
Super-Primary Whole. The reason for this is that, in order for every

part of the Universe to be cognised by some given part, every Primary
Part must be both a determinant term of a determining correspondence
relation, and have every Primary Part as a member of its
Differentiating Group. And these two conditions, we have seen, can
only be satisfied if the Universe is a single Primary Whole.
If we assume that the determining correspondence relations are
cognitive relations, then we must also assume that these relations
are of the same kind. The characteristics of all existents are, we
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have argued, necessarily particular or item-specific. It follows
that, if we are to have knowledge of a kind of characteristic, then
such knowledge cannot be discursive - that is to say, it cannot
consist in knowledge of abstract universal entities. Now, since we
have assumed that there are only two general kinds of knowledge, the
discursive and the intuitive, and since we have concluded that
ontological knowledge can only be given by non-discursive knowledge,
if genuine ontological knowledge is to be possible within a Primary
Whole, then the cognitive relations between the parts within that
whole must be of the non-discursive or perceptual kind. That is to
say, the determining correspondence relations within the Primary
Whole must be of the same kind throughout.
We have seen, then, that if genuine ontological knowledge is to be
possible, then each of the conditions (a) to (d) for a selfreflecting system must be satisfied. The Universe must be a single
Primary Whole; every Primary Part within that whole must be a
determinant - i.e., every Primary Part must be an object of
cognition; the Differentiating Group of each Primary Part must
consist of every Primary Part, including itself; and, the determining
correspondence relations must be of the same kind throughout the
system. In other words, if genuine ontological knowledge is to be
possible, then the Universe must be a self-reflecting system.

15. If we now consider the conditions for the possibility of
genuine cosmological knowledge then we will see that such knowledge
is possible only if the Universe is a self-reflecting unity.
Cosmological knowledge is knowledge of the Universe as a whole.
Now, if we assume that the Universe is a Super-Primary Whole, and
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that the determining correspondence relations within that whole are
cognitive relations, then it is impossible for any proper part to
have a cognitive relation to the whole. In order for any proper part
to have a cognitive relation to the whole it is essential, as I
argued in Sections 10 and 11 of this chapter, that the whole be
reflected by that part. It is impossible, however, for the Universe
to be reflected in any of its proper parts unless the following

conditions are satisfied: (1) the Universe is a single Primary Whole;

(2) the part in question is a Primary Part; (3) Every Primary Part is
a determinant - i.e., is cognised by the part in question; (4) the
Differentiating Group of the Primary Part consists of every Primary
Part of the Universe; and (5) the cognitive relation is of the same

kind throughout the system. That is to say, cosmological knowledge is
possible within a determining correspondence system only if
conditions (a) to (d) are satisfied, and the Universe is a selfreflecting unity.

16. Having established the conditions under which both ontological
knowledge and cosmological knowledge are possible within a
determining correspondence system, we have thereby established the

conditions under which metaphysical knowledge is possible within such
a system. We have shown that metaphysical knowledge is only possible

within a determining correspondence system if the Universe is a selfreflecting unity.
But we have, I think, established more than this. We have shown
that, insofar as metaphysical knowledge is possible within a
determining correspondence system, then the Primary Parts of the
Universe have a status which is not shared by any other parts within
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that system. We have also established that the cognitive relations
between the parts of the Universe can only be of the intuitive or
perceptual kind. This implies that each Primary Part has a system of

cognitive relations among its parts which is homologous with a system
of relations among the Primary Parts themselves. And this is a
characteristic which is not shared by the members of any other sets
of parts within the Fundamental System.

17. Insofar as the Universe is a self-ref lecting system, it is a

much closer unity than is consistent with the kind of unity which our

everyday beliefs or perceptions might lead us to conclude that it is.
And this implies that there is a difference between the nature which
the Universe appears to have, and the nature which it actually has.
Although we are entitled to conclude that there is some difference
between the appearance and the reality, I do not believe that it is

possible, independently of empirical considerations, to determine the
precise extent of the difference. What we can conclude, however, at
this stage, is that the actual nature of the Universe must be
consistent not only with the possibility of metaphysical knowledge,
but with the possibility of there being a distinction between
appearance and reality. And this consideration, I would argue11,
implies that selves or minds are among the fundamental parts of the
Universe.
If we now consider the unique status of the Primary Parts within

the determining correspondence system, and their significance for the
possibility of metaphysical knowledge, then it seems to me that we
are justified in identifying these minds or selves with the Primary
Parts of the Universe. In which case we may conclude that the
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Universe is a Primary Whole, the content of which is divided among a
number of Primary Parts or minds, which perceive themselves, each
other, and the Universe as a whole, and which perceive nothing apart
from themselves, each other, and the Universe as a whole,

18. The conclusions which we have reached in this chapter are, as

might have been expected, similar to McTaggart's own. But there are a
number of significant points of difference. Even after taking
empirical evidence into account, McTaggart is unable to provide any
grounds for concluding that the Universe is a single Primary Whole,

rather than a Super-Primary Whole. Hence, he is unable to provide any
grounds for concluding that the Universe is a self-reflecting unity.
The Universe, on our view, is thus a much closer unity than either
our commonsense beliefs or McTaggart's metaphysics would suggest.
A related, but more significant point of difference is that,
insofar as McTaggart allows for the possibility that the Universe is
a Super-Primary Whole, as well as for the possibility that not every
Primary Part is a determinant, he undermines two of the conditions
which, we have argued, are essential for the possibility of
metaphysical knowledge within a determining correspondence system. A
metaphysical theory may provide us with grounds for believing that
the world is other than it appears to be. But if its conclusions are
incompatible with the possibility of our knowing that it is other
than it appears to be, then, even though it may be a source of
inspiration, it cannot be a source of conviction.
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NOTES

1.

The Fundamental System is a classification of the content of
the Universe into Primary Wholes, Primary Parts, Secondary
Parts of the First Grade, Secondary Parts of the Second Grade,
and so on. See The Nature Of Existence, Chapter 28.

2. McTaggart, The Nature Of Existence, §114.
3. We should distinguish the proposition that there can be a whole
wherein the entire nature of each member of a set of its parts
is intrinsically determined by the fact that it is a part of
that whole, from the proposition that there can be a whole
wherein the entire natures of some members of a set of its
parts are intrinsically determined by the fact that they are
parts of that whole. The former proposition is, I would
suggest, self-evidently false. The latter proposition might in
fact be false; but it is not self-evidently false.
4. Broad, Examination Of McTaggart's Philosophy, Vol.1, p.310.
5. McTaggart, The Nature Of Existence, §149.
6. It is interesting to note that this is the view of an organic
unity which McTaggart appears to have endorsed in the earlier
Studies In Hegelian Cosmology [§196]:
196. My contention has been, so far, that it is
useless and misleading to call any unity organic unless
we are prepared to maintain that it (and not merely
something at present contained in it) is an end to
itself, and to its own parts. Otherwise we shall include
among organic unities systems which exist as bare means
for the carrying out of ends which are indifferent, or
even hostile to the unity. To call such systems organic
would be improper, in the first place, because that word
has always been employed to denote a relatively close
unity, while such a use would extend it to all unities
whatever. Every aggregate of individuals which were not
absolutely isolated from each other, and in which the
connection was not reduced to the level of mere delusion,
would be classed as organic.
McTaggart's use of the adjective "organic" in The Nature Of
Existence to describe all unities of manifestation is, as he
himself admits [§154], not "without its inconveniences". One
such inconvenience is, as I have suggested, that it obliges us
to classify any whole as an organic unity - thus rendering the
concept of an organic unity uninteresting.
7. Kant, The Critique Of Teleological Judgment, Division 1, §2.
8. McTaggart, The Nature Of Existence, §145.
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There is evidence to suggest that McTaggart, himself, did not
adopt a genuinely teleological view of the concept of
Manifestation. In his discussion of Hegel's views on teleology
in the Commentary On Hegel's Logic [§258-261] he seems to
implicitly endorse the view, which he finds in Hegel, that the
categories of End and Means are not essentially teleological in the normal sense. Means and End are not, according to Hegel,
distinguishable entities. They are simply different aspects of
one and the same entity - the End is the aspect of unity, and
the Means the aspect of differentiation. The parts of an
organic unity might, in this sense, be described as the means
to an end - namely, the existence of the whole. And, in this
sense, they might be said to thereby "fulfil the function" of
manifesting the whole. But as McTaggart admits, such a view of
teleology differs significantly from the commonly accepted
view.
Hegel departs considerably from the common usage in
the meaning which he gives to the terms Teleology, End,
and Means. What is generally meant by Teleology is what
Hegel calls "finite and outward design", in which some
independently existing object is used by some selfconscious being as a means for carrying out some plan
which he has conceived. In "outward design" the Means and
the End can exist independently; for the End can exist in
the mind of the designer, even if there are no available
Means to carry it out, while the objects which are used
as Means do not derive their entire existence from that
use, but may have existed before the End was formed, and
might still have existed, if the End had never been
formed. [A Commentary On Hegel's Logic, §252]
The relations between the members of S and the members of R
must, of course, belong to the same kind.
It might be argued that Dedekind, himself, did not consider it
to be a specifically mathematical concept, since the example he
gives of an infinite - i.e. self-representative - system is
that of one's own realm of thoughts.
66. Theorem. There exist infinite systems.
Proof.* My own realm of thoughts, i.e., the totality S of
all things, which can be objects of my thought, is
infinite. For if s signifies an element of S, then is the
thought s', that s can be object of my thought, itself an
element of S. If we regard this as transform 0(s) of the
element s then has the transformation 0 of S, thus
determined, the property that the transform S' is part of
S; and S' is certainly proper part of S, because there
are elements in S (e.g. , my own ego) which are different
from such thought s' and therefore are not contained in
S'. Finally it is clear that is a,b are different
elements of S, their transforms a', b' are also
different, that therefore the transformation 0 is a
distinct (similar) transformation (26). Hence S is
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infinite, which was to be proved. [Dedekind, Essays On
The Theory Of Numbers, p.64.]
The metaphysical significance of this proof is highlighted
in Josiah Royce's essay "The One, The Many, And The Infinite" included as a supplementary essay in The World And The
Individual, First Series.
12. Leibniz, The Monadology, §14.
13. Broad, Leibniz, p.95.
14. The natures of the monads are determined by God at the moment
of their creation. Each successive state of the monad is
completely determined by the preceding state in accordance with
a general principle of immanent causation or appetition which, in the self-conscious monads which Leibniz calls
"souls", appears as a conscious striving. Although the states
of each monad
correspond
to each other monad, the
correspondence is determined by a pre-established harmony
rather than a direct relation of causation or intrinsic
determination.
15. This does not mean that the unities within the Universe, i.e.,
the monads, are not close. Insofar as each member of the
infinite series of successive states of the monad is
intrinsically determined by the preceding state, the unity of
the monad might be said to be very close. The infinite
complexity within each monad is not, however, an infinite
complexity of parts, but an infinite complexity within its
nature.
The plausibility of such a view ultimately depends upon the
assumption
that
there
are
no
incompatible
simple
characteristics predicable of a monad. But this assumption
seems to be inconsistent with the assumption that some states
of the monad precede others. If we assume that m\ is the total
state of a monad Mt at a moment of t ime, t, then the
characteristics of being precedent to m\ and being preceded by
m\ are predicable of M,. But they also, presumably,
incompatible characteristics - that is to say, they can only be
true of different states of the monad, insofar as these states
are among the monad's different parts, and not among its
different characteristics.
16. McTaggart, The Nature Of The Universe, §281.
17. The natures of the monads might be said to be intrinsically
determined by the nature of their Creator, rather than the
natures of the terms which they reflect,
18. F.H. Bradley, Appearance And Reality, Introduction. Whether or
not any such attempt must, as Bradley argues, be based upon
such assumptions, and is therefore self-defeating, is a
question which I do not attempt to answer.
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19.

I have argued for this conclusion in Chapters 2 and 3 of my
M.A. thesis, Studies In Bradley's Metaphysics, University of
Wollongong, 1985.
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AT»F»ENnZ>IX

1

McTaggart " s Immaterial ism — A
Reply To Nathan

1. In a paper entitled "McTaggart's Immaterial ism"1, N.M.L. Nathan
has argued that McTaggart's attempt to construct a mentalist or

immaterialist metaphysic breaks down at a crucial stage in his theory
of the Determining Correspondence of Substance. He states explicitly
where he thinks McTaggart's argument breaks down, and then, rather
than simply dismissing McTaggart's conclusion, claims to provide a

better argument for immaterial ism. In this reply to Nathan's article
I will argue, firstly, that McTaggart's argument does not break down
in the way in which Nathan claims that it does; and, secondly, that
he has not provided us with a better immaterialist argument.

2. According to Nathan there are two premisses which are of
central importance in McTaggart's theory of Determining
Correspondence. The first is that substance is infinitely divisible
or infinitely partitioned. The second is that the nature of a
substance must imply, without including, sufficient descriptions of
each of its infinitely numerous parts2.
Nathan is prepared to accept the truth of the first premiss given two assumptions. The first of these assumptions is that
substances have a temporal dimension, and therefore have temporal
parts. The second is that the terms of a series of temporal parts of
a substance form a dense or compact series - according to which,
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between any two terms of the series there is another term. He
acknowledges3, however, that these are not McTaggart's own reasons
for accepting the principle that substance is infinitely divisible.
We cannot, therefore, object to McTaggart's actual argument on the
assumption that may involve the perhaps erroneous view that
substances have a temporal dimension.
It is the second premiss, then, which, according to Nathan, marks
the point at which the argument breaks down. This premiss involves
two distinct principles. The first is that every substance, hence
every part of every substance, has a sufficient description. The
second is that the nature of a substance must imply, without

including, such a description in each of its parts. Each of these two
principles is discussed by Nathan. Again, he accepts the first, but
rejects the second as probably false.
Since Nathan accepts the validity of the principle of sufficient
descriptions I will not discuss that principle here. I believe that
it is true, and that it can be demonstrated to be true. But for the
sake of the present discussion I will simply assume that the
principle is true.

3. This leaves us with the second principle - that the nature of a
substance must imply, without including, sufficient descriptions of
each of its infinitely numerous parts. Nathan criticises this
principle on two grounds. The first is that, even if we accept the
principle as true, there are theories other than the theory of
Determining Correspondence which satisfy the conditions which it

imposes. The second is that the principle is not proven to be true by
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McTaggart. I will now consider each of these criticisms and argue
that they are unjustified.

4. Let us begin with the claim that McTaggart has not proven the
principle to be true. Nathan does not make it entirely clear why he
believes that McTaggart has failed to prove the principle. He seems
to rely exclusively upon a criticism which he attributes to John
Wisdom.

But, as Wisdom again saw, the trouble begins further back.
McTaggart does not prove that the nature of an infinitely
partitioned substance must imply rather than merely include
sufficient descriptions of all its parts. McTaggart thought
that if the nature of an infinitely partitioned substance
merely included sufficient descriptions of its parts, then
there would be no description of that substance which was
adequate but no more than adequate for the purpose of giving
sufficient descriptions of all its parts, no minimum adequate
description for that purpose. And he took it as evident that
given any description which is adequate for a certain purpose,
there is a minimum adequate description for that purpose. But
that principle seems evident only so long as we do not consider
the case in which our purpose is to give sufficient
descriptions of all the parts of an infinitely partitioned
substance. Suppose that each part of an infinitely partitioned
substance has a sufficient description. Then the whole
substance will have a sufficient description, each element of
which is a description of a description of a Set of Parts, and
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each element of which is entailed by some further element
consisting of a description of the parts of those parts. And
then, of course, each element in the description is
superfluous. If this seems odd, it is only because we are
unconsciously setting our standards by cases in which there are
only finite numbers of things to be described.4

There are two things which ought to be taken into consideration
when evaluating this criticism. The first is whether or not it
provides us with an accurate account of McTaggart's actual argument.
The second is whether, apart from the question of exegetical
correctness, the line of criticism is itself consistent or cogent. It
seems to me that Nathan's criticism fails on both counts.
In the first place, Nathan mentions only one of the arguments put
forward by McTaggart to show that the nature of a substance must
imply, without including, sufficient descriptions in each of its
parts. There are, in fact, three distinct arguments which McTaggart
uses to establish his conclusion. The first, which is to be found in

Sections 189 to 191 of The Nature of Existence, is a general argument
to show that the nature of a substance cannot presuppose* sufficient
descriptions in each of its infinitely numerous parts. The second,
which is to be found in sections 192 to 193, and which does not

profess to be conclusive, involves an appeal to the implausibility of

the assumption that sufficient descriptions of each of the infinitely
numerous parts of a substance can be determined independently of the
fact that the parts have a particular place in the series of
precedent and sequent sets of parts of the substance.
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The third argument, which is discussed by Nathan, involves the
concept of a Minimum Adequate Description, and is claimed to be
conclusive. Now in order to understand this argument correctly it is
essential that we understand the distinction which McTaggart draws
between precedent and sequent sets of parts of a substance. To
illustrate this distinction let us assume that we have two sets of
parts, S, and S2, of a substance, A. If no member of S2 falls within

more than one member of Si, and if at least one member of Sx contains

two or more members of S2, then S2 is said to be sequent to Sx, and Si
precedent to S2. Let us assume, for example, that we have a square
figure, A, which represents the substance A [Figure 1].
Let us then divide A into two halves, B and C. B and C form a set
of parts, {B,C} of A, since, taken together, they make up A, and no
more than make up A. Let us call this set of parts of A, S2. Now if

A
D
B

L.

E

Figure 1
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we divide C into two equal parts, D and E, we will have a further set
of parts of A, {B,D,E}. Let us call this set of parts of A, S2. It
follows that S2 is sequent to Sl} since no member of S2 falls within
more than one member of Slt and at least one member of Slt namely C,
contains more than one member of S2; and, accordingly, that Si is
precedent to S2.
I have dwelt upon the nature of this distinction at some length
because it is not a distinction which Nathan acknowledges in his
exegesis; and yet it is, I would maintain, an essential feature both
of McTaggart's argument to show that the nature of a substance must

imply sufficient descriptions in each of its parts, and of his theory
of Determining Correspondence.

5. Having considered the nature of the distinction between

precedent and sequent sets of parts of a substance we are, I believe,
in a better position to appreciate the cogency of McTaggart's
argument. I will now give my own account of that argument.
To understand, firstly, the concept of a Minimum Adequate
Description, we must understand that, according to McTaggart, a
description of a substance can be either adequate, or more than
adequate, for a particular purpose. For example, the description,

"The only Australian state which is surrounded by water", is adequate
for the purpose of providing an exclusive description of Tasmania. A

minimum adequate description is a description which is adequate for a
given purpose, but no more than adequate for that purpose - i.e. it
does not include any characteristics which are superfluous for the
given purpose. The description, "The only Australian state which is
surrounded by water, and the only Australian state which lies to the
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south of Victoria", is more than adequate for the purpose of

exclusively describing Tasmania; and we can obtain a minimum adequate
description for that purpose by omitting either of the conjuncts
which make up that description.
The next step in the argument is to point out that, for every
description which is adequate for a given purpose, there must be at
least one minimum adequate description for that purpose. The latter

will be either identical with the former, or else it will differ from

it by the omission of those characteristics which are superfluous for
the given purpose.
We are then asked to consider what could serve as a minimum
adequate description for the purpose of providing sufficient
descriptions of each member of the infinite number of precedent and

sequent sets of parts of a substance. McTaggart argues that it cannot

consist of sufficient descriptions of the members of any set of parts
which is precedent to some other set of parts, since sufficient
descriptions of the latter will imply sufficient descriptions of the
former. Hence, sufficient descriptions of the members of the
precedent set of parts are superfluous for the given purpose, and
cannot form part of the minimum adequate description for that
purpose. However, since we know that every set of parts is precedent
to some other set, sufficient descriptions of the former will always
be superfluous for the purpose, and cannot, for this reason, be

included in the minimum adequate description. This implies that there

cannot be a minimum adequate description for the purpose of providing

sufficient descriptions of each member of the infinite number of sets
of parts of a substance. But if we assume that the nature of a
substance can include, without implying, these sufficient
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descriptions, then there must be a description which is adequate for
the purpose of providing such descriptions. Hence there must be a

minimum adequate description for this purpose. And thus, as McTaggart
points out8, we have a contradiction.

6. In view of this account of McTaggart's argument it is difficult
to see that Nathan's claim7 that McTaggart does not prove that the
nature of an infinitely divisible substance must imply, rather than
simply include, sufficient descriptions of each of its parts, is
justified. The point of the argument which I have outlined above is
that if we assume that the nature of a substance supplies sufficient
descriptions of each of its parts by inclusion only, then we reach
the contradictory conclusion that a substance must have, and yet

cannot have, a minimum adequate description. McTaggart then concludes
that since the nature of a substance can supply sufficient
descriptions of each of its parts either by inclusion or by
implication; and, since it cannot, as we have seen, supply them by
inclusion only, it must imply them. The theory of the Determining
Correspondence of Substance is McTaggart's explanation of the only
way in which such descriptions can be supplied by implication.
It is equally difficult to justify Nathan's further claim that the

principle of Minimum Adequate Descriptions is evident only so long as
we do not consider the case in which our purpose is to give
sufficient descriptions of all the parts of an infinitely divisible

substance. It seems to me that this criticism simply misses the point
of McTaggart's argument. We have agreed that every substance, hence
every part of every substance, must have a sufficient description.
And it is clear that any substance can be sufficiently described by
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means of sufficient descriptions of the members of a set of its parts
- namely, as that whole which is made up of the parts with those
sufficient descriptions. It is also clear that a sufficient
description of a substance which is made up of sufficient
descriptions of the members of a set of parts of that substance will
be adequate for the purpose of providing sufficient descriptions of
each of those parts. Now such a description will either be adequate
for that purpose, or more than adequate for that purpose. If it is
adequate, but no more than adequate for that purpose, it will be a
minimum adequate description for the purpose of providing sufficient
descriptions of the members of a set of parts of the substance.
Hence, every substance must have a minimum adequate description for
the purpose of providing sufficient descriptions of the members of
any set of its parts. And if it must have a minimum adequate
description for that purpose, it follows that it must have a minimum
adequate description for the purpose of providing sufficient
descriptions of the members of each of its sets of parts. Every
substance must, therefore, have a minimum adequate description for
the purpose of providing sufficient descriptions of each of its
parts. Whether or not the substance is infinitely divisible does not
affect the validity of this principle.
A problem does arise, however, when we realise that the parts of
an infinitely divisible substance can be ordered in terms of
precedent and sequent sets of parts. Since every substance can be
sufficiently described by means of sufficient descriptions of the
members of a set of its parts, and since the sufficient descriptions
of the members of a set of parts which is sequent to some other set
imply sufficient descriptions of the members of the precedent set,
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sufficient descriptions of the members of any set of parts of the
substance which is precedent to some other set will always be more

than adequate for the purpose of providing sufficient descriptions of

each of the parts of the substance - hence they cannot be included in
the minimum adequate description for that purpose. But if we accept
that every substance is infinitely divisible, it follows that every
set of parts is precedent to some other set of parts. Thus,
sufficient descriptions of the members of no set of parts can be
included in the minimum adequate description for that purpose. The
substance cannot, therefore, have a description which is adequate,
but no more than adequate, for the purpose of providing sufficient
descriptions of each of its parts - i.e. it cannot have a minimum
adequate description for that purpose.
The essential point of the above discussion is that the principle

of minimum adequate descriptions is valid independently of whether we
assume that a substance is infinitely divisible; and the cogency of
McTaggart's argument derives from the premiss that the sets of parts
of an infinitely divisible substance can be ordered in terms of

precedence and sequence. Unfortunately, this premiss is not discussed
in Nathan's paper. His exegesis and subsequent criticism of the
argument suffer, I would suggest, for this reason.

7. It might be pointed out that we reach a contradiction only if
we assume that the nature of a substance must supply sufficient
descriptions of each of its parts by inclusion only. And this is,

indeed, the conclusion which McTaggart claims we must reach. To avoid

this contradiction we must, therefore, assume that each substance has
a minimum adequate description, and that this description is capable
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of supplying sufficient descriptions of the members of each of its
sets of parts by implication, rather than by inclusion only. As
McTaggart concludes in Section 194 of The Nature of Existence:

A chain of implications must run downwards from precedent sets
to sequent sets, such that sufficient descriptions of the
members of the precedent set imply sufficient descriptions of
the members of the sequent sets. In this case the inclusion of
the description of the precedent set will render inclusion of
the descriptions of the sequent sets unnecessary, since they
can be deduced from it. And thus the minimum adequate
description of A which is adequate for providing sufficient
descriptions of all its parts will be the description of the
precedent set, from which the chain of implications starts.

8. Having argued that McTaggart's argument to show that the nature
of a substance must imply sufficient descriptions in each of its
parts does not break down in the way in which Nathan claims it does,
I will now consider the claim that there are theories other than the
theory of Determining Correspondence which satisfy the condition of
implication.
Nathan mentions two such theories. The first is a theory which he
attributes to CD. Broad. The second is John Wisdom's Method of
Echoes. I will now consider each of these theories, and argue that
neither ultimately satisfies the condition of implication.

9. Let us begin with Broad's theory. Although this theory is
ultimately rejected by Nathan himself, an independent discussion of
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the theory is, I believe, justified for two reasons. Firstly,
Nathan's criticisms are based upon two principles, the revised
principles of Infinite Partition and Sufficient Descriptions, which
might not have been accepted by either Broad or McTaggart. And the
failure to accept either or both of these revised principles would
render those criticisms somewhat doubtful. Secondly, apart from
Nathan's discussion, Broad's theory has not received any critical
attention since it was originally published in 1933. An independent

discussion of this theory might dispel any impression that, with this
example, Broad has refuted McTaggart's theory.
Broad claims that McTaggart's condition of implication can be

satisfied by an example which (a) is not a determining correspondence
system; and (b) satisfies the condition in the case of a substance

which has spatial and/or temporal dimensions - i.e., in the case of a

material substance. The example we are asked to consider is that of a
finite straight line, AB, which has a sufficient description, 0,
determined independently of sufficient descriptions of its parts. AB
is divided into two adjoining parts, AX and XB. AX is red, and XB is
blue. If we call these parts Pi and P2 respectively, then Px can be
sufficiently described as "the longest red part of the line which is

the only instance of 0", and P2 as "the longest blue part of the line

which is the only instance of 0". Pi and P2 make up a set of parts of

AB, P\

Now we can get a series of sequent sets of parts of P [i.e. AB]
in the following way. P3 is to consist of the adjoined halves
AU and UX of P, and the adjoined halves XV and VB of P2. Call
these respectively P„, P12, P,,, and P22. Then P3 is the group of
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which these are the only members. P3 and subsequent sets will
be constructed on precisely the same plan. We have now got an
endless series of sequent sets of parts of P.1

Broad then claims that sufficient descriptions of the members of
each sequent set of parts of AB are implied by the sufficient
descriptions of Pi and P2 in the following way.

Take Pn. This can be exclusively described as the half of P
which is co-terminous with both P and P2. On substituting in
this the sufficient descriptions of P and P2 we shall get a
sufficient description of Pi2. Plt will be sufficiently
describable as "that half of the longest red part of the line
which is the only instance of 0 which is co-terminous both with
the longest blue part of this line and with the longest red
part of it". Pu can be exclusively described as the half of P
which is co-terminous with Pt but not with P2. This exclusive
description can be made into a sufficient description by the
same means as before. In the same way, mutatis mutandis, Pu and
Pn, the remaining members of P, could be sufficiently
described in terms of the sufficient descriptions of P and P2.
Now consider a member of P3, e.g., Pu2. This can be exclusively
described as that half of Pu which is co-terminous with both
Pu and Pi2. Since Pn and Pn have already been sufficiently
described in terms of the sufficient descriptions of P and P2,
we can get a sufficient description of Pm by substituting
these sufficient descriptions of Pu and P12 in the above
description. And so P112 will be sufficiently described in terms
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of the sufficient descriptions of P, and P2. It is quite clear
that in this way any member of any term in the series could be
sufficiently described, that the descriptions would involve six
and only six characteristics, viz., 0, red, blue, longest, half
of, and co-terminous with; and that the derivation follows a
general rule."

10. There are a number of reasons why this example fails to

satisfy McTaggart's condition of implication. The first is that Broad

has not, I think, distinguished two senses in which a description, 0,

might be said to imply sufficient descriptions of each member of each
set of parts of a substance. In the first sense, which we might call
the analytic sense, 0 might be said to imply such descriptions only
insofar as it implicitly or explicitly includes such descriptions.
For example, "0" might be the name of a compound characteristic
comprising the characteristics A,B, and C - where A,B, and C are
sufficient descriptions. And if we assume that A,B, and C are
sufficient descriptions of the members of a set of parts of a

substance with the sufficient description, 0, then 0 might be said to

imply these descriptions of the members of a set of its parts in much

the same way that the description of a substance as chequered implies
that at least two of its parts have contrasting colour descriptions.
In the second sense, which we might call the synthetic sense, a
description, 0, of a substance might be said to imply sufficient
descriptions of each part of that substance only insofar as it does
not include these descriptions among its parts or elements. It is in
this sense that the characteristic of being coloured implies the
characteristic of being spatially extended.
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Now, I maintain that in Broad's example, the description of AX and

XB as "the longest red part of the line which is the only instance of
0", and as "the longest blue part of the line which is the only
instance of 0", respectively, imply sufficient descriptions of the

members of each of the sets of parts of AB in the analytic sense only
i.e., in the sense that they implicitly include such descriptions
among their parts or elements. I would further maintain that we are
able to derive such descriptions in accordance with a general rule

only because the sufficient descriptions of the members of any set of
parts imply sufficient descriptions of the members of any precedent
set of parts. In other words, the initial descriptions of AX and XB
imply that there are sufficient descriptions of the members of each
of their sets of parts without directly implying the determinate
nature of any particular part. That is to say, the initial

descriptions presuppose sufficient descriptions of the members of any
sequent set of parts. But in the case of an infinitely divisible
substance, such as the 1 ine AB, the fact that the nature of that
substance presupposes sufficient descriptions of the members of any

set of its parts leads to a contradiction, as McTaggart points out in
Sections 189-191 of The Nature of Existence.

11. I would further suggest that Broad's proposed alternative
example was more or less anticipated by McTaggart. In Section 356 of
The Nature of Existence we find the following points being made.

.. it is clear that the spatial qualities of the members of a
set of parts imply the spatial qualities of the whole of which
they are a set of parts. If we know the shape and size of each
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one of a set of parts of A, and their position relatively to
each other, we know the shape and size of A On the other
hand, the size, shape, and position of the whole implies that
it has parts which have size, shape, and position - for
otherwise it could not be divided into parts in respect of its
spatial dimensions. And if does not also imply what the size,
shape, and position of these parts are, it presupposes them. We
shall thus have an infinite series of terms, in which the
subsequent terms imply the precedent, while the precedent
presuppose the subsequent. And, as was shown in Section 191,
such a series will involve a contradiction, since every term in
it will have a presupposition, and yet will have no total
ultimate presupposition.

The conclusion to be drawn, then, is that unless the parts of a
spatial whole are differentiated by characteristics which are other
than spatial, then the nature of that whole presupposes sufficient
descriptions of these parts - and this, as we have seen, leads to a
contradiction. So, unless each of the parts of AB are differentiated
by non-spatial characteristics, AB will presuppose, rather than

imply, such descriptions. Now, as we have assumed that only two parts
of AB - viz. AX and XB - are differentiated by non-spatial
characteristics, we must conclude that AB does presuppose sufficient
descriptions of the members of each of its sets of parts which are
sequent to the set {AX,XB}. And, since it presupposes these
descriptions, it cannot imply them. Hence, Broad's example fails to
satisfy McTaggart's condition of implication.
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It remains only to point out, in reply to Nathan's proposed
revision of this example, that similar objections can be made,

mutatis mutandis, to the attempt to derive sufficient descriptions of
the parts of a temporal, rather than a spatial, whole.

12. There is a further problem with Broad's example. The example
involves the assumption that the substance P (i.e. the line AB) is
spatially extended, that it has a spatial dimension. Now it is

essential, if a series of sufficient descriptions of all its parts is

to be generated, that it have only one dimension - i.e., it must have
length but no breadth. If it has breadth as well as length, then any
member of the hierarchy of sets of parts of P will be divisible
through each of two different dimensions; and, while Broad's example

might provide sufficient descriptions of the parts of P which make up
one dimension, viz. length, it will not provide sufficient
descriptions of those parts of P which make up another dimension,

viz. breadth. Unfortunately, the fact that P and P2 are coloured, and
the fact that these qualities enter into their sufficient
descriptions, as well as into the sufficient descriptions of the
members of all sequent sets of parts of P - e.g. P, P\ and P3,
implies that P must have both length and breadth. Colour, as Broad
himself points out elsewhere10, is an extensible quality; and any
substance which has such an extensible quality must occupy at least
two dimensions - i.e. it must have an area. However, since Broad's
method provides sufficient descriptions of the parts of P throughout
only one dimension, it fails to provide sufficient descriptions of
all the parts of P. It therefore fails to provide us with an example
which satisfies McTaggart's condition of implication.
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It might be suggested that, even though P has an infinite number
of parts in one dimension, the fact that these parts have an area

does not imply that they are not sufficiently describable unless the
are divisible throughout that other dimension. Now, this suggestion
might seem plausible if that other dimension of P were other than a

spatial dimension. But this is not the case with P, since the second
dimension which it occupies is a spatial dimension; and if it is
infinitely divisible throughout one spatial dimension, it must be
infinitely divisible throughout the other.
Finally, it might be suggested that any coloured substance must be
made up, not of infinitely divisible coloured areas, but of finite,
indivisible, coloured areas. But this suggestion is contrary to the

initial hypothesis that P is infinitely divisible, and that it has a
infinite number of parts.

13. If we now consider the second proposed alternative to
McTaggart's theory of Determining Correspondence, John Wisdom's
Method of Echoes, we shall see that it, too, fails to satisfy the
condition of implication - although for quite different reasons.
The suggestion is this. Let A be a substance which has a set of
parts, a, the members of which have the sufficient descriptions

0i..0,. Below a there is a series of sets of parts of A, Z, such that
each member of the series is immediately below the precedent term.

Each set of parts in Z has the quality •. There are two qualities Xi
and Xi which echo down the series.

.. this means that if you take any set of parts olt in the
series and the set of parts o2 immediately below it and take x
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any member of Oj and y and z the two members of o2 which are
parts of x, then y has Xi > and not Xi, and z has Xi and not Xi<
Let us express all this by saying that A has an Echoing
Quality.... Any echoing quality is an indicator. For any member
x of any set of parts in Z will have a quality such that (i)
its application is entailed by the fact that something has Q,
the echoing quality which A has; and (ii) it is a sufficient
description.
For let x be any member of the set of parts, ft, next below
a. Then x has the compound quality q of being (a) a part of the
thing which has 0,.,, (b) having Xi (or, if not, X2). and (c)
being a member of the set of parts which has if, and is next to
the set of parts (viz. , a), described by 01...0,. That q applies
to something is entailed by "A has Q". Further if Q is an
echoing quality q applies to only one thing. For any member of
ft other than x is either also a part of the member of a of
which x is a part or not. If it is it has Xi and not Xi- If it
is not it not part of what has 0,.,. Similarly, let y be a
member of y and a part of x. Then y has the compound quality,
q', of (a) being a part of the thing which has q, and (b)
having Xi (or, if not, Xi). and (c) roughly, being a member of
the second set of parts from a which has if.n

14. The objection to this method of attempting to satisfy the

condition of implication is, it seems to me, quite obvious. The fact
is that q, the quality of x which is implied by Q, the echoing

quality of A, is not a sufficient description of x. And there are tw
reasons why it is not a sufficient description of x. Firstly, q is
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applicable to more than one member of ft, the set of parts of A of

which x is a member. The reason why it is applicable to more than one

member of ft is that, insofar as it is a quality of x which is implie
by Q, it is a disjunctive quality. Strictly speaking, x has the

quality q' of (a) being a part of a thing which has 0,.,; (b') having

Xi or Xi; (c) being a member of the set of parts of A which has f, an
is next to the set of parts which have the sufficient descriptions
0i...0,. The important difference is the difference between (b) and

(b'). The fact is that Q implies the disjunctive quality (b4'), but it

does not imply which member of the disjunction x in fact has. Rather,

Q presupposes that x is Xi or that it is Xz - which ever it, in fact,
is. And unless Q implies one or the other of these two qualities, x
will not have a sufficient description implied by Q. Hence Q cannot
be, in Wisdom's sense, an indicator. But if it is not an indicator,
then the Method of Echoes will not satisfy McTaggart's condition of
implication.
The second reason why Q is not a sufficient description of x is
that (c) can only be an exclusive description of a set of parts of A
if (i) the series, Z, is a discrete, rather than a compact or dense
series; and (ii) every member of Z is either directly above or
directly below, some other member. Now, Wisdom makes both of these

assumptions. There is, however, given the premiss that all substances
are infinitely divisible, no reason to accept either. If we assume

that below is equivalent to sequent, then the series of sets of parts
of any substance, when ordered in terms of the relations of
precedence and sequence, is a compact series - i.e. between any two

terms in the series there will always be another term. And if it is a
compact series, then there will be no set of parts of A which can be
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exclusively described as "next below" some given set - in which case
(c) cannot be either an exclusive or a sufficient description of a
set of parts of A. Hence q cannot be a sufficient description of x.
Furthermore, even if the series of sets of parts of A were discrete,
it would not follow that, for any two given sets of parts, one must
be below or above the other. Consider the line AB below [Figure 2].
Let us assume that it has a set of parts {AX,XB}, and "below" that
two sets of parts {AD,DX,XE,EB} and {AF,FX,XG,GB}. Let us call the

first set Si, and the two sets below Sl5 S2 and S, respectively. Each

of these last two sets is directly below Si, since there is, we will
assume, no set of parts of A below Si which has members which are

parts of the members of Slt and which has fewer members than either S

or S3. But neither S2 nor S, is below the other. The description "the

A.
I

D

JF

I

I

X. O
I

I

E
1

B
1

Figure 2

set of parts of A immediately below Si" will thus apply to both S2 an
S3. Hence it cannot be either an exclusive or a sufficient

description of a member of Z, the series of sets of parts of AB. But
unless it is either an exclusive or a sufficient description of a
member of Z, q cannot be a sufficient description of x.
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Thus the Method of Echoes does not satisfy McTaggart's condition
of implication.

15. Having argued that neither Broad nor Wisdom has provided us
with an alternative theory which satisfies McTaggart's condition of
implication, I will now consider whether Nathan, himself, has put
forward a sound alternative to the theory of Determining
Correspondence as the basis of a mentalist or immaterialist
metaphysic.

16. In Section 3 of his paper Nathan argues that nothing but a
self is capable of satisfying his revised principles of Infinite
Partition and Sufficient Description. And these principles, he
maintains, must be satisfied by any existent substance. This, in
brief, is the basis of his argument for immaterial ism.
It is clear, then, that unless we accept these revised principles,

Nathan's argument is inconclusive. So, what are these principles, and

what reasons are given for accepting them? The following statement of
the principles is to be found on page 452.

[We must say first] that every entity has temporal parts which
it still would have had even if nothing other than that entity
and its parts existed, and second, that those entities which
are temporal parts would still have had sufficient descriptions
even if nothing had existed other than the wholes of which they
are immediate parts.13
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We are given two reasons why we ought to accept these principles.
The first is that, by accepting them, we are able to circumvent
Broad's proposed alternative theory. The second is that the

principles are independently reasonable. Regarding the first of these
reasons, I have argued above that Broad has not presented us with a
sound alternative which satisfies the condition of implication. So,

by rejecting Broad's theory on independent grounds we need not accept
Nathan's revised principles in order to avoid his criticisms.

17. Regarding the second of these reasons, it is not clear what
Nathan means by describing the principles as "independently
reasonable". They can hardly be considered self-evident - since
neither Broad nor McTaggart would have accepted them. But we are not
given any other reason why we should accept them. Furthermore, I
believe that the principles are demonstrably false. My reason for
saying this is as follows.
Let us assume that we have a substance, A, which has a temporal
dimension - i.e. which has temporal parts, B and C. B and C, we will
assume, in accordance with Nathan's revised principles, depend upon
no substance other than A for their existence. Let us now assume, in
accordance with the principle of infinite divisibility, that B and C
have temporal parts. Let {D,E} be a set of parts of B, and let {F,G}
be a set of parts of C. Now, since B depends upon the existence of A

- the whole of which it is a part - for its existence, B depends upon
C, the other part which makes up A, for its existence. But B itself

is a whole, made up of the parts D and E. Therefore D and E can exist
independently of any substance other than B, the whole of which they
are parts. That is to say, B, which is made up of D and E, can exist
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independently of C - which contradicts our initial assumption. And so
we have shown, by reductio ad absurdum, that the principles are
false.
The only way of trying to avoid this contradiction, whilst
adhering to Nathan's principles, is to assume that every substance,
hence every part of every substance, is an independent existent. But

the principle of infinite divisibility maintains that every substance
has parts. And since it is clear that a whole cannot exist
independently of its parts, no substance, therefore, can exist
independently of its parts. That is to say, every substance is
dependent upon some other substance for its existence. No substance,
therefore, is an independent existent.
In other words, unless we reject the principle of infinite

divisibility, and endorse some form of metaphysical atomism, Nathan's
revised principles must be rejected. But if we reject either the
principle of infinite divisibility, or Nathan's revised version of

that principle, we have no reason to accept the kind of immaterialist
metaphysic which he outlines in the concluding section of his paper.
I conclude, therefore, that Nathan has neither refuted McTaggart's
theory, nor provided us with a more satisfactory basis for a
mentalist or immaterialist metaphysic.

NOTES

1, N.M.L. Nathan, "McTaggart's Immaterial ism", Philosophical
Quarterly, Vol.41, No.165, 1991, pp.442-456.
2, Nathan, "McTaggart's Immaterial ism", p.443.
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Nathan, "McTaggart's Immaterial ism", p.443.
Nathan, "McTaggart's Immaterial ism", p.453.
There are a number of points which ought to be made concerning
the relation of presupposition. The first is that it is
essentially a relation between quality-instances, rather than
between qualities per se. The second is that it is a one-many,
rather than a one-two relation - i.e. there need not be only
two relata in any relationship of which it is a constituent.
The third is that the referent and relata in any such
relationship need not belong to one and the same substance.
McTaggart, The Nature of Existence, §194.
Nathan, "McTaggart's Immaterial ism", p.453.
CD. Broad, Examination Of McTaggart's Philosophy, Vol.1,
p.376.
Broad, Examination Of McTaggart's Philosophy, Vol.1, pp.376377.
Broad, Examination Of McTaggart's Philosophy, Vol.2, p.229.
Wisdom, "McTaggart's Determining Correspondence of Substance",
p.421.
Nathan, "McTaggart's Immateria1ism", p.452.
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D o e s

MeTa^^ar-t ' s

Pr-oof

Of

The

Unreality Of Time Involve An
Index i ca 1 Fa. 1 1 acy?

1. E.J. Lowe has argued that McTaggart's proof of the unreality
time involves an indexical fallacy1. Once this fallacy is made
explicit, and the correct indexical expressions substituted for

McTaggart's own descriptions of the nature of the time-series, t
reality of time as we know it - i.e. as involving change and an
series of events - is, according to Lowe, vindicated.

I will argue that McTaggart's argument does not, in fact, involv

such a fallacy; and, that the use of indexical expressions, such

those proposed by Lowe, does not resolve the contradiction which
McTaggart has uncovered.

2. The first question to be asked of Lowe is whether he has

provided us with an accurate restatement of McTaggart's argumen

basic structure of McTaggart's proof is outlined by Lowe on pag

of his article. The proof, according to Lowe, involves the follo
steps.

(1) Time essentially involves change.
(2) Change can only be explained in terms of A-series
expressions.
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(3) The use of A-series expressions involves a contradiction,
and so they cannot be predicated of reality.
(4) Therefore time is unreal.

For the sake of present discussion Lowe accepts (1) and (2), but

he disagrees with (3). He argues that the use of A-series expression
to describe time does not necessarily involve a contradiction; and
that, for this reason, McTaggart's argument is unsound.
I do not wish to criticise Lowe's account of McTaggart's argument
here other than by remarking that the contradiction which McTaggart
professes to find in time is not, as Lowe seems to suggest, to be
found merely in A-series expressions; and, that the terms past,
present, and future are not merely predicates which we use to
characterise events, but actual characteristics of the events
themselves2. The problem with time, according to McTaggart, lies not
simply in the way it is described, but in the very nature of the
temporal series itself. The importance of this point is that we do

not necessarily avoid the contradiction which McTaggart professes to

find in the time-series by changing the way we talk about or describ

that series. If the characteristics past, present, and future (a) are

essential to any genuine time series; (b) are genuinely incompatible;
and (c) actually belong to every member of that series, then we do
not avoid the contradiction thus generated by merely choosing an
alternative way of describing that series. If the time-series is

described as a P-series, for example, then we may appear to avoid the

contradiction involved in an A-series. But we do so only if the timeseries is not also an A-series.
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To illustrate this point let us consider the following example.

Three events JF/, E1 and F3, we will assume, form a time-series. Let P
be past, P2 be present, and E3 be future. The events thus form an Aseries. Accordingly, we may correctly describe these events by using
A-series expressions or predicates. But it is clear that these

events, in virtue of their forming an A-series, also form a P-series:

E1 is earlier than E1 and P5, P2 is earlier than £* and iater than E1,
and P1 is later than either p/ or E1. Now, if we describe our series

of events using only P-series expressions or predicates we may avoid
any explicit contradiction, such as that allegedly involved in the
use of A-series expressions or predicates. But we do not, thereby,
avoid the actual contradiction involved in the time-series. The
contradiction in the P-series, we may say, is in this case implicit.
With this qualification we can, for the sake of this discussion,
accept Lowe's account of the basic steps involved in McTaggart's
proof.

3. The second question to be asked of Lowe is whether he has, in
fact, uncovered a genuine fallacy in McTaggart's argument. And I
don't believe he has done this for the following reasons.
According to Lowe, the fallacy in McTaggart's proof arises from
the failure to acknowledge certain facts about the use of tenses and
indexical expressions when describing events in time. McTaggart, he
insists, has committed the obvious, if excusable, error of inferring
that, if an event is future, then it will be present.

Consider this: is it true to say of a future event that it will
be present (is 'present in the future')? One might on first

386
reflection be inclined to say yes, but in fact the answer is
surely no. What may be correct is something significantly
(though not unmistakably) different, namely, that if e is a
future event, then there will be a time when the sentence 'e is
present' is true (expresses a true statement). Similarly,
rather than saying of a past event e that it was present (or is
'present in the past'), we should at most say that the sentence
'e is present', though now false, was true. I shall suggest
that by emphasising distinctions like these we may avoid the
entanglements in which McTaggart tempts us to become ensnared.3

I believe that Lowe's "solution" is unsatisfactory. But before I
explain exactly why I believe that it is unsatisfactory I think we
should briefly consider McTaggart's reasons for claiming that every
event in a genuine time series does have each of the characteristics
past, present, and future; and that this fact involves a
contradiction.
McTaggart's proof of the unreality of time includes the premiss
that the characteristics past, present, and future are incompatible.
This premiss is based upon the conclusion, reached as the result of
the arguments to be found in Sections 307-324 of The Nature Of
Existence, that, unless the characteristics in question are
incompatible, there can be no real change and hence no real time.
Lowe does not directly question the truth of this premiss, and so I
will not defend it here. Having established this premiss, McTaggart
then points out that each of these characteristics can be predicated
of every event in a genuine temporal series'.
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If [an event] M is past, it has been present and future. If it
is future, it will be present and past. If it is present it has
been future and will be past. Thus all three characteristics
belong to each event.5

However, since the characteristics are incompatible, no event can
have them all. And thus, according to McTaggart, we have a
contradiction.

4. Let us now consider Lowe's reply to McTaggart's argument. His
reply, in effect, amounts to a denial of the truth of the premiss
that every event has each of the characteristics past, present, and

future. Lowe suggests that we can avoid the contradiction by denying

that a future event will be past or present; that a present event ha

been future and will be past; and that a past event has been present
and future. Instead, he suggests that we say, concerning some future
event F, for example, that the sentence "F is present", though now
false, will be true; and concerning some past event D, for example,
that the sentence "D is present", though now false, was true6.
But have we avoided a contradiction by adopting this strategy? I
suggest that the contradiction is merely transferred from events to

sentences, and, ultimately, to moments of time. I will now explain my
reason for saying this.
Let us consider the following statement which Lowe makes.

...the sentence 'e is present', though now false, was true.

388
On the face of it this statement commits Lowe to the view that
sentences can, and in this case do, have incompatible qualities,
viz., true and false. So we have not avoided a contradiction.
The obvious reply is to point out that no sentence has these
qualities simultaneously; it has them at different moments of time.

The sentence "e is present" is true at t, and false at t1, where t is
a past moment, and t1 is a present moment of time. Now, such a reply
might be acceptable if every moment of time is either merely past,
merely present, or merely future. But as McTaggart points out in

Sections 331-332 of The Nature of Existence, every moment, like ever
event, is past, present, and future. And so, in attempting to avoid
the ascription of incompatible qualities to events, we have,

following Lowe's strategy, involved ourselves in a new contradiction

The dilemma we have reached is clearly described by McTaggart in the
following passage.

The attribution of the characteristics past, present, and
future to the terms of any series leads to a contradiction
unless it is specified that they have them successively. This
means, as we have seen, that they have them in relation to
terms specified as past, present, and future. These again, to
avoid a like contradiction, must in turn be specified as past,
present, and future. And, since this continues infinitely, the
first set of terms never escapes from the contradiction at
all.'

In other words, the sentence "e is present" is not a "timeless"
truth - its truth is determined by the relation of token utterances
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to moments of time. But each moment of time is past, present, and
future; and if we attempt to avoid the contradiction involved in
ascribing these incompatible characteristics to each moment of time
we must stipulate that each moment has these characteristics
successively - i.e., in relation to terms which are past, present,
and future. The vicious regress of such a strategy is, I think,
obvious.
Now, if we attempt to avoid the contradiction thus generated
concerning moments of time in a way analogous to that in which Lowe
suggests we are, I maintain, no further ahead. Rather than saying

that every moment is past, present, and future, we might wish to say,
of a past moment, M, for example, that the sentence "M is present",

though now false, was true. But we are still faced with the fact that
the sentence in question bears incompatible truth values; and we can
only avoid contradiction by saying that it has these qualities
successively - i.e. in relation to moments which are past, present,
and future. And of course, as McTaggart has pointed out in the above
passage, we are thereby involved in a vicious infinite regress.

5. I have given one reason for believing that Lowe's strategy for
avoiding the ascription of incompatible qualities to events is
unsatisfactory. But there is another. Let us assume that there are
two simultaneous future events, P and P. Let one of these events, P,
be an utterance of the sentence "F is present". Now, since P is
simultaneous with P1, Fi is therefore true. In other words, P, an
event which is, ex hypothesi, a future event, is also, we are forced
to conclude, present. So, even if we do not appeal to the regress
generated by the ascription of incompatible truth-values to
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sentences, Lowe's strategy does not necessarily avoid a
contradiction.
Lowe might, of course, reply to this second objection, and,
incidentally, to the first, by denying that future or past events
have any reality or existence. And, in the final paragraph of his
article he does, in fact, mention such a view without actually

endorsing it. But this recourse would have two implications which, I
am sure, he would wish to avoid. The first is that reality or
existence would be reduced to the content of a durationless or
instantaneous present. It would not even be contained in a specious
present - since the specious present is generally assumed, by its
advocates, to contain past and present (and perhaps future) events.

The second is that, unless past and future, as well as present events

have a reality of some sort or in some degree, there simply cannot b

a time series. A series cannot exist unless the terms of that series
and their connecting relations, exist. Now Lowe might wish to deny
that time has a serial nature; but if he does the whole point of
paper seems lost. If he had been successful he in his strategy Lowe
would have shown that the use of A-series expressions does not
involve any contradiction. But if A-series expressions do not
describe the actual nature of time, what is the point in trying to

vindicate their use? A more fruitful course would have been to argue
that time is not constituted by an A-series of events; and that,

rather than being fallacious, McTaggart's proof is simply irrelevant
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NOTES

1. E.J. Lowe, "The Indexical Fallacy In McTaggart's Proof Of The
Unreality Of Time", Mind, 1987, pp.62-70.
2. I will use the term "characteristic" to cover relations and
qualities, including the relational qualities, of entities.
3. Lowe, "The Indexical Fallacy In McTaggart's Proof Of The
Unreality Of Time", pp.64-65.
4. Unless that term is the first or last of a bounded series.
5. McTaggart, The Nature Of Existence, §329.
6. Lowe, "The Indexical Fallacy In McTaggart's Proof Of The
Unreality Of Time", pp.64-65.
7. Lowe, "The Indexical Fallacy In McTaggart's Proof Of The
Unreality Of Time", pp.64-65.
8. McTaggart, The Nature Of Existence, §332.
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